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1 
I. INTSODOCnOB 
In recant years, both within the United States and abroad, problems 
associated with land have received an increased share of public atten­
tion* Land problems in the United-States, as elsewhere, have arisen 
largely from interrelationships between supply of land, population growth 
and the supply of capital. In the early history of the country, land 
problems centered around the disposition of the public lands. Late in 
the nineteenth century, however, moat of the public lands had been alien­
ated, Free and cheap land disappeared with the disposition of public 
land, BeginniDig farmers without capital to buy land acquired access to 
land resources through the rental process to an increasing extent. The 
existence of rent permits the separation of ownership and operatorship, 
and gives rise to a complex problem of dividing the return between the 
tenant and the landlord. Rental arrangements which are influenced 
appreciably by what is customary look backward rather than forward and 
do not adjust readily to the dynamic changes of prices, costs and pro­
duction, Landlords and tenants are frequently searching for ways and means 
to adjust their rents to changing farming conditions. This problem of 
rent adjustment is of importance to the consumers of all products, not 
merely the landlord and tenant alone. If either party receives more than 
the productivity of his contribution the physical output in the aggregate 
will be reduced. This study pertains to the problem of adjusting this 
division of retiarns to current prices, costs, and production. 
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A, Importance and fiethods of Renting 
The majority of Iowa farmers rent part or all of the land thoy 
operate. In terms of nxanbers, this aeans that of the 203,159^ farmera 
in the state, 107,765, or 53.0 per cent, till land owned by aomoone 
else (Table l); of these renters, 38 per cent rent all of their land and 
15 per cent own part and rent the remainder of the land they opejrate. In 
O 
terns of area, 18,109,901 acres in loxm are rented,*^ This rented area 
accounts for 52,9 per cent of the total farm land area of the atate. 
An important part of the agricultural output of Iowa is produced 
on rented land. If the land of the state were perfectly homogeneous with 
respect to production, it would be reasonable to expect that at least 52.9 
per cent (the proportion of rented land of the total land area) of the 
total output would be produced upon rented land. Under this assumption, 
rented farms accounted for ^ 1,125,950,580 of the 12,128,451,000^ of agri­
cultural products produced in the state in 1950. This is probably a con­
servative estimate as a higher proportion of renting exists on the more 
fertile lands which contribute relatively more to the agricultural pro­
duction. 
A large number of people are involved in rental arrangements. Al­
together around 215,000 landlords and tenants participate in the 107,000 
lu. S. Census: 1950, Preliminary Releases. Farm, farm character-
istios, farm products. State of Iowa and all counties. (42000-42099) 
series AC50-1. 1951. 
^Ibid. 
®n. S. Dept. of Agriculture. Agricultural statistics, 1950, Wash., 
D. C., U. S. Govt. Print. Off. 1951. p. 641. 
Table 1. Proportion of lom Fam Land Rented and Proportion of Iowa Farm Operators flho Kent All of 
Their Land, by Agricultural Area.® 
Area 
Per cent of 
all farm 
land rented 
Per cent of 
fam operators 
renting all or 
part of their 
land 
Per cent of 
fara operators 
rentinj; all of 
their land 
Per cent of 
fam operators 
ranting part of 
their land 
Western Livestock 59 59 44 15 
Cash Grain 62 61 46 15 
Northeast Daii*y 47 49 56 13 
Eastern Livestock 50 51 36 15 
Southern Pasture 41 43 26 17 
State 53 53 88 15 
^U. S. Censust 1950. 
of Iowa and all counties* 
Preliminary Releases* Farm, farm oharaoteristios, farm products. State 
(42000-42099) series AC50-1. 1*951. 
rental agreements in effect throughout the state. Of course, some land­
lords rent to more than one tenant. Similarly, some tenants rent from 
more than one landlord. A recent survey has shown that 25.4 per cent of 
i 
Iowa landlords rent out more than one farm and 6|.5 per cent rent more 
1 • . !' 
than two. All of these landlords and tenants have their income deter­
mined in some measure by the terms of a rental agreement. With the 
addition of non-operating managers and the members of the tenants' and 
landlords' households, the number of people concerned with the rental 
arrangement is considerably larger* 
Four basic plans of renting farm land are used in Iowa. These plans 
are the cash, crop-share-cash, stock-share and labor-share arrangements. 
According to the 1950 U. S. Agricultural Census, 16.8 per cent of Iowa 
tenants rented for cash;" 46*0 per cent wore rented under a crop-share 
Ijohn P« Timone and Raleigh Barlowe, Farm ownership in the midwest. 
Iowa Agr. Exp* Sta* Hes. Bui* 361, 1949* p. 914. 
2 Under the cash arrangement, the landlord receives a specific amount 
of cash determined in advance by agreement with the tenant. The landlord 
is responsible for the labor and materials used in the mintemnce of all 
improvements with the possible exception of some unskilled labor which the 
tenant nay provide* Ileal estate taxes and building insurance are paid by 
the l^dlord and all personal taxes and insurance on personal property are 
paid by the tenant* The landowner usually makes the long term contribu­
tions of lime and: grass seed* The tenant provides all labor and all cap­
ital with the exceptionsnoted above, and receives all of the gross re­
turns* The rent constitutes a lien against the crops^* The tenant's net 
return under the cash-plan-is the gross return less the cash rent and op­
erating costs. The landlord's net return is the cash rent,, determined be­
fore the prices, costs,'and production of the season are khoim, less the 
real estate expenses and'such other contributions he may make* The usual 
provisions of the most commonly used lease typies have been set forth by 
I. W. ^thiir. TOiich farm, lease shall 1 use? Iowa Para. Economist. 10, 
Ho* 7»12-13. July 1944.. 
5 
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arrangaaienit; 25.4 per cent were rented under a stock-share arrangement}* 
and 13.8 per cent ranted tinder a labor-share or some other plan,® 
^The true crop-share lease is rarely found, but the crop-share cash 
lease Is quite prevalent. The parties using this method agree in adranoe 
upon the ratio of the dirision of the crops growx upon the land rented 
on the shares. At the same time agreement is reached upon the cropland, 
the tenant usually agrees to pay a specified sum for the use of hayland, 
pasture, and buildings* The landlored assumes responsibility for taxes, 
insurance, building and fence maintenanoe, and may make some contribution 
toward seed and fertiliser. The tenant usually supplies all labor a^ 
all items of capital not furnished by the landlord. The landlord's net 
income under this plan is his share of the crops plus the cash rent less 
land ownership costs and the costs of his contribution to the crops. The 
tenant's net inoome is his share of the crops plus inoome from livestock 
operations less the cash rent and all operating coats not borne by the 
landlord. 
^The liTestock-share lease is identical to crop-share lease except 
in the manner in which the livestock and pasture are handled. Under the 
stock-share arrangement, the landlord furnishes part of the livestock and 
receives part of the gross return from the livestock operations. The 
tenant is not required to pay cash rent for hayland, pasture and buildings. 
The landlord's net inccnae is his share of the gross income less real 
estate OTmership costs less his contribution to the operating expenses. 
The tenant's net inoome is his share of the gross return less his shsire 
of the opeirating expenses. 
3 
The labor-share plan 1ms several variations and little is known 
about the details of the arrangements. A plan that is used, however, 
provides for the landlord to furnish all land and capital and pay all 
expenses. The tenant may receive a pre-determined share of the net re­
turns or a guaranteed minimum, whichever is greater. 
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6« ObjaotlTos and Nature of Rent and Rental Arrangements 
The term rent uaually refers to the payment to the ouner of the land 
for its use.^ This payment performs two functions in that it (l) allo­
cates land between its alternative uses and helps detemiine the eombin-
ation of land with other factors of production! and (2) contributes toward 
the distribution of the total product of the economy among the owners of 
the factors of production* 
In agriculture! rent is seldom paid for the use of land alone* De­
pending upon the lease type, the landlord may furnish various amounts of 
capital in addition to the land. Thus, the total payment to the landlord 
includes both land rent and a return on the landlord's capital* In case 
the landlord contributes management and labor, his income includes re-
turxxs from Idiese factors as well as returns from land and capital* As 
this amount is usually contracted ahead of the rental tem^ it may not 
be closely related to the economic conditions prevailing during the 
term of the lease* Once this rent is established, in terns of a fixed 
amount or share of products, it is possible to distinguish between two 
types of factors that influence the division of net returns between land­
lord and tenant* These may be classified as internal and external factors* 
The internal factors are the terns of the lease} for example, the 
^Hent does not at present have such a narrow connotation* The 
French have used it to indioate income assigxiable to any Icind of property) 
the Germans distinguish between ground rents and capital rents* English 
and American economists have used rent in connection with wages and con-
sus^tion* Richard T* Bly and George S* Wehrwein* Land economics. New 
York, The Maomillan Company. 1940* p. 117* 
diirislon of crops and llvestoolc, the amount of oash rent, the kinds and 
amounts of contributions and all other provisions which are negotiated 
between the contracting parties. 
The external factors are those for whioh provision is not made in 
the lease* Those are the factors, including prices, costs and production 
as influenced by natural conditions, which cannot be predicted with 
certainty and are not subject to the control of either party* As agri* 
culture operates in a competitive environment, the individual farmer 
cannot influence the price he receives for the products he markets. His 
costs are likewise determined in a market in which he as an individual 
has no control, but are an important factor in detenoining his net in­
come* Also, part of the variation in production steioning from weather, 
disease and pests is not controllable.^ 
Factors affecting the net incomes of laxidlords and tenants, and, 
consequently their division of net returns, appear in Table 2 for each 
lease type* It is not unreasonable to expect that while the lease pro­
visions form the internal variables for a given year, these provisions 
are in turn a partial function of external variables of previous years. 
^Production, to a certain extent, is controllable, but is influenced 
in part by factors such as weather conditions, crop and livestock disease, 
and unavoidable accidents* Technological developments in recent years, 
such as insecticides, watez^soluble plant nutrients, weed sprays, new 
plant strains and new vaccines, have given the famer increased control 
over output, but sane of the element of risk still remains* Depending 
upon the lease type this variation nay aUTfect the net income of the 
tenant only or both the incomes of the tenant and landlord* In either 
event, however, production variation affects the division of net returns* 
^On the assun^tion that the contracting parties tend to use prices 
lagged one year as an estimator of current prices* 
8 
Table 2* Factors Affecting Net Return of Landlord and Tenant Under Each 
Lease Type* 
Factor 
Internal Sxteroal 
Fixed 
costs 
"Set Lease LiTestock Grain Operating (real 
inooiae provision prices prices costs estate) Production 
Cash 
Tenant 
Landlord 
X 
X 
X X 
Cjrop-share 
Tenant 
Landlord 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X X 
X 
Stock^share 
Tenant X 
Landlord X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X X 
X 
X 
9 
Thus, when a rental oontraot is made the net return of each party and the 
ratio of these net returns is a function of the past external forces as 
well as internal factors. 
C. Problems Arising from Failure of Rent to 
Adjust to £conomio Changes 
Since factors affecting the division of net returns do not change in 
the same proportions» the division of net returns under each lease type 
could be expected to be affected differently by a given sat of price, 
cost, or production changes* In a period of rising prices for example, 
the cash rent is determined in advance of the production period and if 
landlords and tenants tend to project current prices and costs, the rent 
will lag behind prices. In this event, the landlord would receive a 
smaller share of the net return* Conversely, when prices are declining 
if rents do not decline as rapidly as prices, "tiie landlord may receive 
a larger share of the net return of the farm* Offsetting this in part 
will be the failure of the landlord's costs to change as rapidly as the 
texiant's costs* 
For example. Figure 1 shows the division of net return on a farm 
rented for cash during the period 1939 to 1948 inclusive*^ Within the 
period the landlord's share of the net income ranged from one-fifth to 
one-thirteenth of the tenant's xiet income* The tenaxxt's net income 
increased at a much higher rate during the period than the landlord's 
^Data used in preparation of Figure 1 appear in Table 1, Appendix 6* 
10 
cent 
otal not 
I^ ir^ l^or('.' s not 
20,000 
10,000 
Plfruro 1, L&ncl.crt''u ilet InoDrr.e. Farm ".iet Income ursd Sotio of I.ari«jior<-'s. 
r'fit Inco".3 to Far". J\©t Tncorne for a C'esh 'ier.ted Farm (1S39 
thrcvirh 1P4B) . , • 
IX 
net income and nearly all the variations in the division of the net in-
oone can be attributed to the variation in the tenant's net income.^ 
Under a orop-share arrangement, the landlord pays a relatively 
greater part of the more stable expenses and a relatively smaller part 
of the less stable operating expenses* On the income side, the land­
lord usually receives a part of the crop and a fixed rent for the hay and 
pasture land. Part of his income then will change directly tfith prices 
and yields and part fiill remain fixed for az^ given year* As the land­
lord bears the less changeable fixed coats, his expenses nill not change 
as rapidly as the tenants* On a crop-share basis alone, the landlord 
could be expected to receive a larger share of the net returns when 
prices are advancing. VHien cash rent and livestock production are in­
volved, however, this may not be the result if livestock prices advance 
more rapidly than cash rent* 
For exan^jle, the division of net returns for a crop-share farm 
2 
rented over the 1939 to 1948 period is shown in Figure 2 . The range 
of the ratio of the landlord's net returns to the total net return was 
from 32 per cent to 54 per cent. Thus, the crop-share lease division of 
^The effect of economic changes on the division of net returns may 
be Illustrated by assuming some hypothetical price and cost changes* If 
commodity prices were to increase 35 per cent, operating costs 25 per 
cent and fixed costs 15 per cent from the 1948 levels in a period of time 
less than that necessary to adjust production to the new price ratios, 
the landlord's share of the net returns would decrease to 11.4 per cent* 
If,however, the prices of these factors increased by the above amounts 
the landlord's share of the net return would increase to 17*9 per cent 
of the total net return* 
^Data used in the preparation of Figure 2 appear in Appendix B* 
ihoone 
Tptiil nof incopve' • 
'LantJ 16 r&y 5,' ;'H9; ^.. per 
-Vceht'or^toi^l;/.' - ^ 
Landlord's net - •• 15,000 
-TO 
-60 
10,000 SO 
-SO 
•10 
1939 ; .•19.;4Q:;r 1^ 41 ,1542 '-.1543 .l£fV4 • 15.45-• 1946> 1947: v. r94e 
Figure 8, , L«ndlpr^'d ..;>}et IncoTne and :Hatio "of 'Landlord 
J^et rincons.: to ' Pa^ .'.?7et;for' a Crop-share; Xeiil^ed,: Farm 
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net returns is similar to the cash lease division as both tend to vary 
inversely with the temnt's net income.^ 
It is reasonable to expect that the differential responses of the 
division of net returns caused by factors beyond the control of landlords 
and texiants under each lease type would be a source of contention be<» 
tween landlord and tenant* This esi^ectation is substantiated by the 
number of requests for help on this problem, by landlords and tenants and 
by difficulties found among them. As the price level changes, with 
'• 
production remaining constant, one lease type becomes more favorable in ^  
comparison to the otiiers. If the prices rise and cash rent does not in~ 
crease as much as commodity prices, tenants would prefer the cash lease* 
Landlords who are in a position to make the additional contributions 
would prefer one of the share arrangements* Hlhen prices are declining, 
the converse situation prevails; tenants prefer the share plan and land-
lords prefer the cash arrangement. Thus, whenever the prioe level is J i '' 
changing there is a potential strain upon landlord-tenant relations* > 
^Extrapolation of the net incomes and the ratio for the hypothetical 
cost and prioe changes considered for the cash lease result in less vari­
ation in the division under the crop-share plan than under the cash plan* 
Assuming the same pattern of inputs and outputs that existed in 1948, a 
35 per oent rise in commodity prices, a 25 per cent increase in operating 
costs and a 15 per cent increase in fixed costs would result in the land­
lord receiving 48.0 per cent of the total net rettirn* If the prices and 
costs declined by the above proportions, the landlord would receive 55*S 
per cent of the total net return* Moving from the bottom extreme to the 
top extrme in the division of net return resulting from the hypothetical 
chaxtges would increase the cash landlord's share of the total net return 
by 50 per cent, but would result only in a 15 per cent increase in the 
crop-share landlord's net return* Thus, the range of variation in the 
division of net returns under the crop-share lease is less than under the 
cash lease* 
lA 
lAndlords and tenants, howarar, alao itrl-va to work out latlsfaotory 
adjuitinanta within particular laaae types. Examples of these attempts 
are found in leases where the rent is a function of com or hog prioes* 
If the division beoooes too far removed from the one expected in 
the beginning landlords and tenants may resort to several types of changes} 
they may work out changes in the provisions of the leasei they may ohan^e 
the lease typei they may change renters and fams*^ If none of these 
changes are made^ the division of net returns may vary widely over tiste 
as a result of eoonomic forces* It is in accord with the above reasoning 
that the objectives of this study have been developed* 
%ae of these techniques may only offer partial solution to the prob* 
Ism* The tenant in changing lease types gives up one rigid system and 
accepts another* The second may suit his purpose only slightly better 
than the first* 
The change in rental partners inrolving the tenants moving from one 
farm to another is costly both to the individuals involved and to society* 
The individuals concerned bear tiie direct costs of moving and suffer the 
inconvenience* Other costs are incurred by the forced disposal of umtov-
able property, sale of unfinished livestock, and breakage* Lack of know­
ledge of soil conditions on the new fam may result in a lower than normal 
income for a period after the move* Social costs may accrue from the 
breaking of oonnunity ties, disruption of education, greater erosion 
losses on rented fanns and similar factors* These costs are treated in 
detail by Bainer Sohickele in Effect of tenure systems on agricultural 
efficiency* Jour. Fam Econ* 18, No* lt200-201* 1941* 
. In an early Oklahoma study of tenure conditions in four counties, it 
was estimated that costs of unnecessary moving was equivalent to 11 per 
cent of the total net worth of the tenants* As only one-half of the moves 
were considered unnecessary, the total cost of all moving was 22 per cent 
of the total net worth of the tenants* L* J* Sanders, Ihe economic and 
social aspects of mobility of Oklahoma farmers* Oklahoma Agr* E^qp* Sta* 
Bui* 196* 1929* p* S3* 
In an Iowa survey made in 1948 and 1949, moving costs of 18 tenants 
were obtained* The average cost of moving for these tenants was f615 of 
which |275 was direct cost and $840 indirect oost* Actual cash outlays 
were considered direct costs and loss of income, breakage and similar 
factors were considered indirect costs. Data from John F* Timmons, Ira-
proving fam rental arrangmnents in Iowa* Uopublished manuscript, Ames, 
Iowa* 1960* 
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D, ObjeotlTes 
The problem as conceived is concerned with the failure of rent to 
adjust to changes in prices, costs and production and the effect of such 
failure on the division of net returns between landlord and tenant. The 
objectives, therefore, deal with the determination of division of net 
returns, the effect of variation of the division on landlord-tenant re­
lations, and the remedial measures ei:^loyed» 
Stated explicitly, the objectives are: 
1» To determine if the division of net return is different between 
lease types for a given point in time* This involves comparison of the 
division of net returns under each lease type with the division under 
other lease types for specific years* 
2* To determine if the division of net returns varies over time 
for the same lease* This objective pertains to a cos^arison of the 
variation of the division of net returns under each lease type with the 
variation under the other lease types* 
3* To determine the effect of variation in the division of net re­
turns upon landlord-tenant relations* A division of the net return wholly 
incoxiBistent with the one expected at the time the lease was drawn nay 
reisult in such economies upon the part of one of the parties that the 
worldng relationship may deteriorate* This deterioz>ation may result in 
misallocation of resources and short tenure* For efficient operation of 
rented farms it is impozi:ant that the net return be divided in a manner 
satisfactory to both parties* 
4* To determine the kind and effectiveness of techniques now 
16 
ejiqjloyed by landlords and tenants to introduce flexibilities into the 
rental arrangement. Objective 3 pertains to the nature and scope of the 
problem} Objective 4 pertains to the methods with -which selected land­
lords and tenants have attempted to remedy the situation* These methods 
offer the basis for the constructs of action for the solution of the 
problem* 
5* To develop means to keep the division of net returns within 
permissible limits of variation desired by landlords and tenants* This 
objective involves the refinement of means determined in Objective 4, 
with the possible introduction of additional teohnlques* These means cure 
designed to enable the lease to become more dynamic and to reflect changes 
in costs f prices and production in the manner intended at the time the 
contract was made* 
E* Hypotheses of Inquiry 
Prom a preliminary analysis of relevant evidence, four hypotheses 
have evolved» 
1* That rental difficulties arise resulting in changes in lease 
types or termination of relationships because of the inability of land­
lords and tenants to adjust rents to changes in price» costs and pro­
duction within the static frameworks of current leasing arrangements* 
2* That changes in prices and production and disproportionate 
changes in landlords and tenant's costs will affect the division of net 
returns diffei*ently under eaoh lease type* 
S* That for any one lease type, changes in prices, oosts, and 
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produotlon nay result in a division of net returns not antlolpated by the 
parties at the time the oontraot was made and oonsequently, the division 
may become wholly unsatisfactory to one or both of the parties. 
4. That if landlords and tenants possess sufficient knowledge of the 
possible effects of price, cost and production changes upon the division 
' of net returns under the various leasing arrangements they will be in a 
better position to choose the type best suited to their wishes. Also, if 
the contracting parties have knowledge of the possible leasing adjustments 
for keeping rents more in line with changing coats, prices and production, 
they will be in a position to make such modifioations as they feel 
necessary to provide a satisfactory division. 
Three sources of information were used in this study. These sources 
are (l) accounting records of tenants cooperating with the Iowa Farm 
Business Associations, (2) information obtained from interviews with 
teziants cooperating with the business associations, and, when possible, 
their landlords, and (3) related research studies. 
The information was used- in the following manner to test the 
hypothesest 
F. Procedures 
H^othesis 1 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis S 
Hypothesis 4 
Intei*vlews and Farm Seoords 
Farm Records 
Interviews 
Interviews, Farm Records, and Related Studies 
IB 
1* Mature of reoorda uaed 
The lemi Fam Bualnesa Aaaooiatlona maintain accounting reoorda for 
orer ei^ht hundred farmera, approximately four hundred of whom are 
tenant!* Thia aerrioe haa been provided for more than 25 yeara* Reoorda 
for teoanta inolude varioua kinda of leaaing arran(;ement8* The reoorda 
are maintained in aooord with standard farm aooounting procedure and eon-
tain the income atatement and balance aheet for each oooperator for each 
year* The reoorda ahow the oontributlons of both landlord and tenant 
and the diTiaion of returns between them* IRius, from the reoorda, the 
landlord's net income and the tenant's net inoome are available* These 
not income figures are adjusted for Inventory chaoiges and farm contri­
bution to family living, but do not make provision for the rental value 
of the dwelling* Alternative costs have not been allowed and the net 
income represents the pai^y's return to his contribution* 
These reoords are not the records of typical Iowa farmers* Hopkins 
found in a comparison of record-keeping farms with a random san^le of 
Iowa fanas that the reoord-keeping farms had a higher gross and net re­
turn per hundred acres, were more highly equipped and produced higher 
yields*^ A hazard exists when attempts are made to make ixiforences for 
all Iowa farmers from data obtained from reoord-keeping farms. In a 
study of this nature, however, adequate reoords over time are needed and 
possibly aiQT farmer possessing these reoords is not a typical farmer* As 
^John A* Hopkins, Statistical comparisons of record-keeping farms 
and a random sample of Iowa farms for 19S9, Iowa Agr* Sta* Bui. 308. 
1942* p. 266. 
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the problOTi is not primarily concerned with the measuring of alternative 
resource organizations, the lack of representation may not be serious. 
Sine© these fanners can be expected to adopt the newer practices and to 
obtain incomes greater than those of the average famer, it can also be 
expected that they are more desirable as tenants, and in position to ob­
tain concessions not obtainable by the average tenant. These concessions 
would tend to make the record-keeping tenent's lease more flexible than 
the average lease. If, however, despite whatever concessions are made, 
the division of net returns is different between lease types and over 
time for the same lease type for the record-keeping farmers it would be 
reasonable to assume that the same would be true for the average farmer. 
Therefore, whatever conclusions are reached about the effects of lease 
rigidities and remedial adjustments with respect to the record-keeping 
farmers, would appear to be useful for other landlords and tenants de­
siring this type of information in adjusting their rental arrangements. 
Information about and from record-keeping farmers is preferable 
both from the resource and the obstacle aspects of the problem. If 
these tenants are above average, they probably have a better concept of 
the obstacles to achieving flexibilities in leasing. In addition to a 
better grasp of the problem, these farmers have probably been more re­
sourceful in attempting to overcome the difficulties. The techniques 
which these people have used in attempting to introduce flexibilities into 
the arrangment should provide helpful ideas and procedures for others to 
consider. 
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2, Seleotion of sample for Interviews 
To test the Hypothesis 1, tenants who had made various types of 
changes wero interviewed. The object 7<aa to determine if these changes 
were a result of the parties' inability to make their leasing contract 
sufficiently adjustable to provide a division of the net return satis­
factory to both. Tenants over a period of time have a number of alter­
natives with respect to their leasing arrangement. Tenants say: 
1, Make no change in lease type 
2. Change lease t^^es, i.e., 
a* Change from cash to crop-share or stock-share 
b. Change from crop-share to cash or stock-share 
c* Change from stock-share to cash or crop-share 
3, Change farms or occupations 
4. Purchase a farm and become an owner-operutor 
Interviews with sixty-five record-keeping farmers who made a total 
of seventy-six of the changes listed above were obtained (Table S). In 
addition to these tenants, twenty-five of their landlords were inter­
viewed. 
For each alternative, including changes frtwa each lease type, an 
effort was made to interview sixteen tenants who had made that type of 
change. For some alternatives, however, sixteen potential respondents 
wero not available. If more than sixteen changes of type had been made, 
a random sample was drawn; if less than sixteen changes had been nuaide, 
the total number available was interviewed. In addition to those who had 
made changes in lease type, sixteen farmers who had made no changes in 
Table S, Initial and Final Classifioation of Interviews with Sixty-Five Tenant Farmers# 
Expected 
Eejeoted 
Transferred into 
class 
Type of change 
Cash • Crop-share • Stock-share • Change in * Change' 
t o  ' t o  *  t o  •  f a m s  o r  '  t o  •  M o  
Crop-Sh Stock-Sh* Cash Stook-Sh* Cash Crop-Sh* oooupationa* owner * ohanRe 
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1 
I 
1 1 
6 
2 
£ 
0 
i ! 
2 0 
16 
0 2 
Transferred out 
of class 
Completed 
ITnvisited 
5 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10 
0 
2 
2 
0 
1 
8 
1 
3 
2 
1 
0 
15 
2 
1 
12 
4 
0 
16 
2 
Changes found in 
addition to 
change sought 
Total oonq>leted 
Changes made with 
change in farms 
Landlords inter­
viewed 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
10 
0 
2 
0 
8 
0 
2 
7 
20 
3 
15 
0 
16 
8 
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leai* type were intonrivwsd to daternlne what ohangea had been made In 
l«ai« proTlsions to keep It abreast of ooononio oonditions. 
8t Information aought and aohedule uaed 
Detailed aohedulea^ ooverlug the period 1939 to 1950 and requiring 
two hour* to oomplete were used. The aohedules were designed to provide 
itiforaation in the following baslo areas i 
!• Detemine the changes in lease provisions or type made between 
19S9 and 1950. 
2» Determine if the changes were a result of ohanges in prloes, 
oostsy or production* 
S. Detemine if the ohanges were suooessful in remedjring the con­
ditions originating the ohange* 
4* Detemnine the effect of the ohange, or the need for change« on 
lasdlord'tenant relations. 
5« Deteradne the desirabilltjr of holding the division of net re­
turns within a certain range of varlability. 
G. Assumptions and Limitations of Analysis 
No Bpeoiflo standard of equity has been developed to test the 
division of net returns under the alternative leasing arrangements. The 
most ooBsaon standard of equity, division of the returns in the same ratio 
as the oontributions are divided, is not particularly useful, either from 
Copies of the schedules and method of use, along with relevant 
sampling information appears in Appendix A. 
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the standpoint of allocation of resouroes or the maintenanoe of a 
-workable relationahip between the parties. 
The only concept of equity that is defensible with respect to the 
allocation of resources and is compatible with the institution of private 
property requires knowledge of the marginal productivities of the factors.^ 
The marginal productivities are difficult to determine for an individual 
farm and application of this oonoept has been limited* 
!Ihe analysis and reoonmendations are not directly concerned with 
allocation of resources. The object is to develop a more flexible 
leasing environment wherein the impact of unascpected contingencies can be 
distributed between the parties in such a manner that the relationship 
will not be terminated. Some gain in the allocation of resources would 
result in the reduction of unneo^ssary moving and the redirection of re­
sources now used in the moving pirocess* Some further gain in efficiency 
might result from the reduction of the effect of unanticipated price and 
cost changes upon planning. If a tenant knew that his rental commitments 
would be adjusted downward in the event of a decline in prices or yields 
he would need hold fewer of his resources in a highly liquid form and 
would be free to invest in enterprises with longer production periods.^ 
^This concept of equity has been advanced by Earl 0* Heady. Economics 
of farm leasing systems. Jour. Farm Econ. 19, No. 3:661. August 1947. 
^Transferring part of the income variability from the tenant's re­
souroes to the landlord's resouroes would result in less risk discounting 
for labor and capital and provide an incentive for a greater ii^ut of 
these factors* The increased variability in the return to land might re­
sult in capitalization at a higher rate, which would result in lower land 
prices, but the quantity of land offered would not be affected* 
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II. TO BENmL AEBA.NGBMBNTS FAIL TO ADJUST EBNT3 TO PRICE, 
COST AND PRODUCnON CEA.NGES 
A* Role of Rent in Agricultural Production 
Rent4 used in the sense of a return to land, has, like the return to 
any other factor in production, two functions. The return must serve to 
allocate land between its alternative uses and as a determimnt of 
quantities of other factors employed in conjunction with land* Rent also 
has a distributive function in that its payment gives the landowner a 
claim against the output of the eoonony. 
The iDOst efficient combination of resources cannot be achieved un­
less the marginal value product is ii^uted as a return to each factor* 
Resource allocation is at an optimum when the ix^ut of each factor is 
carried to the point where the marginal value product equals the marginal 
cost of the factor. In Figure 3, MK is the marginal value product of 
land. If Ea is the rent per acre, •tdio tenant desiring to rent for 
cash would obtain the most efficient use of his resources by renting OX^ 
quantity of land. 
The quantity of land used by a share tenant is not as clearly 
determined as that used by the cash tenant. As the share tenant gives a 
portion of the output as rent, the marginal cost of land is always less 
than the marginal revenue for ax^ quantity having a marginal value 
product greater than sere. There are several reasons however, wl^ the 
landowners will not permit share tenants to operate so extensively that 
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the marginal value product of land becomes zero*^ 
The effect of the share arrangements on output may be seen in 
Figure 4» In the figure is an assumed marginal cost curve for a 
farm firm* If the farm is opeirated on a cash lease the tenant will 
reoeive the full output and if sold in a competitive market, the marginal 
return could be represented by the horieontal line MR^. The cash tenant 
maximising profit then iwould operate at an output of 0X||^» The share 
tenant, receiving a part of the output, would have a marginal revenue 
belov that of the cash tenant and -would equate marginal revenue and 
marginal cost at a lower output (0X2^ in Figure 4) than the cash tenant* 
6* Role of Rental Arrangements in Agricultural Production 
The farm lease is an institutional device enabling the combimtion 
of individually owned factors of production in a single enterprise* The 
lease enables the owner of land, who may not have the necessary labor, 
capital, managerial ability, or inclination to farm, to combine his land 
with the complementary factors owned by another person. The undertaking 
^Some restraints suggested are short-term leases, sharing of vari­
able inputs, and restrictive lease clauses* The short-term lease permits 
review of contract periodically and gives the landlord an opportunity to 
place the land on the cash rental market if share rents do not approxi­
mate cash rentsj the sharing of variable inputs provides incentive for 
additional use of these factorsj the restrictive lease provisions may 
spell out precisely the uxilts of capital and the type of husbandry to 
be es^loyed* D* Gale Johnson* Resource allocation tmder share contracts* 
Jour* Pol. Soon. 58, No* 2:118* April 1950* 
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in an economic sense, could be joint or individual.^ With a cash lease, 
the tenant usually has a wider latitude of management, assumes nearly all 
of the risk, and the undertaking could bo considered an individual 
enterprise* With the share arrangement the landlord assumes part of the 
risk and usually retains a voice in the management. Thus, although the 
courts would rule that tenancy exists, the landlord's surrender of rights 
is not aa complete as it is with the cash plan, and share tenancy has 
much in common with joinb entei^rise. 
Hhe role of rental arrangements in agriculture is to bring together 
resources owned by separate individuals into an economic unit of pro­
duction. The rental arrangement is the framework within which these 
resources are combined and used, and the output distributed among the 
contributors. For rental arrangements to achieve this objective, it 
must be flexible enou^ that both parties can make sufficient adjustment 
in contributions and returns to preserve their working relationships. 
If sufficient flexibi],ity is not present in the lease, misallocation of 
resources will occur within the firm and high tenant mobility could be 
expected. 
C. Why Hents and Rental Arrangements Fail to Perform Roles 
The rental contract covers at least one particular time period of 
^In a legal sense, the caah and share arrangements would be re­
garded as creating tenancy and thus the landlord would be considered as 
surrendering his rights in land for a period of time. The tenant then 
would be considered the entrepreneurs. Actually, throu^ custom, lease 
provisions, and other restrictions the landlord's abrogation of rights 
is not absolute. Sly and ffehrwein, 0£« cit.. p. 81. 
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production. In addition, the lease must state irhat each party will eon-
tribute to the arrangement and specify how the payment to the landlord 
will be made. If the most efficient allocation of resouroQS is to be 
achieved, the parties must have knowledge of prices, costs and pro­
duction of the lease period available at the time the lease is drawn* 
This knowledge, however, is not available and expected returns and costs 
fix the distributive and allooative function of rent in ad-mnoe of the 
production period* Only if all prices and costs were identical with 
expectations, and if the parties had complete knowledge of the production 
funotion, would the most efficient allocation of resoiurces result with 
the owners receiving the marginal value product of their factors* 
Custom is an important factor in the failure of both rent and rental 
arrangements in fulfilling their expected funotion* Customary practices 
in sharing costs and returns may be such that the tenant maximizing profit 
will not combine his resources In a manner most consistent with consumer 
preferoncaa*^ Soma of the customs affecting effioienoy of resource 
allocation adversely are different shares for different crops, failure 
to share all variable expenses in the ratio the product is divided arii^ 
inflexible each rent coranitmexit requiring that the tenants assets be 
maintained in a highly liquid fona* 
jRental arrangements are largely based upon the customs of the 
community.^ The share provisions are fixed Irrespective of the price 
%eady, op* oit*, p. 665* 
^Tabulation of 522 letters received at Iowa State College Ixtquiring 
of about i*ental matters indicated 22 per cent of the writers wanted to 
know "what Is customary". John F. Tlmmons, Improving farm rental arrange­
ments in Iowa* Unpublished research* Ames, Iowa* I960* 
29 
leT»lf quality of land and capability of the tenant* Caih renti do not 
retpood quiokly to ohangea in the price level* The flexibility of 
rental arrangeaente i« United by the eovironment of ouiton in which the 
arrangement* oust funotion* If laadlorda and tenants cannot make 
adjustmntt for ehangea in prices, costs and production, and rest cannot 
fulfill its allocative and distributire function, the rental arrangement 
cannot fulfill its role maintaining a workable relationship between the 
two parties* 
If all prices and costs changed in the same proportion the division 
of returns between the parties would rflaa.in unchanged and the rental 
arrangenent would continue to proride a satisfactory mediuB for combining 
the landlord's and tenant's resources* All prices and costs do not 
ohange in the same proportion howerer* The ratio of the Iowa all fans 
price index to the index of produotion costs on Iowa farms is shown in 
Figure 6*^ If prices and costs had changed proportionally the ratio 
would have remained oonstant* It may be seen from the figure that during 
the prioe rise assooiated with World War I that produotion costs did not 
increase as much as farm pxdoes* In the period 1920 to 1924, immediately 
following World War I, produotion costs did not declixie as far relatirely 
as farm prices* The same relationship prvTailed in the period following 
1929 irtien farm prices remained lower than produotion costs until 1942, 
relatire to the 1926 relationship between the items* In the period 1942 
to 1947 produotion costs did not rise as much as farm prices and farm 
^The data used in preparation of this and all succeeding figures in 
this chapter appear in Appendix B* 
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operators were in a. more favorable profit making position. This position 
waa changed in 1948, however, when farm prices declined approximately 
20 per cent and production costs declined only 2 per cent* 
Livestock prices and crop prices have not changed in the same 
proportion* This is of particular inqportance for the crop-share lease 
where the tenant's income is determined in part by livestock prices and 
the landlord's income is in part a function of crop prices* The ratio 
of the crop price index to the livestock prices index is shown in Figure 
6. The ratio varies from 86 in 1957 to 185 in 1954. In general when 
crop prices are low relative to livestock prices, livestock feeding is 
a profitable venture. When the ratio is high, livestock feeding is less 
profitablej for example, in 1934 when drought curtailed feed supplies 
resulting in high prices and the livestock markets received large 
quantities of unfinished animals, livestock prices declined resulting in 
a very unfavorable feeding ratio. 
Some expenses borne entirely by the landlord do not change rapidly 
as the changes in other costs and changes in farm prices. This differ­
ential rate of cliange affects division of net income and the operation of 
the rental arrangement for each lease type. Taxes, although seldom the 
major component of the landlord's expenses, do not change in relation to 
changes in farm prices. The ratio of the index of farm prices to the 
index of taxes is shown in Figure 7. From 1910 to 1915, taxes nearly 
doubled while farm prices rose only slightly. In the succeeding three 
years when prices more than doubled, taxes increased about 20 per cent. 
The most abxnipt change In the ratio, 1918 and 1921, when taxes continued 
20G 
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to increase and farm prices declined with a resulting decline in the 
ratio from 216 to 72 -within the three year period. A similar change 
occurred in the periods 1928 to 19SS and 1937 to 1939, -when taxes again 
failed to decline aa rapidly or as far as farm prices* Since 1959, 
taxes have not, in general, risen as much as farm prices • 
The failure of cash rent to adjust to changes in fam prices re­
sults in friction between landlords and tenants when prices are changing 
rapidly. Assuming that if cash rent were equal to marginal value product 
of the land and prices increased -with rent not increasing proportionally 
the landlord would not receive the productivity of his resource. Con­
versely, if prices declined and rent did not decline proportionately the 
landlord would receive more than the productivity of his contrihution. 
The index of the average cash rent and the index of farm prices are 
shown in Figure 8* In the figure it may be seen that rent did not de­
cline as rapidly or as far as farm prices in periods of declining prices 
follcffing 1929* The slun?) in farm prices of 1938-1940 did not result 
in any deoline in cash rents* 
Correlations of residuals from second degree polynomials fibted to 
the two series are shoira in Figure 9.^ The correlation between current 
0 
price and rent residuals is *416* The correlation between rent residuals 
g 
and the prices residuals of the previous year is *732, and with price 
residuals lagged two years, .712* Further lags result in considerably 
^Data shown in Ikble 6 and Table 7 of Appendix B* 
^Significant at the 5 per cent level* 
"Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
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lower T>luas of the oorrelatloa ooefflolents* Thus the one and two year 
la prioee appear to exert an inportant effeot upon current rents* 
Zt would appear that the level of prioea of last year and two years ago 
hat Bore effeot upon current rents than current prices* This would be 
expeoted as rents are nearly always determined in advance of the crop 
year* 
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III. RESULTS OF FAILURE OF ilENTS TO ADJUST TO PRICE, 
COST ASD PRODUCnON CMMGES 
The maintemnoe of a worlcable situation in leasing rests upon 
several factors. Important among these factors are the landlords and 
tenants expectations with respect to prices, costs and production, and 
the division of net income under a given rental arrangement. More 
important, is the tolerance of the parties in that this tolerance 
determines the limits of the variation in the division of income that 
is permissible without disrupting the relationship. 
A. Rent Noroas and Permissible Variation 
In negotiatlni; the rental provisiozis both landlord and tenant may 
have in mind a given set of price, cost and production expectations. If 
the economic expectations of both parties are not identical, then a given 
set of lease provisions will result in the parties having different ex­
pectations with respect to the division of net returns. If the parties 
find themselves in agreement on the expected course of future events 
their expectations with regard to the division of net returns should be 
the same. 
Neither party nay anticipate that his expectations will be fulfilled 
with certainty. There is probably an upper limit above which the tenant 
will not continue to rent the farm unless there is some change in lease 
provisions. Similarly, the landlord may have a lower limit on the 
• 
acceptance of a division of the net return without modification of the 
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lease provisions* 
Three possibilities exist for the landlord's and tenant's expec­
tations j the tenant's expected division of the net return may be greater 
than the landlord's expected division, it may be leas than the landlord's 
or it may be the same. These three possibilities, with possible tones 
of variation are shovm in Figures 10a, 10b, and 10c. 
The assun^tion is made in Figure 10a that the tenant expected the 
landlord to receive a larger share of the net return than the landlord 
expected to receive. The tenant's expectation is indicated by OT and the 
upper limit of his expectation is indicated by OT'; the landlord's ex­
pectation is OL and the lower limit is OL'. The range of permissible 
variation in the division of net retuzTis for these parties with this 
lease is L'T*. 
In Figure 10b the situation is reversed. The tenant does not, in 
this example, expect the landlord to receive as much as the landlord 
expects to receive. When each expects to receive more than the other 
expects to give, the range of permissible variation, L'T', is less than 
the range when each expects to give more than the other expects to 
receive. 
In Figure 10c, L'T' is the range of permissible variation when both 
the landlord and tenant expect the same division of the net return. With 
t 
these expectations the range of permissible variation is less than that 
of the first case, but greater than that of the second. 
A fourth possible case is one in which the landlord's e:q>eoted share 
of the net return is greater than the share the tenant expects to give by 
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more than the sum of the dlfferenoes between the individual liaita and 
the expected diTisions. This situation is shown in Figure lOd. In this 
event no division of the net return will satisfy both parties and the 
lease will be modified or terminated at the end of the first year* 
In general, the less eaoh party expects in the division of net re­
turns the wider the range of permissible variation in the division* IThen 
eaoh expects more than the other expects to give, the range of permissible 
variation is narrowed and may be xianrowed to the point of non<>exlstance 
with the result that the lease oaxmot succeed* 
It is assumed that both landlord and tenant, in drawing up a lease, 
and having knowledge of the division on the basis of past prices, costs 
and production, are in a position to fairly accurately estimate the 
division of net returns if present prloes and costs were to continue Into 
the future* Both estimates under these conditions should be fairly close 
together* Ihe expected ratio of the division of the net return between 
landlord and tenant is termed the rent norm and the division of net return 
for 'tile first year could be accepted as its approximation. This method 
of approximating the rent norm has definite limitationsi it is not 
accurate for those years in which considerable change in prloes, costs 
or production have occurred* The use of the division of the first year 
does not take into account the possibility of a changing noxm such as 
would be expected in the case of the orop-share tenant starting with 
little or no livestock and planning on building up a herd, or a stock-
share landlord planning on reducing his contributions as the initial 
capital wears out or becomes obsolete* The rent norm may be increasing 
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over a period of years as the landlord adds capital to the entei^riae 
in the form of soil improvements, buildings, or other productive resources. 
If the norm is formulated on the basis of current prices, costs and 
average production then it is constant as long as the lease provisions 
remain unchanged* If the norm is expected to change then changes in the 
amounts or the productivities of contributions are expected. The con­
stant rent norm concept rests on the projection of current price-cost 
ratios through the term of the lease with no change in the marginal 
productivities of contributed resources. Consequently, resource pro­
ductivity changes should be estimted and incorporated into the rent 
norm. Otherwise the rent norm concept introduces inflexibilities not in 
keeping with ohanging conditions. 
The rent norms for the various lease types could not be expected to 
be equal. The landlord renting for cash probably does not expect to re­
ceive, and his tenant does not expect to give, as large a share of the 
net returns as the landlord and tenant operating under the crop-share 
plan, as the ratio of contributions is different under the two lease 
types. For the same reason the landlord renting his land under the crop-
share plan would expect a smaller share of the net returns than the land­
lord using a stock-share arrangement. The rank of these long-run norms 
is shown in Figure 11, where OA is the rent norm for the cash lease, OB 
is the rent norm for the crop-share lease, and OC is the rent norm for 
the stock-share lease. This rant norm concept is not unlike the base 
condition used by landlords and tenants in the so called flexible cash 
lease or leases whereby the rent is made to vary with prices, costs or 
LamnLono's N£r 
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production of particular oosnnoditiai produced on the farm oovered by the 
leate* Not withatanding the aereral disadvantages and limitations of the 
concept, it does provide a point of departure or a base point for working 
out changes ia leases in keeping with changes in prices, costs and pro­
duction* 
B* Possible Variation of the DiTision 
of Returns about the Rent Norm 
It would seem reasonable to expect that the larger the number of 
enterprises in which the landlord and tenant share the return and cost, 
the more stable the division of the total net return* For this reason 
it would be expected that the landlord's relative share of rent returns 
would be more stable for a stook-share lease than for a crop-share lease 
and more stable for a crop-share lease than for a cash lease. Thus, 
under changing cost, price and production conditions the stability of 
relative income shares would be inversely related to fixed rentals in 
terms of o&sh or to a lesser extent fixed commodity shares. 
Cie expected variation of the division of net returns over time Is 
shown in Figure 12* The stock-share landlord's share of the total net 
is indicated by BC, the cash landlord's share by AP« If OX^ is a period 
of rising prices and cash rent lags behind prices, the cash landlord's 
share of the net could be expected to decline. On the other hand, if 
the cash landlord's share benefited with the increase in prices as does 
the stock-share landlord's, while his costs did not increase in proportion 
to the tenant's costs, his share of the net return would increase in a 
Landlord's 
share of 
net returtj 
Fic^i-Te 12. Sxpsctsd Variation of L'ivision of I'ot Koturns abovt the 
- Kent I'?orn of a Sharo and a Cash Lease. 
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period of rising prices. When prices are declining (period X-jXg in 
Figure 12), and if the cash rent does not decline as rapidly as prices, 
the cash landlord's net income will increase relative to the tenant's 
net income and the net return ratio Aid. 11 increase. The situation would 
be different for the stock-share landlord. If the landlord's costs did 
not decline as rapidly as the tenant's costs while his income decreased 
the same as the tenant's income he would receive a smaller share of the 
net returns. This would not necessarily be the case, however, if the 
tenant's costs were greater than the landlord's costs. 
Little can be said in regard to the expected division of returns 
under the crop-share arrangement. As part of the land is usually rented 
for cash, the variation in the division of net returns my resemble 
both the stock-share and the cash arrangement. If hay and pasture land 
constitute a small part of the land rented the division of net returns 
may be similar to the stock-share division; if a large part of the farm 
is devoted to hay and pasture, the division of net returns over time will 
be similar to the cash division. 
C. Possible Results of Excessive Variation 
in Division of Net Returns 
As postulated earlier, variation in the division of net returns can 
result in three types of changes; (l) the parties can modify the lease 
provisions to bring the division back within acceptable limits, (2) they 
can change the lease type, or (S) they can seek new rental partners. As 
the net z*eturn ratio moves away from the rent norm, dissatisfaction -with 
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the lease provisions develops and the farther the deviation from the 
norm the stronger the dissatisfaction. If the deviations are suffi­
ciently large so that another lease type would he more favorable to one 
of the parties, pressure will exist against both the lease type and the 
lease provisions. Further, if neither the lease type nor the lease 
provisions are changed and the net return ratio deviates widely from the 
norm, the dissatisfied party may attempt to in^rove his position by 
seeking a new rental partner. These three critical points are shown in 
Figure 13. In the diagram OA is the rent norm and AF is the net return 
over time* BB* is the range through which the division of net returns 
would be permitted to vary with no change in the lease provisions. CC* 
is the range of permissible variation of the net return ratio with no 
change in lease type. It is assumed that if no modification of pro­
visions or type were made and the ratio reached D or D' the relationship 
will be terminated. 
Each limit of peirmissible variation is the result of several factors 
affecting the individual. The amount of variation in division of income 
that the party to a lease will tolerate may be modified by his ideas as 
to what is customary, what are his alternatives to the present situation, 
what are his chances of achieving these alternatives or what is his 
bargaining position.^ Acceptance of a division deviating widely from 
^A study in north Central Iowa indicated that landlords and tenants 
considered five factors in determining a "fair" rent; "what is custonary"; 
contributions of the paxiiies; productivity of contributions; bargaining 
position of each party; and what is satisfactory to both. These factors 
have been discussed by John F. Timmons, I. W. Arthur and Walter E. Chryst, 
in Hlhat rent for your farm? Iowa Farm Science. 5, No. lOt 147-149. April 
1951. 
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the expected division nay hinge upon the physical njobility of the 
party's resources or the social mobility of his family. A tenant with 
strong community ties would be willing to accept a more unfavorable 
division if his achievable alternative lay outside the oommunityj land­
lords, livizig in the same comiuiity with the tenant, have not always 
utilised their bargaining position to the fullest advantage because of 
a fear of incurring social displeasure* The parties to the lease may 
consider the productivity of their resources without obser*ving the 
return on the other resources used in combinationj in which case the 
limit of tolerance would have little or no meaning. The limit of toler­
ance would be expected to vary widely among individuals and would not 
be subject to a precise determination for all parties concarned with 
leasing. 
The limits are subjective and are a function of the tenant*8 
alternatives* As the alternatives change so will the limits of tolerance 
change. In order for a workable situation to exist, either for a lease 
or a landlord'^tenant relationship, the division of returns must be within 
the limits. 
D. Variations in Division of Ket Incomes Under Different 
Lease Types for the Period 1920 - 1950 
Records of tenants cooperating with the Iowa Farm Business Associ­
ation were investigated to determine the division of net return under 
each lease in periods of different levels of economic activity. One of 
the l^potheses advanced was that periods of rising and falling prices and 
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costs affected the division of net returns differently for each lease 
type. In order to test this hypothesis a sample of records ms drawn 
for each lease type for each year and the not returns for the farm and 
for the landlord determined,^ 
The net return figure used is the net farm income as computed 
according to the standard practice of the business associations.^ Ihe 
net farm income is obtained by subtracting total business debits, which 
include all positive inventory changes and farm contributions to family 
living." Opportunity costs were not considered for the real estate, 
labor or capital. The net farm income of the farm represents the return 
to all resources used in the farm operation. The landlord's share of 
the net farm income was computed in the same manner as the total net 
farm income and represents the total return to his contribution. 
^Sandom sai^^les of ten farm records were drawn for each lease for 
each year from 1929-1950. Ten records were not available for each lease 
type for each year for the period 1920 through 1928, and when the total 
number available was less than ten all records were used* 
The records used from 1955 through 1960 were those of tenants wg 
no change in lease type while affiliated with the business associations. 
The sample was restricted to these tenants in order that the division re­
turns represent enterprises which had been adjusted to the lease type. 
In order to fill the samples for years prior to 1935, however, it was 
necessary to use records of farmers who had changed lease types. The 
assuiqjtion is made that increase in accuracy thjrough the larger sample 
was greater than the loss incurred through inclusion of tenants who had 
changed lease types. The number in each sample appears in Tables 8, 9 
and 10 of Appendix B. 
9 
John A. Hopkins and Earl 0. Heady. Farm records. 3rd ed. Ames, 
Iowa State College Press. 1949. p. 179. 
^The real estate valuation was held constant. 
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The ratio used to determine the division of returns between the 
parties is the landlord's net farm income as a per oent of the total net 
farm inoome and is referred to as the net return ratio. The ratio is 
obtained by summing all of the landlords' net incomes in the sample and 
dividing by the sm of the net farm incomes. 
1. Variations in the division of net returns under a cash lease 
The landlord's share of the net return varied widely in the period 
1920 to 1929, ranging from 100 per cent^ in 1920 to 19.2 per cent^ in 
1922 (Figure 14). The net return ratio increased sharply in 1923 but 
remained relatively steady until 1950. 
The period of 1929 through 1932 mis one of considerable strain on 
the cash lease arrangements. In 1930 prices were 20 per cent below the 
1929 level while rents decreased only slightly more than 1 per oent. The 
landlord's share of the net return increased from 23 per oent in 1929 to 
63 per cent in 1930. In the following year, 1931, farm product prices 
were 30 per cent below the 1930 level. Rent, however, had declined only 
21 per cent and the landlord's share of the net return reached 100 per 
oent. All cash tenants in the 1931 sample had a net loss while all land­
lords had a net gain. In 1932, farm prices again declined 30 per cent 
from the previous year while cash rents fell 18 per oent. All tenants 
^In a sample of six cash rental records in 1921 all tenants had neg­
ative net farm incomes and only one landlord had a negative net return. 
^This and all other data on the division of net returns presented in 
this section appear in Table 8, Appendix B. 
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Figure 14. Estimated Division of Net Returns Between Landlord and Terant for Cash, Crop-share and 
Stock-share Leases (1921 - 1930; 1933 - 1950). 
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in the 19S2 sample had net losses while all of their laxidlords had a net 
?;ain.^ 
Farm prices in 1933 -wore vinohanged from the 1932 level. Rent, 
lagging prices, declined 28 per cent in 1933 and the landlord's share of 
the net return decreased to an estimated 26 per cent. Following 1933, as 
rent increases lagged rising prices (Figure 8) the landlords' share of 
the net return had a downward trend, the estimated 1950 ratio being 
slightly more than half, 13,89, of the 1933 ratioFarm, prices in the 
^Year to year data on proportion of tenancy by lease type is not 
available. In 1930, however, 45 per cent of all tenants were cash temnts. 
In 1956 it was estimated that 18 per cent of the farms were cash tenants. 
Ihe reduction in the propoi*tion of cash tenancy in this period has been 
attributed to the tenants' inability to secure adjustments for changing 
prices and yields. From Bainer Schiokele and Charles A. Norman. Tenancy 
problems and their relation to agricultural conservation. Iowa Agr. Exp. 
Sta. Bui. 354. 1937. pp. 175-180. 
^The years of 1937, 1958 and 1948 are of pai*tioular interest. An 
abrupt increase in the landlord's share of the net returns occurred in 
1937 when the estimated ratio increased from 16.48 in 1936 to 37.5, while 
the rent level remained unchanged from the previous year and farm product 
prices increased 12 per cent. The number of hogs jnarketed in 1937, however 
was 20 per cent less than the number in 1936 and total receipts from fam 
marketings were 9 per cent below the 1936 level. iOius the drought of 1936 
apparently had its effect upon the division of net income in 1937. In the 
following year, production increased but prices declined and the net in­
come ratio remained near its 1937 level. The same general situation 
occurred in 1943 when prices increased 5 per cent and the landlords' share 
of the net returzis increased from 11 per cent to 21 per cent. Corn yields 
the proceeding year declined from 56.7 bushels in 1946 to 30.5 bushels in 
1947. The decrease in production was greater than the increase in price 
and as production costs also increased the tenant's net retvirn decreased 
and the landlord's share of the net returns increased. Marketing changes 
computed from data provided by Iowa Weather and Crop Bureau. Iowa Depart­
ment of Agriculture. Yearbook 38, part 12. 1937. pp. 441-443* 
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period increased 430 per cent while cash rents increased only 260 per 
cent. Production oosts, increasing 35.5 per cent, did not rise as muoh 
as farm prices and the tenants' net inoomes increased relative to the 
landlords' net inoomes during the period.^ 
^ of division of net returns under prop-share lease 
The landlord's share of the net return varied from an estimated 
53.58 per cent in 1924 to 17.12 per cent in 1925^ (Figure 14). Following 
1926^ as crop prices increased relative to livestock prices with pro­
duction showing little variation, the landlord's share of the net return 
increased and reached an estimated 55.06 per cent in 1930.^ 
In 1931, seven of the ten farmers in the sample had a net loss 
while all of the landlords showed a net gain. The landlords* net income 
amounted to 227 per cent of the net income of the farms. The decrease 
in prices in 1931 without a proportional decrease in operating expenses 
had more effect upon the tenant's net income than the income of the 
^The linear trend line fitted to estimated divisions of net returns 
for the period is Y - 26.16 - .dTX, where Y is the estimated division and 
X is the time in years measured from 1933. The reduction in sum of squares 
is significant at the 5 per cent level with an F value of 5.05, n^^ ^ 1 and 
ng — 16. 
^Table 6, Appendix B. 
®Under the crop-share arrangement, the landlord's income is deter­
mined Tiy his share of the crop, the price of the commodity and the amount 
of cash rent. The tenant may mrket his share of the crop through live­
stock and his income will "be dependent upon livestock prices. The ratio 
of the crop price index and the livestock prioe index appears in Table S, 
Appendix B. 
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landlord* 
In 1932, seven of the ten tenants and two of the ten landlorda had 
negative net inoonea. The total of all landlords' Inoones however, wat 
positive; the total of the net incomes of the farms and tenants was 
negative* The 3S per cent deorease in farm prices with only an 11 par 
cent deorease in production costs from the 1931 levels apparently waa 
sufficient to eliminate all of the tenants' net income and result in 
losses for part of the landlords* Following 1938, as prioea inoreaaed 
and production oosts did not inoroase as rapidly, there has been a 
slight upward trend in tiie division of net returns*^ The division haa, 
2 however, varied widely fjrom year to year. 
^The trend line fitted to division of net returna from 1983 through 
1950 ia Y - 32*18 «• *67X, where Y is estimated division of net returna and 
X is time in years measured from 1933* The reduction in sum of squares 
due to regression is significant at the 5 per cent level; P * 5*19 with 
nj^ * 1, and nj " 16* 
2 
Farm prices increased relative to production costs in 1988 and the 
net return ratio for that year was positive, being an estimated 29*68* In 
1934 the net return ratio decreased substantially, possibly due to the d«-> 
crease in corn yields from 1933 of 51 per cent as a result of the drou^t 
of 1934* Livestock production did not change between 1933 and 1934 and 
the price increased 23 per cent* The tenants gross Income remained near 
the 193S level while the landlord's gross declined with the deorease in 
yield and was not offset by the Increase in price. These changes left the 
tenant with a larger share of the net farm income* 
In 1935 livestock production declined 24 per cent but this was offset 
by a 60 per cent increase In price* The landlords net Income however waa 
influenced by 78 per cent increase in corn yields over 1934 and a 48 per 
cent increase in price* The landlord's estimate of share of the net re­
turns increased from 22 per cent in 1934 to 32 per cent in 1935* 
Another period of considerable fluctuation in the net return ratio was 
from 1945 to 1950* A partial crop failure in 1947, corn yields declining 
from an average of 56*7 bushels in 1946 to 30.5 bushels in 1947, with less 
than a corresponding increase in price could account for the landlord's 
low share in 1947* Livestock products prices Increased proportionally 
more than grain prices which would result in the tenants receiving a 
large share of net returns If he marketed the crop of the previous year 
through livestock and the landlord sold his part of the current crop* 
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3. Variation In division of net returns under the stook-share lease 
The landlord's share of the net return showed a general upward 
trend In the period 1923 to 1930, reaching 59 per cent In 1930* The 
decline In farm prices from 1929 to 1930 had less effect upon the 
division of net returns under the stock-share lease than under either 
the orop-share or the cash leases.^ The greater sharing of expenses and 
returns under the stook-share plan has been an oft cited advantage In 
that the division of net returns tends to be more stable in periods of 
wide price and production variability* This feature was demonstrated in 
1931 when nine of the ten farms sampled indicated a net loss cmd eigjht 
of the ten landlords had net losses* The landlords' share of the total 
net lost was 59 per cent* The situation was similar in 1932 when eight 
of the ten farms indicated losses* All of the ten landlords in the 1932 
san^le had losses; their share of the total farm losses being 54 per 
cent* This is in sharp contrast with the cash landlords in the sample, 
all of whom had net gains in 1932, and the crop-share landlords, eight of 
whom, out of a san^le of ten, had a positive net return* 
The low risk feature of stock-share leasing apparently appealed to 
tenants throuj^out the depression years* The tenant had no fixed rental 
commitments as he would have had with cash or share cash renting* In a 
period of widely fluctuating prices, as existed from 1930 to 1939, many 
tenants apparently were satisfied to trade the possibility of a higher 
^From 1929 to 1930 the landlord's share increased 174 per cent for 
the cash lease, 40 per cent for the crop-share lease, and 26 per cent 
for the stock-share lease* Computed from Tables 8, 9 and 10 of Appendix 6. 
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net income under other lease types for the opportunity to avert possible 
indebtedness occurring from defaulted rent* It niould seem reasonable 
that those •who chose the stock-share plan to avert risk would tend to 
become dissatisfied with the plan if prices were expected to stabilize 
or advance. In 1959, with the outbreak of war in Europe, price ex­
pectations of farmers znay have changed and one of the principal advantages 
of the stock-share lease for tenants -nas no longer applicable* 
The trend in the division of net returns continued upward in the 
period following; 1939,^ The general trend in prices was also upward. 
If all returns were divided evezily the increase in the landlord's share 
of the net return in the period of rising prices could be due to em 
unequal sharing of total expenses, with the landlord bearing the larger 
part so that an increase in the gross retiurn would have a greater 
relative effect upon his net return than on the tenant's net income} 
or the failure of costs borne by the landlord to advance as rapidly as 
those borne by the tenantj or to a combination of both causes* 
The ratio of the landlord's total fixed and operatiaag costs to the 
total fixed and operating costs of the farm, along with the division of 
^There was a significant upward trend in the net returns ratio for 
the period 1933 through 1950* The trend line is Y = 43*99 • *48X, where 
7 is the estimated net return ratio and X is time measured in years from 
19SS* The reduction in sum of squares due to the linear trend is 
significant; F = 7*16 with nj^ • 1 and n2 "16* 
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net returns, is shown in Figure 15.^ There is some indication that the 
landlord's share of the net return moves inversely with his share of the 
fixed and operating expenses, particularly in the postwar period of 
1945 to 1950. 
4« Relationship between total net farm income and landlord's net income 
for selected years 
(a) Cash arrangements• In recent years the relationship between 
the landlord's net income and the total net income of the fara has not 
been a close one* In 1950 the correlation between the inconies was .248^ 
and there is little reason to believe that the landlord's net income is 
influenced by the net income of the farm for the current year (Figure 16a). 
The situation was somewhat similar in 1945 when the correlation between 
the income was .464 (Figure 17a), or only 21 per cent the variation in 
^The ratios were computed by summing all landlord's fixed and oper­
ating expenses and dividing by the sums of fixed and operating expenses 
for all farm for each sample of ten records. Fixed expenses used were 
taxes, interest, insurance, and permanent io^rovement repairs. Operating 
expenses Included equipment repairs; truck repairs, fuel and oil; auto­
mobile repairs and fuel (farm share)} tractor repairs, fuel and oil; 
special equipment, repairs emd hire (custom work); hired labor; live­
stock expense; crop expense and miscellaneous operating expense. The 
majority of other expenses are divided evenly between landlord and 
teziant. 
^Not statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. The samples 
used are the same used to obtain the data shown in Figure 14. 
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net income of landlords was explained by variation in the current net 
income of farms.^ 
In 1940 and 1935 the relationship was somewhat closer when the 
correlations were .655 and .760, respectively (Table 4). In 1940 the 
landlords received an estimated -^17 of each \U00 increase in the 
not returns and in 1935 received an estimated $18 of each #100 
increase. 
In 1930 followinj; a 15 per cent decline in farm prices, there was 
little relationship between the two net incomes, as the correlation was 
.02. In 1925 the correlation between the landlord's net income and the 
total net income was fairly hi^h, .943. Ihe landlord received an esti­
mated $13.80 of each llOO increase in net income. 
A close relationship between the net income of the landlord and the 
net income of the farm under a cash lease cannot be expected. As much 
as 18 months may elapse between the determination of tho rent and com­
pletion of the harvests and marketingis of products produced on the land. 
The net income of the farm is influenced by current yields and pricesj 
net income of the landlord is largely predetermined. 
(b) Crop-share arrangements. The relationship between the net in­
comes of the landlord and farm could be expected to be closer under the 
llf rent is based upon the projection of current price-cost re­
lationships the landlord's net income is a fimotion of the total net in­
come only to the extent price and cost series are autocorrelated. Rent 
is predetermined and does not change with current prices. 
Table 4. Regression and Correlation Coefficients for Regression of Net Farm Income on Landlord's 
Ket Income for Different Lease Types for Selected Years.®' 
Lease type 
Cash Crop-share Stock-share 
Year 
Linear 
regression 
coefficient 
Correlation 
coefficient 
Linear 
regression 
coefficient 
Correlation 
coefficient 
Linear 
regression 
coefficient 
Correlation 
coefficient 
1950 .051 .248 .509 .862^ .591 .987^ 
1945 .051 .464 .162 .675° .382 .964^ 
1940 .171 .655° .361 .410 .465 .943^ 
1935 .184 .760° .246 .754® .339 .615 
19SD .137 .027 .356 .446 .503 .977^ 
1925 .138 .943^ .425 .999^ .469 .987^ 
^Coeffioients derived from san^ples used in computing data appearing in Tables 8, 9 and 10, 
Appendix B. 
^Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
®Signifioant at the 5 per cent level. 
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crop-share than under the cash lease. The two parties share the income 
from the crops and only the cash rent on the part of the farm used for 
hay and pasture is determined in advance of the crop year. 
In 1950, the relationship vfas highly significant.^ The landlord 
received an (Figure 36b) estimated |51 of each $100 increase in the 
farm's net returns. This represents a considerable ohang:e from 1945 
when the landlord's estimated net gain from eaoh $100 Increase in total 
net -was ^16.20 (Figure 17 b), 
(c) Stock-share arrangements. As under the stock-share lease, a 
part of the variable costs of both crop and livestock production are 
shared, it could be expected that the landlord's net income is more 
closely related to the total net income than the relationship between the 
two net incomes for either the cash or crop-share farms. In 1950, the 
correlation between the types of income was .987 with the landlord re­
ceiving an estimated $59.10 of the increase in net income (Figure 16c). 
In 1946 the landlord received an estimated $38.20 of eaoh flOO increase 
in net income.^ (Figure I7e). As the tenant's share of the net returns 
represents the return to his labor and mamgement he had less incentive 
to expand outpirb in 1950 than he had in 1945. A possible con^laint by 
stock-share tenants concerns investing savings outside of the farm 
^At the one per cent level. 
^In 1946, landlords received an estimated $59.22 of each $100 in­
crease} 1947, when prices increased substantially, $64.56{ $59.84 in 
1948J and |40,56 in 1949. 
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enterprise* Such investment would seem to be a logical course of action 
for tenants who, if by employing more labor or investing in more machin­
ery, succeeded in increasing the net return of the farm by 11,000, T»ould 
receive only s^409 of the increase. 
In the years of 1940, 1935, and 1925 a significant relationship 
existed between the landlord's net income and the tenant's net income. In 
none of these years, however, did the landlord receive as much of the in­
crease in the net income as he did In 1950* 
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IV. HOVV UmORDS AND TEMKTS ATTEMPT 
TO OVERCOME REHT PJGIDITIES 
Within the oustomary framework of rental arrangements, landlords and 
tenants have developed a niunber of means for adjusting rents to compen­
sate for changes in prices, costs and production. Some of these means 
appear to justify serious consideration; others have serious limitations. 
Analysis of these means in use by landlords and tenants should prove 
useful to others searching for means to provide flexibilities in rent. 
In analyzing these means both weak and strong features vrill be pointed 
out. 
As mentioned earlier, three broad oategozdes of ohaziges exist* 
These categories are changes in lease provisions, changes in lease t3rpe, 
and changes In farms or tenants. The first type of change, changes in 
the terns, may involve changing the ratio of contribution or the retio 
of returns* If cash rent is paid, the suaount may be changed to increase 
the income of one party and decrease the income of the other* 3fore 
subtle means of adjustment nay be employed by lengbhening or reducing the 
term of the lease, changing the date of notification for termination, or 
even adopting a written lease instead of an oral one. On the diversified 
farm, vlth a production pattern built aiMund several enterprises, there 
are at least 112 points of agreement, and consequently, at least 112 
possible means of altering the division of net returns.^ 
^The schedule used in this study contained questions about 112 points 
of agreement between the landlord and tenant* Field interviews disclosed 
additional agreements and areas of controversy. The schedule used is con­
tained in Appendix A. 
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It Is possible that the force of custom niay be too atrozig to permit 
the adoption of the practices necessary to bring the net return ratio 
tvithin the permissible limits of variation established by the two 
parties* Horms associated with the rent of land have been determined 
through deoades of usa^e and, in the past, ohanp;es have been made slowly. 
Some choice, however, nay exist between leasing systwns. The landlord 
and tenant may make some adjustment in the returns by changing from a 
stock-share lease to a cash lease, or from a cash lease to a orop-share 
lease, or any one of four other possible changes.^ Such changes result 
in the substitution of one rigid system for another and may not provide 
the degree of adjustment desired by the paz^ies, or, in an environment 
of changing prices, costs and production, offer a permanent solution to 
their problems* 
1[he adoption of either of the two alternatives mentioned above rests 
on the willingness of the two parties to make a change* Instances may 
exist in which one party may be dissatisfied and the other party may be 
satisfied with the present division, particularly if tho share of the 
dissatisfied party is higher than it has been in the past and he feels 
that he needs the higher share to offset past low returxis, even though 
these low returns were not received while operating with his present 
rental partner* If the landlord refuses to change the lease provisions 
or the lease type, the tenant can only ia:qprove his position with respect 
^Dtilisation of all of three established lease types nenrlts six 
forms of inter-lease changesj tenants may change from cash to crop-share 
or stook-sharej from crop-share to cash or stock-sharej and from stock-
share to cash or crop-share* 
68 
to the divisions of net returns by terminating the lease and finding 
a landlord -who will rent under the conditions that he, the tenant, 
desires. Similarly, a landlord who cannot effect changes in either 
the rental provisions or the lease type because of the tenant's unwill­
ingness to accept these changes can remedy his situation only by changing 
tenants, providing a new tenant can be found who is willing to rent 
under the landlord's tenns, 
A tenant has one more alternative in addition to the above three. 
If hia capital position permits he may change to some form of ownership, 
either as a full owner of all land operated, or as an owner of part and 
a renter of the remainder. If his capital position is such as to pre­
clude ownership in either form, he may discontinue farming and take up 
some other occupation. 
A. Changes in Lease Provisions 
Leases in force for all or part of the 1939 - 1950 period and total­
ing 608 years of leasing were investigated. The cash leases studied 
totaled 209 years} the crop-share leases, 199 years; ajid the stock-share 
leases, 200 years. 
1. Changes in cash lease provisions 
Adjustments in cash lease provisions were few relative to the total 
number of possible adjustments. In the 209 years of cash leasing of the 
investigation, only 49 changes were disclosed. Of these 49 changes, 48 
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•were changes in the amount of cash rent. The other change involved 
changing the date of notification for the teroiination of the relation­
ship. It could be inferred from this that landlords and tenants rentinc; 
for cash adjust their rental provisions once each four years on the 
average• 
The number of changes appear to depend in part on the length of 
time the lease has been in effect* The relationship is not a close one, 
but of the xiineteen tenants who -were on the oash lease for more than 
five years, fourteen had made changes; of the sixteen on the cash type 
lease less than five years, only three had made changes* A leasing 
arrangement existing for five years or more may be expected to have some 
of the elements of success. To determine these elements, cash leases 
of five years duration or longer have been treated separately* 
Tenants on the cash lease for five or more years made 38 changes in 
their lease pro-visions, a change about each three years* Increasing or 
decreasing the oash rent -mere the only changes made by these tenants* 
Tenants related to their landlord made seven changes in a total of 35 
years oash leasing or a change each five years. 
Changix^ prices, costs and production -were responsible, ei-bher 
in full or in part for all of the changes in cash rent* According to 
the tenants, changing prices nere responsible for one-half of the 38 
changes (Table 5)* A combination of changing prices and costs -were 
responsible for an additional 10, or 26 per cent, of the changes* 
Changing prices, costs and production accounbed for another 11 per cent 
of the total* Thus changing prices entered into 86 per cent of the 
Table 5. Causes of Changes In Cash Rent as Given by Tenants. 
Causes of changes Number of changes Per cent of total 
Changing prices 19 50 
Changing costs 5 13 
Changing prices and costs conibined 10 26 
Changing prices and production combined 1 3 
Changing prices, costs and production combined 8 8 
Total 38 100 
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ohflingoB nada In cash rent* Only 5 per oent of the changes were attrib­
uted to increases in the landlord's oosts. 
The landlords interriewed indicated more interest in costs as a 
rent determinant than the tenant. Five landlords were interviewed who 
had made 19 adjustments in cash rent. The landlords attributed 16, or 
84 per oent, of the ohaziges to rising prices and oosts and 8, or 16 per 
oent, to changing prices, costs and production (Table 6). The corres­
ponding tenants had attributed 16, or 84 per cent of the rent increases 
to rising prices alone and 3 to increasing prices, oosts and production. 
The three adjustments caused by prices, oosts, and production were the 
result of a flexible lease based upon these factors. 
Few cash tenants considered any alternatives to changing the cash 
rent. No alternatives were considered for 29, or 76 per cent, of the 
38 changes made. 
Either an Inorease in the cash rent or a change to a share ai*range-
ment would haye resulted in an inorease in the landlord's share of the 
net returns (Figure 14). Consequently, eight of the nine alternatives 
consideired involved changes to a form of the share lease and were sug­
gested by the landlord (Tkble 7). None of the alternatives were accept­
able to the tenants as they felt that the share rent would result in the 
landlord receiving too large of a share of the net return. The increase 
in cash rent was accepted as a coiq>romise between the division occurring 
with the prevailing cash rent and the division that would occtir under a 
share arrangement. 
Of the 38 changes, 54, or 89 per oent, provided a satisfactory 
Table 6. Reasons Given by Landlords and Tenants for Changes in Cash Bent 
Tenant*8 replies 
Beason for 
ohanatnR rent 
l^uinber of ohanges Per cent 
attributed to cause of total 
Landlord's replies 
Number of changes Per cent 
attributed to cause of total 
Changing prices 
Changing prices and costs 
Changing prices, costs and 
production 
16 
0 
3 
84 
0 
16 
0 
16 
0 
64 
16 
Total 19 100 19 100 
Table 7. Nvunber, Kind, and Origin of Alternatives Coiisidered to Increases in Cash Rent by Tenants 
on Cash Leases Longer than Five Years* 
Alternatives considered 
Changes 
Number 
Per cent 
of total 
Alternative 3ue;e;ested by 
Tenant Landlord 
Crop-share lease 
Stock-share lease 
Other 
None 
5 
3 
1* 
29 
13 
8 
3 
76 
0 
0 
1 
5 
3 
0 
C/5 
Total 38 100 8 
®The cash rent in this case was based upon the landlord's needs, and bore little relation 
to prices, costs or production of the farm. Ihe alternative considered was a fixed rent based 
upon the rent of similar land* 
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solution for the short run^ (Table 8)* The la^ in cash rent with respect 
to prices (Figure 9) was the reason piven for the satisfaction with 74 
2 per cent of the changes in cash rent. A satisfactory division of the 
net returns or a level of rent lower than share rent accounted for the 
satisfaction of tenants with an additional 20 per oent of the changes* 
Only four of the changes were unsatisfactory. These were ohanpes 
made based upon personal costs of a related landlord and not associated 
with the farm production, fam price level, or farm oosts. 
Tenants making 22, or 57 per oent, of the 38 changes believed that 
they would have been evicted if they had refused to accept the higher 
rent (D&ble 9)* Tenants were not sure whether or not refusal to grant 
^The concept of satisfaction as used herein pertains to the ex­
istence of a -workable situation. It is assumed that dissatisfaction 
cannot arise -without the presence of an achievable alternative. The 
alternatives, may develop from within or without the present situation. 
Thus, a tenant may be satisfied if he cannot improve his position with 
respect to the division of net returns or by altering his lease pro­
visions by changing lease types. If, however, the tenant's lease is 
sufficiently flexible he may use the flexibility to offset alternatives 
arising within his lease type, e.g., comparable farm renting for less 
than his farm, or alternatives outside of his lease type, e.g., another 
form of lease providing a larger share of the net return to the tenant. 
Flexibility in lease provisions then can restore a workable situation 
which permits the operation to continue and provide a satisfactory 
solution to problems of income division. 
^ne tenant making eight changes in the cash rent in twelve years 
was not completely satisfied. He had experience renting for cash in 
depression years and wanted to base rent on prices during favorable 
years in order to have an argument for reducing rent when prices were 
declining. This tenant had developed a lease in ii^ich the amount of rent 
would be determined by the price of idiole milk, but was unable to get it 
into effect as the landlord regarded such a lease as unduly coi^lioated. 
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Table 8. Number of Changes Tiiado in Cash Rent Regarded as Satisfactory 
and Reasons Given for Satisfaction with Change. 
Reason for 
satisfaction 
with ehange 
Increase in rent 
less than increase 
in prices 
Cash rent less than 
share rent 
Kvanber of 
increases regarded 
as satisfactory 
25 
Per cent 
of total 
74 
Division of returns 
still satisfactory 
Kent less than prevailing 
cash rent 
Other 
2 
0 
14 
6 
0 
Total 34" 100 
®'The other four changes of the 58 arising from changes in prices, 
costs and production were made by a tenant related to his landlord and 
were regarded as imsatisfactory. The cause of dissatisfaction was due 
to the fact the rent was based upon the landlord's personal needs and 
not upon the productivity of the farm. 
Table 9. Impoi^^nce of Changes in Cash Rent to Maintenance of the Cash Rental Relationship. 
Changes Tenants 
Importajioe of 
change Huniber 
Per cent 
of total Number 
Per cent 
of total 
Critical to 
relationship 
Kot critical 
Not known if 
oritioal 
22 
4 
12 
57 
11 
32 
10 
1 
52 
6 
22 
Total 38 100 14 100 
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rent increases in. another 32 per cent of the ohanp;e8 would have neces­
sitated their moving. In terms of numbers of tenants, 10 of the 14, 
or 62 per cent, granting increases in the cash rent felt that the in­
crease was necessary for the continuation of the rental arrangement. 
Three tenants, or 22 per cent, were not sure that they could hare stayed 
without increasing the rent. 
The six landlords interviewed were not as well satisfied with the 
rent adjustments as their tenants. Of the 19 changes, five were satis-
faotoiy, and 14 were moderately satisfactory. Landlords expressing 
reservations in regard to satisfaction with the changes stated that rent 
never advanced as rapidly as prices, the same reason their tenants ^ave 
for their satisfaction with the changes. 
Chann;e8 in crop-share lease provisions 
Of the tenants interviewed, 31 had more than one year experience 
rentinj; under a crop-share agreement (Table 10). The total leasing ex­
perience of these tenants amounted to 196 years. A total of 31 changes 
in lease provisions were made "by these tenants. Of these 31 changes, 
11 were caused by changes in prices, costs, or production and 20 resulted 
from other causes (Tables 10 and 11).^ 
^The changes in lease provisions not resulting from changes in prices 
costs or production were such changes as the tenant managing the disposal 
of the crop because of the landlord's enfeeblement, renting soybean 
ground for cash because lack of storage for hay on rented trect, taking 
over niaintenance of improvements because tenant expected to inherit 
property, and corrections of mistakes in lease. 
Iteble 10. Number of Respondents with Tifore Than One Tear Experience with Crop-share Lease and 
Nuniber of Changes In Lease Provisions* 
Nuniber of respondents 
Number of years 
leasing experience 
Nuniber of ohan£;es 
Caused by prices, Caused by 
costs and production other factors 
51 196 11 20 
Table 11. Distribution of Changes in Crop-share Lease Provisions by Cause as Given by Tenants. 
Prices Prices and costs Production !Itotal 
6* 3 2 11 
^Relatives tiere not computed because of the small number of changes involved. 
79 
The eleven changes were made by seven tenants, and eight involved 
increasing the cash rent. One tenant was permitted to substitute home 
improvements in lieu of increased cash rent* 
Only two adjustments in share proportions were found. One respondent 
mads two changes in his lease at different times because of changes in 
production. The changes were made in 1942 and 1944 when the corn cx*op 
was a near failure. The landlord sold the tenant his interest in the 
crop for less than one dollar per acre in 1942 and gave the tenant the 
entire crop in 1944, This permitted the tenant to utilise the corn as 
ensilage and resulted in a larger income than would have been forthcoming 
had the corn been handled in the usual manner. 
As would be expected in a period of rising prices, the changes were 
usually made at the landlord's suggestion. All of the increases in cash 
rent and the installation of home improvements in lieu of an increase in 
rent were suggested by the landlord. The decision to give all the poor 
crop to the tenant was arrived at jointly. All changes were within the 
tenants* permissible zones of variation. 
ITo alternatives were considered for any of the changes and all were 
satisfactory to the respondents. The usual reason given for the satis­
faction with the change was that prices advanced more than the rent ad­
vanced, or even with the increase, the cash rented land was cheap con^ared 
to their share rented land. All tenants felt that the landlords were 
satisfied with the size of the increase. Three tenants believed that if 
the increase had not been granted they would have been evicted, the other 
four stated that the increase was not absolutely necessary in order for 
80 
them to stay on the fam. Of theae four, three were renting from 
relatives, 
S« ChanRea in stock-share lease provisions 
A total of 33 tenants were interviewed who had 200 years experience 
with the stock-share lease in the 1939 to 1950 period. Ten of these 
tenants made 14 changes in lease provisions to adjust for changes in 
prices, costs or production. Four tenants made changes for other causes 
(Table 12).^ 
Twelve of the fourteen changes were made to condensate the tenant 
for his increased costs* The cost increases for which the tenants wanted 
compensation were changes in fuel prices, machinery, repairs, and wages. 
As would be expected in a period of rising prices most of the changes 
would be suggested by the tenant; of the 14 changes, 11 were suggested 
by the tenant and two jointly by the tenant and landlord (Table 14), 
Four of the olmnges involved transfer of the poultry or dairy 
enterprise to the tenant (Table 13), The procedure used in these oases 
waa for the tenant to purchase the landlord's interest in these enter­
prises and to use grain from an undivided supply. The tenant purchased 
ai^ protein supplement fed. The number of cows or chickens permitted 
outside of the lease arrangement was limited by the landlord. All of 
^Because of the limited number of changes fo\md in the stock-
share and the crop-share leases, the changes occurring after five years 
of operation under the lease type were not treated separately as were 
the changes occurring in the cash lease provisions. 
Table 12. Number of Tenants Interviewed with Stock-share Leasing Experience, Total Amount of 
Leasing Experience, Number of Changes in Lease Provisions and Cause of Changes. 
(1939 - 1960). 
Number 
Kespondents interviewed 
Total years of stock-share experience 33 
Numiber making changes to adjust for prices, costs and production 199 
Number making changes for other reasons 10 
Number making changes in lease provisions 4 
Numiber not making Amy change in lease provisions 12®^ 
Changes 
Arising from changes in prices, costs, and production 14 
Arising from other causes 4 
^As some tenants made more than one change the number of tenants making changes is not the 
stun of those in the cause of change classification. 
Table 13. Distribution of Lease Provision Chani^es Arising from Changixig Prices, Costs and Pro­
duction by Type of Ch&ng;e and Cause of Change* 
Type of change 
Kuniber 
making 
change 
Number 
of 
changes 
Cause 
of 
changes 
Change term of lease 1 1 Price and cost vartability 
Tenant aesunw dairy enterprise 2 2 Increased costs 
Tenant assume poultry enterprise 2 2 Increased costs 
Landlord assuns one-half of poultry enterprise 1 1 Increased prices 
Landlord contribute to grass seed 1 1 Increased costs 
Landlord contribute to machinery, fuel and labor 
expense 3 4 Increased costs 
Adjust division of returns from dairying 1 2 Increased costs 
Adjust division of products for honie use 1 1 Increased costs 
Total 12a 14 
^Some tenants made more than one change* 
Tiable 14. Party Suggesting Change and Alternatives Considered to Fourteen Changes Made in 
Stoek-share Lease Provisions. 
Number 
of 
Type of change obanges 
Change term of lease 1 
Tenant assume dairy enterprise 2 
Tenant assume poultry enterprise 2 
Landlord assume one-half of poulti^ 
enterprise 1 
Landlord contribute to grass seed 1 
Landlord contribute to machinery, fuel 
and labor expense 4 -
Adjust division of returns from dairying 2 
Adjust division of products for home use 1 
Total 14 
Number of 
Number of changes suggested by alternatives 
Landlord Tenant Both considered 
0 1 0 0 
0 2 0 1 
0 2 0 2 
1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 4 0 0 
0 0 2 0 
0 1 0 0 
1 11 2 3 
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theaa changas were made at the tenant's suggestion. The transfer of the 
dairy cows to the tenant was successful in maintaining the rental re­
lationship, but both tenants assuming the poultry enterprise regarded 
the adjustment as inadequate and later moved to other farms. 
In another case, the landlord took over one-half of the poultry 
enterprise when prices increased in 1942. As poultry was only a small 
part of the output the tenant did not resist the change, but later 
changed landlords in order to |:;et a more satisfactory lease. 
Another adjustment in the division of returns was to alter the 
shares from dairying. Dairying was the principal source of income from 
the farming operation. Following a rise in the tenant's labor cost the 
tenant's share of the milk proceeds was increased from 50 per cent to 
67 per cent. Later, after the landlord had constructed a new barn the 
original division was restored. The landlord and tenant were related 
in this case. 
One tenant discontinued paying the landlord one-half of the value 
of products used in hoate consun^tion as a partial adjustment for increased 
operating costs. The change was not sufficient to offset the tenant's 
higher costs but helped to hold the relationship together. 
Three tenants approached the problem of adjusting for increased 
costs more directly by securing the landlord's participation in the con­
tributions which had risen most in cost, machinery, fuel and labor. One 
landlord found that the only incentive that would cause the tenant to 
operate a beef enterprise on the scale that the landlord wanted was to 
pay part of the cost of the additional hired labor. This payment has 
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been very effeotive and both landlord and tenant have expressed their 
satisfaction with the arrangement. Another tenant had been paying rent 
on the hired stands house and this practice was discontinued when wages 
increased. The tenant, however, did not feel that this was an adequate 
adjustment. In addition to the concessioa on wages, the landlord, the 
tenant's father, started paying a fixed sum of ^600 per year to offset 
increased machinery and fuel costs. While the tenant does not consider 
these amounts are adequate, the payments are responsible for the con­
tinued operation of the lease. The third tenant received $50 per year 
for the part time services for a grown son, but the tenant did not feel 
this was sufficient and moved to a larger farm where the son's labor 
would be utilized more effectively. 
Alternatives were considered for only three of the fourteen changes 
(Table 14). The alternatives considered by one tenant were all of the 
dairy and all of the poultry, or all of the dairy and one-half of the 
poultry. The second alternative was rejected because the tenant felt 
that the landlord's share of the net returns was already too high. 
The other two alternatives considered were considered in lieu of the 
tenants taking over the poultry enterprise. One tenant wanted the land­
lord to pay one-half of the tractor fuel, the change in cost that gave 
rise to the dissatlsfBiction. The landlord would not make this concession. 
The tenant did not feel that the adjustment was adequate and eventually 
secured a change in lease type. The other tenant who considered an alter­
native to taking over the poultry wanted the landlord to pay a larger part 
of the grass seed costs. The landlord refused to do so, but later assumed 
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the cost* Both ohanges together did not pro-vide a satisfaotory solution 
and the tenant later moved to a smaller farm that he owned. 
Further adjustments were desired after six of the ohanges (Table 15), 
Glvlnj; the tenant the poultry enterprise was insufficient adjustment in 
both eases and three of the four landlords' contributions to machinery, 
fuel and labor expenses were regarded as inadequate. 
At the time the ohanges were made, only one was regarded as neces­
sary to keep the rental relation intact. Subsequently, however, four of 
the ten tenants moved or ohan|!;ed lease typos because of their inability 
to make further adjustments in the stock-share oontraot. 
Landlords of eight tenants were interviewed. Provisions of five of 
the ei(;ht leasee had been changed. One of the changes involved changing 
the lease terms. The tenant changed from a 3 year lease to a 1 year 
lease In order to be in a position to chajige lease types, or farms if 
necessary, if prices and costs changed in such a manner that he would be 
better off on another lease type. This tenant had previously changed to 
a stock-share type lease in 1946 because an expected decline in prices 
with a smaller decrease in costs, and had secured a three year stock-
share lease as protection against that contingency. As prises and costs 
changed contrary to his 1946 expectations the longer term lease seized 
to his disadvantage. The other five ohanges have been discussed above. 
All changes were satisfactory to the landlords (Table 16) and none 
desired further -odification of the lease terms. 
At the time the ohanges were made none were regarded, either by the 
landlords or the tenants, as necessary for the continued operation of 
Table 15. Changes in Stock-ahare Lease Provisions for Which Further Changes were Desired by-
Tenants and Importance of Change to J'aintenanee of Relationship* 
Nvimber JJumber of changes 
of for -which further 
Change . changes changes are desired 
Change term of lease 1 0 
Tenant assume dairy enterprise 2 0 
Tenant assume poultry enterprise 2 2 
Landloz*d assume one-half poultry 1 0 
Landlord contribute to grass seed 1 1 
Landlord contribute to machinery, fuel and labor expense 4 S 
Adjust division of return from dairying 2 0 
Adjust division of products for home use 1 0 
Table 16. Landlords and Temnts Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction with Changes Made in Lease 
Provision of Eight Stockoshare Leases. 
Changes 
Number of leases 
investigated 
containing change 
Nvffliber of further changes desired 
Tenant Landlord 
Length of lease 1 
Tenant assume dairy enterprise 1 
Landlord dontrlbute to labor expense 2 
Landlord assume one-half of poultry enterprise 1 
Adjust division of products for home use 1 
Total 6 
0 
0 
1 
0 
O 
0 
b 
0 
0 
0 
CO 
09 
No change 
Total 
3 
ga 
fAs one lease was changed twice the total number of changes is one more than the number of 
leases investigated. 
^Landlord did not give reaction to the change. 
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the lease, but of the flTe tenants making changes, two later moved or 
changed lease types beoause of dissatisfaction -with the division of 
net returns under the stock-share arrangement* Of the three that 
made no change in the lease provisions, two later discontinued the 
relationship and moved because of an unsatisfactory division of the 
net return* 
B* Change Lease Types 
1. Extent 
Large shifts from one form of teioancy to another have occurred in 
Iowa during the 1945-50 period* According to the 1950 U* S. census, the 
niuDber of cash tenants declined nearly 40 per cent during the period 
while the number of share-cash tenants increased 50.9 per cent. The 
number of tenants classified as share and cropper, which would include 
the stock-share tenants, decreased 34.S per cent and the number of un­
classified tenants decreased by 25.7 per cent* The 50.9 per cent increase 
in share-cash tenants is even more significant when considered along 
with a 12*1 per cent decrease in tenancy of all forms. 
Various lease tjrpes offer the landlord and tenant a set of alter­
natives for adjusting the division of net returns* The wide use of this 
technique by Iowa Farm Business Associations members is shown in Table 17* 
Approximately 400 tenants cooperated with the business associations during 
the 1940-50 period and these tenants made a total of 148 changes in lease 
type during the ten year period. The period was one in which the cash 
Table 17. Changes in Lease Types Made by Members of the Iowa Farm Business Assoolatlons in the 
Period 1940 - 1950. 
Lease type 
Year 
Cash Crop-share Stock-share 
Total To From Gain To From Gain To From Gain 
1950 5 7 2 15 7 8 3 9 -6 
1949 7 4 3 7 6 1 1 5 -4 
1948 7 4 3 6 5 3 0 6 -6 
1947 5 7 "•2 7 4 3 3 4 -1 
1946 6 1 5 4 3 1 1 7 -6 
1945 8 1 7 2 7 -5 2 4 -2 
1944 8 3 5 3 8 -5 1 1 0 
1943 1 5 -4 12 1 11 0 7 -7 
1942 7 3 4 5 6 -5 1 2 -1 
1941 5 4 1 4 3 1 1 3 -2 
1940 4 3 1 4 5 -1 3 3 0 
Number change 
to lease type 63 69 16 148 
Nvffliber changes 
from lease type 42 55 51 148 
Gain 21 14 -35 0 
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rent type lease was most favorable to the tenant from the standpoint 
of division of net returns and the stock-share lease the least favorable. 
Throughout the period there was a net gain of 21 in the cash leases, a 
net gain of 14 in the crop-share leases, and a net loss of 35 ia the 
stock-share leases. This would indicate that the tenants held an advan­
tage in bargaining power during the period. The situation is somewhat 
different, however, when the time covered is divided into the war and 
postwar periods. The war period, 1940 through 1946, was one of a de­
creased supply of farm manpower and the tenant was in a favorable 
bp,rgaining position. Of 80 changes made in lease type, there was a net 
gain of 19 to the cash lease, a net loss of one to the crop-share lease, 
and a net loss of 18 to the stock-share arrangement. Figure 18.^ The, 
tenants were able, in large part, to select the lease that gave them 
the most favorable division of the net return. 
In the post war period the bargaining position of the tenant has 
been reversed. With the return of the veterans, many seeking rental 
farms, competition for farms has been stronger and the tenant has had 
less choice over the type of lease he will use. Of the 66 changes occur­
ring in lease type between 1947 and 1950, there was a net gain of 2 to 
the cash lease, 16 to the crop-share lease, and a net loss of 17 to 
stock-share plan (Figure 18). As the net return ratios of the cash and 
stock-share leases show considerable divergence in this period, the 
shift to the crop-share arrangement may constitute a compromise between 
^The data used in the preparation of the figure appear in Table 1, 
Appendix C. 
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the two lease types. 
Ihe data presented in Table 17 and Figure 18 have been found to be 
subject to considerable error throui^h inaoouraoias of observation and 
classification* The shifts in lease types made by business association 
oooperators in the postwar period, however, are similar to those shown 
in the 1860 IT* 5* Census data.^ 
2. Changes from a cash lease 
Only three tenants could be found who had changed from a cash lease 
to another form and retained the same farm and landlord* These three 
tenants ohan,e;ed to a crop-share arrangement| none were foimd who had 
changed to the stoekoshare plan. 
(a) Cause and alternative to change* The changes were made in 
2 
1947, 1948, and 1949* All changes were made at the landlord's sug­
gestion. The o&use of the changes, as given by the tenants, was the in­
crease of farm prices and ownership costs* As two of the landlords did 
not offer alternatives in the form of higher cash rent, apparently they 
felt that cash rent could not be increased enough in environment of 
custom to provide an adequate adjustment* Two tenants were willing to 
pay a larger cash rent, but not the cash equivalent of the share rent. 
liable 2, Appendix C. 
^Table 3, Appendix C. Wiere the number of observations is too 
small to permit effective aggregation details of the individual cases, 
they have been presented in the Appendix. 
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The third party, who was offered an alternative in the form of a sub­
stantial increase in cash rent, declined the alternative for the same 
reason, even though the cash rent, including the increase, would have 
amounted to less than the share rent.^ 
(b) Satisfaction with chan;;e» Two of the three tenants were 
reluctant to make the change to share rent as they expected to receive 
a smaller share of the net returns under the new arrangement.^ One was 
not opposed to the change as his principal income was from livestock and 
not the crops grown on the farm. 
While the change resulted in higher rent, two tenants regarded it 
* 
as successful because it provided a division of the returns acceptable 
to both parties and permitted a continuation of the rental relationship.^ 
Two of three tenants felt that they would have been required to 
move had they not accepted the changes. In all cases accepteuace of the 
changes in lease types was aoknowledgnent of the superior bargaining 
position of the landlords. 
3. Changes from crop-share leases 
A total of ten tenants were interviewed who had changed from the 
crop-share lease to another type of lease while retaining the sajne farm 
^One tenant, who was not satisfied with the change at the time it 
was made, moved after one year on the crop-share plan. The increase in the 
landlord's share of "tiie returns was responsible for his moving. 
2 
Table 4, Appendix C. 
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and landlord. Of these ten, eight had changed to cash leases and two 
to the stock-share lease* 
(a) Cause and alternatives considered to change» Of the ten tenants 
interviewed, half had changed their lease type in order to adjust for 
changes in prices, costs, or production (Table 18). Three of the tenants 
changed from a crop-share lease to a cash lease and two from a orop-share 
to a stock-share lease. 
Hone of the teiaants changing lease types, as a result of direct 
economic causes, was related to his landlord. All tenants making the 
change for other reasons were related to their landlord.^ 
Of the three changing from a crop-share to a cash lease to compen­
sate for economic changes, two made the change in 1941 and one in 1945. 
Both of those changing in 1941 stated that the change was made because 
cash rent was lower than share rent, and both suggested that the change 
be made* The tenant who changed from a orop-share lease to a cash lease 
in 1945, did so at the land.lord'8 insistence and had to accept a three 
2 year cash lease. It ire-S the tenant's opinion that the landlord expected 
a decline in farm prices following World War II and wanted a cash lease 
^Three of the five changes made for reasons other than adjusting 
prices, costs aiid production were made because of the landlord's inability 
to further participate in management. The remaining changes were made to 
sisqplify record keeping. All of the changes from the orop-share lease 
arising from noneoonomio o&uses were designed to transfer part of the 
managerial duties of the landlord to the tenant. 
The temnt had rented the farm for more than 20 years preTiously 
on a year to year basis. 
Table 18. Number of Tenants Interviewed Who Changed from Crop-share Leases to Another Type to 
Adjust for Changes in Prices, Costs and Production and Other Causes. 
Type of change 
Changing to adjust for 
changes in prices, 
costs and production 
Changing for reasons 
other than to adjust for 
changes in prices, 
costs and production 
Kumber 
Number 
related to 
landlord Wianber 
Number 
related to 
landlord 
Crop-share to cash 3 0 5 5 
Crop-share to stock-share 2 0 0 0 
Total 5 0 5 5 
97 
as protection ai^inst a decline in income* This view was substantiated 
in part when the landlord Insisted on changing back to the crop-share 
lease after the expiration of the three year period and prices had risen 
rather than declined. The tenant felt that his bargaining:; position was 
weak relative to the landlord's and he was left with no alternative but 
to comply with the landlord's wishes* 
None of the tenants changing from a crop-share lease type for 
economic reasons considered any alternatives, (Table 19), 
Two tenants changed from a crop-share lease to a stock-share lease; 
one making the change in 1940 and the o'^er in 1947. Both changes were 
made because of the landlord's dissatisfaction with his share of the net 
returns xmder the crop-share arrangement. The tenant making the change 
in 1940 felt that his capital was limited and that his return would be 
greater under the stock-share plan. No alternatives were considered by 
the tenant making the change in 1947 as he felt that the number of farms 
available for renting were too few relative to the number of tenants for 
him to bargain effectively. 
(b) Satisfaction with changes from crop-share leases. Tenants 
making the change from crop-share leases to cash leases were well satisfied 
with the ohai^;e.^ The reason given in all cases was the failure of the 
cash rent to advance as rapidly as prices.^ Two felt that their landlords 
^Table 5b, Appendix C • 
^Of the three making the change« two later purchased the fai*m8 they 
were renting. 
liable 19. Origin, Cause of, and Alternative Considered to Changes from Crop-share Lease because 
of Change in Pirioes, Costs and Production. 
^ ^ , Humber Number 
considering satisfied 
Type of change Total Tenant Landlord alternatives with change 
Crop-share 
to cash 3 3 
Crop-share 
to stock share 2 0 
Total 5 3 
0 0 S 
2 0 0 
2 0 3 
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were satisfied ivith the ohange irhen it was made and after the elapse of 
a period of time* The third tenant felt that his landlord -was satisfied 
originally, but after a rise in prices the landlord insisted on changing 
back to the crop-share plan.^ 
Neither of the changes to stock-share renting worked out success­
fully. One tenant became dissatisfied with his share of the net return 
and was able to purchase the farm from the landlord. The other tenant 
making the change from crop-share to stock-share has been dissatisfied 
with the dlTision since the change was made and is seeking adjustments 
in the lease* 
4« Changes from stock-share leases 
A total of nine tenants who had changed from the stock-share lease 
were interviewed. Of these nine, seven had changed from the stock-share 
plan to the cash lease, and two had changed from the stock-share plan 
to the crop-share arrangement. All of the former group of tenants, and 
one of the latter group, are related to their landlord,^ 
(a) Cause of changes and alternatives considered. Six of seven 
changes from stock-share to cash resulted from changes in prices, costs 
^Only one landlord involved in any of the changes from crop-share 
leases was interviewed. This landlord is a banker who managed a large 
number of farms at the time the change was made and did not recall mai^ 
of the details surrounding the change. 
^Details of the schedules are shown in Table 5a,Appendix C. 
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and production and occurred after 1945, Of the two changing from stock-
share to crop-share, one mde the change in 1941 and the other in 1949, 
The tenant inakinE; the change in 1941 was not related to the landlord 
and possibly would have encountered more resistance to the change if 
the attempt had been made in the postwar period. 
Of the eight changes resulting from changes in prices, coats and 
production seven were made at the suggestion of the tenant (Table 20), 
This would suggest that tenants had knowledge of which lease was most 
favorable with respect to their incomes. None of the changes were 
suggested by landlords; the one change not suggested by the tenant was 
a result of a court order in the administration of an estate. The court 
contended that stock-share plan entailed too much risk for the estate. 
The court decision was satisfactory to the tenant who had previously 
failed to secure a change of lease type or modification of his stock-
share provisions. 
Two alternatives were considered by those changing to the cash lease. 
One tenant stated that he would have discontinued farming and sought 
employment as a farm laborer had he been unable to change from the stock-
share plan. Another tenant offered to purchase the farm from the land­
lord, and after six years operation on the cash lease the landlord sold 
the farm to the tenant, 
(b) Satisfaction with ohangea from stock-share leases. All tenants 
changing from the stock-share lease expressed satisfaction with the 
change (Table 21), Of the ei^t making the change, seven regarded the 
Tftble 20. Cause of Changes fraa Stook^share Leases, Party Suge;estlng Change, and Niiaiber of 
Alternatl7es Considered to Change* 
Number of Number of . Number 
Cause of tenants tenants related Sugges —y. considering 
change making ohange to landlord Landlord Tenant Other alternatiyes 
Fr«m stock-share 
to cash 
Change to adjust 6 6 0 5 12 
for prices, costs 
or production 
Change for other 1 1 0 0 10 
reasons 
From stock-share 
to crop-share 
Change to adjust 
for prices, costs 
or production 
Change for other 
reasons 
Total 
Table 21. Satisfaction of Landlords and Tenants with Change from Stock-share to Crop-share and 
cash rent* 
Type of 
change 
Number making 
change to 
adjust for 
prices, costs 
or production 
Number of 
tenants 
satisfied 
with change 
when made 
Number 
considering 
change 
successful 
by tenants 
Nunfljer of 
landlords 
satisfied 
with change 
Number of 
changes 
critical to 
relationship 
Stock-share 
to cash 
6 6 6® 5 3 
Stook-share 
to crop-share 2 2 2 2 1^ 
®Five of the six tenants said the change was successful as it gave them a larger share of the 
net returns* The other regarded the change as successful because prices advanced more than cash 
rent. 
^The other respondent making change did not know whether or not he would have stayed on the 
farm if the change had not been made* 
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change succeoBful and one moderately successful. The tenant with reser-
Tations with respect to the success of the lease type change found 
livestock improvements difficult to obtain after changing from a stock-
share lease to a crop«>share lease* 
The success of the changes was due to the effect upon the division 
of net income* Six of the respondents who said the change was successful 
attributed their satisfaction to their larger share of the net income, and 
one to the fact that prices subsequently increased more than his cash 
rent.^ 
Seven of the eight tenants changing from stock-share believed that 
their landlords were satisfied with the change frc®i the stock-share plan, 
but some expressed reservations or indicated that landlords were not as 
well satisfied as they were before the change was made* One tenant 
stated that the change was not satisfactory to his landlord at any time 
following the change. This tenant has since purchased the fairm. 
Although all but one of the tenants making the change were related 
to their landlord, half, or four, of them stated that they would not have 
continued, to rent on the stock-share lease. In addition to these, one 
^Table 6, Appendix C. 
^The landlords' views were not obtained. As all but one of these 
respondents were related to the landlord it was necessary to interview 
some in the landlord's presence. Every effort was made to prevent 
these interviews from causing difficulty between landlord and tenant and 
when the landlord was present ho was not asked to confirm the information 
given by the tenant. Of the landlords not present at the time of inter­
view, all were either economically inaccessible or in a state of health 
that prevented their being interviewed. 
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more was uncertain about whether or not he would have continued with the 
stock-share arrangement. The change from the stock-share appears to 
have been a necessary adjustment in the division of net returns for the 
preservation of the rental relationship. 
C. Changes in Farms as a Means to Change the 
Division of Nat Returns 
A total of nineteen tenants who had changed farms or discontined 
farming were interviewed. Of these nineteen tenants fifteen made the 
change for reasons other than dissatisfaction with the lease. The four 
making the change for reasons other than dissatisfaction vith the lease 
changed because of dissatisfaction with the farm, uncertainty of tenure, 
inability to agree with the landlord, and death of the landlord. 
All but one of the tenants changing farms because of dissatisfaction 
with the lease changed lease types at the same time. The changes in 
lease type accompanying the change in farms is shown in Table 22. In 
addition to these tenants, one former tenant was interviewed who had 
quit fanning and assumed another occupation as a result of his inability 
to get a satisfactory lease. 
Of the thiz^een tenants interviewed who changed lease types and 
farms simultaneously, two changed from the cash lease, three from the 
crop-share type and eight from the stock-share lease.^ 
^Details of the schedules of the tenants are shown in Tables 7, 8, 
and 9, Appendix C. 
T»ble 22. Changes Made in Lease Type by Temnta VVTio Changed Farms Because of Dissatisfaction with 
Rental ArrangeFent. 
Changes in lease type 
From cash to 
Crop- Stock-
share share 
From crop-
share to 
Cash 
Stock-
share 
From stock-
share to 
Crop-
Cash share 
Change farm 
but not 
lease type 
Cult 
farming Total 
Number 15 
Total changing 
from a lease type 2 S 8 
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Chanj^es in farms accompanied by ohangss from cash leases 
(a) Date J cause« and success of chang!;e« Both of the tenants inter­
viewed who changed farms and changed from the cash t^/pe lease did so 
•because of demands from the landlord for more cash rent,^ The two 
tenants felt that in the light of price uncertainty the landlord's de-
aired cash rent involved too much risk. One tenant made the chanre 
in 1947, and the other in 1948, years in which prices fluctuated con­
siderably. 
One tenant offered his landlord the alternative of some increase 
in the cash rent, although a smaller increase than the landlord desired, 
or of changing to the crop-share arrangement. Neither of the alternatives 
•was acceptable to the landlord and the tenant moved after finding a 
farm available on crop-share terms. Risk aversion was an important 
factor in the tenant's resistance to increased cash rent. 
The other tenant changing from the cash plan changed to the stock-
share, and made no counteroffers to the landlord. The tenant felt that 
the cash rent was already too much at the time the landlord made the 
additional demand, and as he had an opportunity to rent a larger farm 
on the stock-share plan, vfith the landlord bearing more than the customary 
expenses, he refused to grsuat the increase. 
Both tenants felt that the change improved their long-run position 
with respect to division of the net income and regarded the change as 
successful. Tieither believed that any problems with his present landlord 
^IPable 9, Appendix C. 
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were incapable of solution or that he would have to change farms again 
in order to adjust the division of net returns. 
2. Changes in farms aooompanied by changes from the erop-share lease 
Three tenants were interviewed who changed farms and changed from 
the crop-share lease type at the same time. Two changed to the stock-
share and one to the cash lease arrangement* 
(a) Cause of changes in farms, changes from crop-share lease type, 
and alternatives considered. The changes from the crop-share leases were 
unsatisfactory to the tenants maJdLng the change. The tenant who changed 
farms and changed from the crop-share lease to cash lease made the 
change in 1950 and did so because of inability to agree with the landlord 
about rental terms.^ The landlord wanted to change to cash rent or in­
crease the landlord's share from 40 per cent to 50 per cent. The 
temnt offered to change to cash rent at a rate lower than the rate the 
landlord asked. Agreement on the terms could not be obtained and the 
temnt moved to a less productive farm renting for less than the proposed 
rent of the original fam. The tenant now feels that the rent is ex­
tremely high relative to the productivity and that he would have been in 
a better position by paying the rent the first landlord asked. The move 
did not provide a satisfactory solution to the teimnt's problems and 
unless the rent is reduced on the second farm he will move again. 
^able 8, Appendix 0. 
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The two tenants who changed farms and changed from crop-share 
leases to stock-share leases did so because of an expected decline in 
farm prices. One made the change in 1941 ajid the other in 1946. Both 
expected the stock-share lease to provide a larger share of the net 
returns to the tenant on a decline of price level. Prices did not 
decline, however, and both tenants believed that they would have fared 
better by continuing on the old arrangement.^ 
Neither of the crop-share landlords offered any alternative to the 
tenants when the tenant desired to make the change in lease types. 
Two of the three landlords owning the farms from which the moves 
were made were interviewed. The landlords confirmed the teriant's version 
of the difficulties leading to the move. Neither landlord experienced 
any trouble in obtaining new tenants willing to rent on the terms the 
former tenants rejected. 
3. Changes in farms acoompanied by a change from the stock-share lease. 
Bight tenants viere interviewed who had ohajiged from a stock-share 
lease at the time they changed farms; three tenants changed from stock-
share to cash, and five changed from stock-share to crop-share. 
^One tenant succeeded in getting a stock-share lease somewhat differ­
ent than the customary lease; the landlord pays three-fifths of the 
fertiliser costs and receives one-half of the crop, pays part of the 
hired labor costs, and bears other expenses normally paid by the tenant, 
and the division of net returns under the stock-share plan is not con­
sidered unsatisfactory. The other tenant making the change eventually 
became dissatisfied with the division of the net retura and moved to a 
smaller fam that he had previously purchased. 
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(a) Cause of changes and alterna-tlves oonaidered* The eight 
changes were distributed fairly uniformly over the period studied with 
only two of the changes occurring in the same year.^ 
All of the changes were made for a single reason; stock-share rent 
was considered high relative to rent under the other lease types. Half 
of the tenants would have continued on the stock-share plan and remained 
on the farm if some adjustment would have been made in the poultry and 
dairy enterprise. Three other tenants would have remained on the farm 
if they could have changed to another leas© type. Thus in seven of the 
eight cases, the costs associated with moving could have been avoided 
by modifying the rental arrangement, and in half of the cases the 
modification needed was very small* 
None of the landlords involved offered the tenants any alternative 
to acceptance of the stock-share lease unchanged. One landlord, after 
the tenant had moved, offered the adjustments the tenant wanted origin­
ally if the tenant would move back. The tenant had changed to a cash 
rented farm and would not have rented again on the stock-share without 
additional modifications. 
All tenants changing farms and changing from the stock-share 
lease considered the changes as a satisfactory solution to their rental 
problems of income and income division. Four of the tenants later 
acquired ownership stating that land prices and oiraership costs had not 
increased as rapidly as rent. None of the tenants believed that their 
new rental arrangement contained any problems pertaining to the mechanism 
^Table 7, Appendix C. 
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of the lease that oould not be -worked out satisfaotorially -with the new 
landlord. All tenants maklnc!; subsequent changes did not do so because 
of inability to agree with the landlord on rental terms, 
ChaP'RQS in farms with no change in lease type and ohanges from 
fanning to another ocoupation 
Only one tenant was interviewed who had changed farms and retained 
the same lease type. The change was made because of the tenant's dis­
satisfaction with the division of net returns under a stock-share 
arrangement and his inability to obtain modifications of the leasing 
arrangement. The tenant wanted to have all of the returns from the 
poultry and dairy enterprises in order to compensate for his increased 
costs. The landlord would not agree to these changes and the tenant 
ranted another farm under a stock-share lease permitting him to retain 
all dairy and poultry receipts. This change provided a satisfactory 
division of the net return for a number of years. The tenant eventually 
became an owner but not because of any dissatisfaction with the lease. 
The owner of the farm from which the tenant moved verified the tenant's 
account of the cause of the change. The fann was rented to another 
tenant on the same terms that the original tenant refused to accept. 
One tenant was interviewed who had given up farming as an occupation. 
The tenant had operated a small farm on the stock-share arrangement. He 
became dissatisfied with the division of net returns and believed that 
the division was not appropriate to the ratio of the contributions. The 
landlord offered the tenant a crop-share lease but the tenant did not 
Ill 
feel that this would be an adequate adjustment. He had an opportunity 
to enter another line of employment and this has provided a satisfactory 
solution to his income problems. 
D. Acquisition of Farm Ownership as An Alternative 
to an Unfavorable Rental Situation 
Number interviewed and cause of ohanpie to ownership 
A total of twenty tenants were interviewed who had changed from a 
form of tenancy to full ownership. Of these twenty, eleven became 
owners because of direct dissatisfaction with their rental arransrements 
(Table 23). The remainder acquired ownership for such miscellaneous 
reasons as desire for security of tenure, freedom from landlord's inter­
ference in the management of the farm, and inheritance. 
2. Alternatives considered and satisfaction with ehan!!:e 
Of the eleven tenants changing to ownership only two attempted to 
negotiate with the landlord before leaving the farm. One tenant, renting 
on crop-share, would not have terminated the rental relationship if the 
lease type had been chained to cash. He had rented the farm for a number 
of years on a cash arrangement and changed to the crop-share plan at the 
landlord's insistence. Following one year on the crop-share plan he 
moved to a farm he had purchased previously. 
The other tenant who negotiated with his landlord before purchasing 
a farm had operated several years on a stock-share arrangement. During 
Table 23. Reasons Given by Tenants for Acquisition of Ownership. 
Number 
Reasons 
Costs of Inability to 
ovfnership agree on 
less than rent rental terms Other Total 
20 
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this period his operating expenses, particularly machinery replacements, 
repairs, fuel and labor, increased considerably. The landlord offered to 
pay part of the hired labor cost but the tenant did not consider this an 
adequate adjustment* 
All except one of the tenants interviewed -who obtained ownership in 
the 1939 - 1950 period were well satisfied with the change. The reason 
given by all of those satisfied ms the rising level of farm prices 
throughout the period which enabled them to reduce their debts easily and 
secure their equity in the property.^ The one tenant who did not find 
ownership a satisfactory solution to his rental problems purchased a 
small farm. The operation of this fanii did not keep him fully employed 
and he felt that he would have been in a better position by staying on 
as a renter on the old farm. 
S. Landlord's views 
Six landlords were interviewed, three of whom had sold their farms 
to the tenants. These three landlords sold because they needed their 
money for other purposes; the tenants bought because the costs of owner­
ship were less than the rent they were paying. Of the remaining three 
landlords whose tenants bought farms, two confirmed that their tenants 
bought because of inability to agree on rental terms and one that he 
lln the period of 19S9 through 1949 the average cash rent increased 
122 per cent while land values increased 102 per cent. Computed from 
B. French and W. Chryst. Prices affecting Iowa agriculture 1910-1949. 
Mimeo. Ames. 1950. pp.34-39. 
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bought because of the difference between rent and ownership costs. Both 
landlords whose tenants purchased farms because of their inability to 
agree on rental terns succeeded in obtaining tenants who would accept 
the terms the landlord desired, both changes having occurred in 1948, 
a year in which the demand for rental farms was very intense. 
E. Sununary of Methods Used by Landlords and Tenants 
to Secure Adjustments in Rental Arrangements 
The limited number of observations with respect to some changes has 
made summarization and interpretation of the results difficult. The 
absence of observations in some classifications is the result of a small 
population of changes of the type, and this is indicative of the lack 
of use of the particular change as a method of adjustment. 
From the information available it appears that landlords and tenants 
do not make many charges in lease provisions to adjust for changes in 
prices, costs and production. The share arrangements provide more pro­
tection against price, cost and production variability than the cash 
lease; consequently, share tenants made fewer changes in their arrange­
ments than cash tenants. Changes in cash and crop-share lease provisions 
are restricted largely to changes in the amount of cash rent. Half of 
the changes in the stock-share provisions were of a makeshift mture axid 
half concerned the problem of increased costs directly. 
The difficulty in finding tenants who had changed lease types while 
returning to the same farm and landlord indicates that this technique is 
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seldom used*^ 
No difficulty, howevar, was encountered in finding, tenants who 
had changed farms. Of the fourteen changing farms because of dissatis­
faction with their rental arrangement, thirteen changed lease types at 
the same time. Since few make changes in lease type while retaining the 
same fam and landlord, but nearly all change lease types with a change 
in farms there is some reason to believe that the lease type accompanies 
the farm. 
This could be ea^eoted to be true when the landlords are in as 
.favorable a bargaining position as they have been since 1946. If the 
tenant cannot secure changes in lease provision or lease type, his only 
alternative is to find a landlord willing to rent under the type that 
he desires. The cause of fourteen of the nineteen moves investigated was 
to secure a lease type not available on the farms the tenants were oper­
ating. 
There is little evidence to indicate that dissatisfaction with rigid­
ity in leasing is an important factor in motivating tenants to acquire 
ownership. Of the 20 tenants interviewed only four were pushed into 
ownership because of inability to get a satisfactory lease. The leases 
of seven other tenants were satisfactory, but they were pulled into 
ownership because of the difference between the cost of owning and the 
cost of hiring land. The remaining tenants acquiring ownership did so 
^The sum of Total completed" and the "Unvisited" items in Table S 
represents all changes in lease type with no change in farms known to 
the present fieldmen of the Iowa Farm Business Associations. This is a 
total of 28 changes of all types. 
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beoauae of inheritanoo, deair® for security of tenure, and related factors. 
From the interviews it appears that custom prevents many changes in 
lease provisions* The landlord's bargaining position prevents chanf;es 
in lease type. Adjustment for changing prices, coats and production is 
achieved by changing; farms and lease types simultaneously. Acquisitior 
of ownership oomea about more as a result of failure of land ownership 
costs to rise as rapidly as rent and not as the result of any particular 
dissatisfaction with the lease. 
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V, SOME ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF ADJUSnKG KBNIAL HATES 
A. Need for Methods 
The need for methods of adjusting rental arrangements for changes 
in prices, costs and production is indicated in Table 24, Of the tenants 
interviewed, 39 per cent of the cash tenants, 42 per cent of the orop-
share tenants and 76 per cent of the stock-share tenants stated that 
their leasing arrangement did not permit eatisfaotory adjustments for 
changes in prices, costs and production during the period 1939 through 
1950» Since this was a period of rising prices, the order of relative 
satisfftction with the lease types indicated by the tenants could be 
e:q)ected» For example, lack of flexibility in the cash lease provisions 
could be expected to be satisfactory to the tenant in a period of rising 
prices during which the tenants income increases more rapidly thain cash 
rent which lags behind farm incOTie changes. On the other hand, the in­
ability of stock-share tenants to make adjustments in their leases for 
disproportionate cost changes would lead them to say that the arrange­
ment lacks sufficient flexibility for adjustment for changes in prices, 
costs and produotion* 
A lease which the tenant considers adequate from the standpoint of 
flexibility may not be considered adequate by the landlord. In a period 
of rising prices, the raiiking of leases by the landlords in order of 
flexibility with respect to price, cost and production adjustment could 
be expected to be the opposite of the order given by the tenants. Satis­
faction of the landlords interviewed and their tenants with the lease 
Table 24, Ability of TenantB to ^ ake Satisfactory Adjustments in Lease Provision to Compensate 
for Changing Prices, Costs and Production. 
Cash tenants 
Per cent 
Number of total 
Crop-share tenants 
Per cent 
Number of total 
Stock-share tenants 
Per cent 
Number of total 
Lease permits 
satisfactory 
adjustment 
19 61 15 58 24 
Lease does not 
permit satis­
factory adjustment 12 39 11 42 25 76 
Total 31 100 26® 100 33 100 
®'I)ifferent from total nvanber of crop-share tenants given in Table 10 because some tenants did 
not give a clear answer to question* 
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types from the standpoint of ability to make adjustments la shown in 
Table 25, While the number of observations are few, there is some 
indication that landlords and tenants have opposite views on their 
ability to make adjustments within the framework of the rental arrange­
ment. Of the ten cash landlords interviewed only three stated that 
satisfaotoi*y adjustments for price, cost and production changes could be 
made within the framework of the leasej all three of these landlords 
were renting under a flexible leasing arrangement. The three tenants 
of these landlords and four other tenants indicated that the cash lease 
permitted satisfactory adjustments. For the stock-share leases the 
situation is reversed; eight of nine landlords stated that the lease 
tjrpe permitted satisfactory adjustments as compared with only three of 
nine tenants. 
The inability of landlords and tenants to make provision changes 
satisfactory to both within the lease t3rpe necessitates the utiliuation 
of other means of obtaining adjustments. They may either change lease 
types or change fanas or tenants, or change farms or tenants and lease 
types simultaneously. The changing of lease types without changing 
farms is frequently difficult or impossiblej some landlords are not 
qualified to rent on the stock-share and some tenants are not in a 
position to assume the risks associated with cash leasing. This requires 
that a change in lease type to adjust for changing prices, costs and 
production be accompanied with a change in farms or a change in tenants. 
This conclusion is supported by findings of the survey in which a small 
nmber of changes in lease types with no change in farms was found and 
Table 25* Ability of Landlords and Their Tenants to Make Satisfaotory Adjustments in Lease 
Provisions to Condensate for Changing Prices, Costs and Production. 
Cash leases Crop-share leases Stook-share leases 
Landlords Tenants Landlords Tenants Landlords Tenants 
% of % of % of % of % of % of 
No. total No. total No. total No. total No. total No. total 
Lease permits 
satisfactory 
adjustment 3 30 7 70 8 100 5 63 8 89 3 33 
Lease does 
not peirmit 
satisfaotory 
adjustment 6 60 3 30 0 0 3 37 1 11 6 67 
Do not knofw 1 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 10 100 10 100 8 100 8 100 9 100 9 100 
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the high proportion of changes in lease type found in conjunotion with 
changes in farms. As pointed out earlier, the necessity of changing 
farms in order to snake an adjustment in the rental arrangement inrolves 
both individual and social costs* These costs could be avoided ia large 
measure if means were developed for making intra-lease and inter-lease 
types of adjustments without changing farms. Achievement of intra-lease 
type adjustments would lessen the need for changes in lease type, and if 
changes in lease type must be accompanied with a change in farms, serve 
to reduce tenant mobility. 
Several advantages would result from the reduction in tenant mobil­
ity caused by unsatisfactory leasing arrajagements. Longer certainty of 
expectations would permit the investment of resources in enterprises 
with longer production periods if these were economically desirable; the 
substitution of cheaper factors of production with a longer life would 
be possible. An example of this type of substitution would be the use 
of raw rock phosphate instead of commercial phosphoric acid. Some con­
tribution could be made in making farm and land improvements through the 
achievement of longer tenure on rented farms. A tenant faced with a 
fixed rental payment is motivated to hold all or part of the rent in 
reserve, or to restrict investments to enterprises which will mature in 
advance of the rent paying date. This could result in the substitution 
of hogs for oattle in production, with emphasis on corn over rou^age. 
Flexibility in rental arrangement with longer tenure would permit greater 
production of roughage consuming animals and the use of longer 
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rotations. ^ 
Development of means to make rental arrangements more flexible 
with respect to economic changes affeotii^ the division of income 
could result in a better allocation of resources within the firm and 
reduce the need for adoption of more costly methods of adjustments now 
being employed. Practices for adjusting rents have been developed by-
landlords and tenants, and by parties interested in landlord-tenant 
relations. 
B, Evaluation of Methods Found in Study 
Landlords and tenants can follow one of two procedures in adjusting 
rental rates. They can (l) make absolute changes on the basis of 
expectations, or (2) devise the rental payment in such a maimer that 
it varies with conditions prevailing during the period of the lease. 
The first type of ohanc;e fixes the rental conditions for the next rental 
period; the second bases the rent on events that have transpired. 
1. Fixed changes based upon expectations 
Landlords and tenants did not rely upon any mechanism to altor the 
lease provisions to compensate for changes in prices, costs and pro­
duction. Under the cash lease, the adjustment was confined in nearly 
^The lack of flexibility in the cash payments of crop-share leasing 
resulted in misuse of land resources in the nineteen-thrities. Some 
tenanbs fallowed hay and pasture land in order to reduce cash rent com­
mitments. Schickle and Norman, og. cit» p. 175, 
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all oaaea to ohangas in the amount of the cash rent. With the current 
statutory period of notification for termination of the lease, this 
necessitates setting the amount of the rent at least 16 months ahead 
of the date of payment.^ Unless the parties correctly estimate the 
future price movements, cash rent must always lag behind prices. This 
lag in rent is unsatisfactory to the landlord whan prices are rising, 
and to the tenant Tfhen prices are declining. One method of minimiBin^ 
the lag in rent is to restrict the rental terra to one year.^ This per­
mits annual negotiation of the amount of rent but adds to the tenant's 
insecurity of tenure and to restriction of investment to short term 
enterprises. Adoption of a flexible renting scheme based upon prices, 
costs and production ivould eliminate the need for yearly negotiation of 
the rent and perm.it the adoption of longer term leases. 
Adjustments for changes in prices, costs and production are more 
difficult to make under the share plans than under the cash arrangement. 
Adjustments in crop-share provisions in nearly all cases were limited to 
changing the eunount of cash rent for hay and pasture land. As the cash 
rent is payment in part for the livestock facilities maintained by the 
landlord for the tenant's use an increase in the cash rent would be 
expected if the tenant continued to demand the same amount of service 
^Assuming the final payment due on the last day of Februai^r, the 
customary end of the leasing year. 
^Only one cash lease of a period longer than one year was found in 
the total of 33 investigated. Some landlords volunteered the need for 
frequent adjustments as the reason for restricting the case to one year. 
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and the building costs increased. With an increase in livestock pro­
duction and, consequently, an increase in demand for livestock faoilities 
on the rented farm, cash rents for hay, pasture and buildings could be 
expected to advance. A flexible renting plan baainf; the cash rent upon 
the price of livestock products would facilitate the construction of 
new improvements at the time needed to expand production. The tenant 
would also be protected when prices are declining and the expansion of 
crop acreage to reduce cash rental fees such as occurred in the early 
nineteen-thirties would not be necessary. 
The stock-share plan has no single feature that can be adjusted as 
easily as a cash payment. Any adjustment for changes in prices, costs 
and production must take the form of changes of the ratio of contri­
butions or returns. In a period of rising prices, adjustments may in­
volve the transfer of a minor enterprise to the tenant or the landlord's 
direct contribution to some of the expenses. The first method of 
adjustment, while not defensible from the standpoint of resource allo­
cation, was successful in holding the relationship together in some 
cases. The effect on incomes and the income division of some of the 
enterprise transfers was small, but it was enough to compensate the tenant 
for his increased costs. Some landlords have started paying part of the 
fuel, machinery and labor costs and the success of these contributions 
depends upon how extensively the landlord contributes. The landlord's 
contributions to some of the expenses has been necessary for the main­
tenance of some stock-share relationships. If the landlord-tenant 
relationship is sufficiently amiable so that the landlord and tenant 
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can barf;ain freely, the contribution of the landlord to some of the 
expenses offers a desirable method of adjusting the rental arrangement. 
The landlord may have an incentive to make such concessions in a period 
of rising prices when the demand for stock-share farms by experienced 
tenants has decreased and the landlord -wants to retain his present 
tenant to avoid the trouble and cost of dividing the jointly owned 
property and the need for starting over with a younger and less ex­
perienced tenant. 
Another method of rental arrangement adjustment employed by 
landlords and tenants is to chance farms or tenants. The necessity for 
the use of this method frequently grows out of the inability of the 
parties to make adjustments in the lease provisions or lease type. The 
disadvantages of the use of this method pertain to the costs involved, 
both the direct costs to the individuals and the social cost to the 
community. Some mobility between farms may be necessary to permit 
more effective combination of resources, but to the extent that mobility 
arises from inflexibilities in rental arrangements the changes result 
in a net loss to the individuals concerned and to societyJ^ 
Some of this mobility may be generated by the stock-share lease 
which may have a limit upon the effective period of operation. The fre­
quent justification of the stock-share lease is baaed upon its use by be­
ginning farmers with limited capital. As these tenants accumulate capital 
their investment opportunities may become limited and they become dissat­
isfied with the stock-share leaase. If the landlord is unwilling to ex­
pand his investment to match the tenant's excess resources or change lease 
types the tenant's only means of combining his total capital with his 
labor and management is to move to a farm where a different lease type is 
available. Thus, the function fulfilled by the stock-share arrangements 
is not without eventual cost. The mobility engendered by the maturity of 
stock-share arrangements could be eliminated by providing credit facili­
ties that would permit the beginning farmer to start with one of the other 
lease arrangements. 
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2, Methods of adjustments based directly on prices, coata and production 
prevailing during the lease period 
Wo share leases were found in which any chanj^es were made directly 
on the basis of prices, costs or production. Four cash leases were 
found in which some or all of these factors were taken into account. 
One of the most successful cash arrangements encountered was based 
upon a "base" rent and a "bonus" rent.^ The tenant had been renting 
for cash since 1914 and had experienced the price collapses of 1921 and 
1929. As protection against repetition of these circumstances he 
negotiated a "bonus" rent with his two landlords in 1942. The base 
rent has remained unchanged from 1942 and the bonus rent is termed 
a payment to the landlords for renewing the rental contract unchanged. 
The amount of the bonus, negotiated at the end of the year, is based 
upon prices received, costs incurred, and rent of comparable land. Thus, 
the tenant is protected against any sudden decline in prices, and at the 
same time, the landlords are receiving a rent based upon current con­
ditions. The tenant and his landlord are both well satisfied with the 
plan. 
The disadvantage of the plan is that the tenant is legally obli­
gated only for the base rent* As the bonus is negotiated after the date 
of notification for termination of the lease^ the tenant could refuse to 
^Successful in the sense that the tenant was well satisfied with the 
low risk feature involved and that landlords felt that the rent lag had 
been eliminated. 
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pay the "bonus for a given year and remain on the farm for the next 
year at the 1942 rental, thus having the use of the farm for two years 
at less than half of the current level of rent. The landlord inter­
viewed v/as aware of this possibility, but trusted the tenant not to 
pursue this course of action. 
A similar arrangement was found between another landlord and tenant, 
No rent was agreed upon between these parties when the farm was let. At 
the end of the crop year a decision in regard to the rent was reached. 
The amount of the rent was based upon the prices, relative costs and 
production of the year. The parties had never encountered any difficulty 
in arriving at a rent satisfactory to both. The advantages and dis­
advantages of this method are the same as those of the previous planj 
the tenant's legal obligations are not spelled out, but rent is based 
upon prices, costs and production of the term covered by the lease. 
Another cash tenant was interviewed who had a choice between lease 
tjrpes each year. The contract was written in such a manner that the 
tenant could pay cash rent for the entire farm or pay cash rent on hay 
and pasture land and give a share of the crop on the remainder. The 
tenant had to notify the landlord of his intentions on the first of 
September of each year. If the prospects for the corn crop were rela­
tively poor, or if the price of corn were low relative to cash rent, the 
tenat could cnoose the crop-share plan and pay cash rent on the hay and 
pasture land only. Conversely, if the yield prospects were good and 
the price of corn high relative to the cash rent, the tenant could choose 
the cash rent. In the later years of the lease, the "date of declaration" 
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Table 26* Comparison of Averaji^e Cash Rent Paid in Distriot with Cash 
Rent Determined for a Particular Farm by the Price of Hogs, 
Year 
Price 
of 
hogs^ 
Leas 
base rent 
(^6.75) 
Rent 
adjustment 
Total 
rent 
Actual 
rent for 
area^ 
1940 
41 
42 
43 
44 
1945 
46 
47 
48 
49 
$5.30 
9.20 
13.10 
13.80 
13.20 
14.00 
17.50 
23.80 
22.80 
17.50 
?>6.75 §6.14 
2.45 .61 7.36 6.41 
6.35 1.58 8.33 6.60 
7.05 1.76 8.51 7.31 
6.45 1.61 8.36 7.89 
7.25 1.81 8.56 8.20 
10.75 2.68 9.43 8.45 
17.05 4.26 11.01 9.53 
16.05 4.01 10.81 9.86 
10.75 2.68 9.43 10.34 
^B. French and W. Chryst. Prices affecting Iowa farmers, 1910-
1949. AsieBf Dept. of Econ. and Soc. Iowa State College. 1950. c^'imeo. 
rept,'=' p. 8. 
hbid. p. SO. 
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ohanaies in prices and production. At least four states in the Middle 
Vfeat, Iowa, Minnesota, Illinois and Missouri, developed such plans.^ 
Some of the plans are quite similar and statements in regard to one 
would, in general, be applicable to the others, Considerinp; first 
the Iowa plan, the arran.e;0iaent originally provided for parties to agree 
upon a base rent for the farm and for the modification of this rent 
in direct proportion with changes in a weighted index of ton major Iowa 
farm commodities. For example, if the parties agreed upon a base rent 
of §6.00 per acre when the price index was 80 and the following year 
^Hllard Peck. A plan for adjusting of farm products to changes in 
the price of farm products. Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Bui. 295. 1952. 
W. L. Cavert. Adjusting of farm rentals to fluctuating values, 
T-'inn. Agr. Ext. Ser. Cir. 42. 1933. 
H. C. Sa. Case and Joseph Ackerman. Farm leases in Illinois. 111. 
Agr. Ext. Ser. Cir. 474. 1957. 
John F. Timmons. Landlord-tenant relationships in renting Missouri 
farms. -Mo. Agr. Exp. Sta. Bui. 409 2nd ed. 1946, 
^The Minnesota plan provided that the payment over time be specified 
in fixed quantities and qualities of various farm products. The accepted 
quantities times the current values could be considered as the base rent 
and the current rent would vary in direct proportion with changes in 
prices of the base products. Thus, the plan is.identical with the Iowa 
plan except for the weights of the index used for correction. 
The Illinois plan provided that the tenant pay the landlord the 
cash equivalent of various quantities of farm products. The quantities 
were fixed over time and the rent would vary as the prices of products 
varied. With the exception of the weights of the index which depend 
upon the selection of products, the plan is the same as the Iowa and 
Minnesota arrangements. 
As the rent under these plans varies directly with prices in the 
same manner as rent is varied under the Iowa plan, only the Iowa plan 
will be discussed. 
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the index increased to 120, the rent would increase to $9.00. If, 
however, in the second year the index had declined to 60 the rent would 
have been reduced one-fourth, or to ^4.50 per acre. 
Further details of the plan sugigested determination of actual 
rents for each county in Iowa with suggestions about how to modify the 
rent if the individual farm deviated significantly in quality from the 
county averafre. 
The plan appeared to have considerable merit for both tenant and 
landlord; it provided a rent the tenant could pay and that the landlord 
could collect. Appearinf, as the plan did after agricultural prices had 
undergone a severe change, there was considerable public interest in the 
proposal, and there is reason to believe that it was adopted by hundreds 
of landlords and tenants immediately following its appearance.^ 
A comparison of the rent adjusted tinder the "sliding scale plan" 
and the average cash rent paid in Iowa is shown in Figure 20. It is 
assumed that a landlord and tenant agreed in 1926 upon the state average 
rent of $7.54 per acre as a base rent for their farm and agreed to vary 
^Estimates of the nusiber of flexible cash leases put into effect 
are not available, but several hundred inquiries about the plan are 
on file with Iowa State College. Blank flexible lease forms were 
distributed by the College until 1951. 
Flexible leasing plans were used extensively in Minnesota. As 
late as 1940, 11 per cent of the cash leases in Minnesota had provisions 
adjusting the rent on the basis of fam product prices. George A, Pond. 
Farm tenancy in IsSinnesota. Minn. Agr. Exp, Sta. Bui. 355. p. 30. 
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the rent directly with changes in prices,^ Thus, the rent would have 
been adjusted doTwnward in the period 1929 through 1933 with the decline 
in prices} the adjusted rent in 1931 and 1932 being about one-half the 
actual average cash rent paid. In the period following 1933 the sliding-
scale rent advanced upward with pricesi in the years 1938, 1939 and 1940, 
however, the adjusted rent would have been below the average rent paid, 
ffith the rise in prices following 1940, the sliding-scale rent would 
have been considerably above the actual cash rent paid. Farmers using 
the plan would have found their rent reduced with the price decline in 
1949, but the adjusted rent would still have been more than the average 
rent paid. 
The argument was made in the proposal that yield variation could 
be ignored as changes in Iowa crop yields were associated with price 
changes of the oppositstype in half the cases. Thus it was argued that 
in half of the years when the corn yields were below the yield of the 
previous year the price was not any higher thsm the previous year and, 
consequently, the low yield would necessarily not be accompanied by a 
higher rent.® 
^IQie base rent in the example was adjusted by use of the Iowa Fam 
Products Prices Received Index which is slightly different from the index 
recommended by Iowa State College. The index used in the example is the 
January 1-December 31 index of all farm products; the one used by the 
Iowa State College Extension Service covers the lease year of March I-
February 1. The index used in the example appears in Table 6, Appendix B. 
2peok, op. cit., p. 215 
^Ibid. 
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The omission of a correction factor for yields caused the plan to 
encounter difficulty almost immediately after being put into use. In 
1934, a drought reduced corn yields almost one-half, the yield index 
declining from 112 in 1933 to 55 in 1934 (Table 27). Prices, on the 
other hand, increased more than one-third, the price index rising from 
41 to 56 (Table 27). The tenant's rent increased at a time when he had 
fewer resources with which to meet his obligations. This combination 
of events placed a considerable strain on the sliding scale leases then 
in existence.^ A similar set of circumstances existed two years later 
in 1936 when yields were again reduced severely by drought. Prices, 
and the sliding scale rent, however, remained unchanged from the 
previous year, but tenants experienced considerable difficulty in 
9 
meeting rental payments.*^ If the average rent had been corrected for 
farm price changes it would have been greater in 1936 than the average 
rent paid, which would have appeared high to the aveirage tenant as a 
result of the abnormally low yields. 
After experiencing the effect of production changes upon the level 
of the rent through price changes, the plan was revised to take into 
' s 
account years in which the yields were abnormally low. The revision 
suggested that in years when yields were less than 75 per cent of nomal 
the tenants pay the same proportion of the computed sliding scale rent 
•I 
"^I. W. Arthur. Index cash rent - a plan to make sliding scale cash 
leases work. Iowa Farm Economist. 8, No. 1:14-15. January 1942. 
^Ibid. 
^bid. 
Iftible 27. Average Rent Paid in loisa. Average Rent Adjusted for Price Changes and Average Rent 
Adjusted for Price and Production Changes. 
Average cash 
rent per 
acre - lowa®^ 
Index of all 
farm prices 
(1926 » 100) 
Rent 
adjusted 
for price 
chanses^ 
Index of 
com yields® 
(1926 = ICQ) 
Hent adjusted 
for price and 
yield changes'^ 
1949 
48 
47 
46 
1^1.06 
10.42 
9.51 
8.59 
178 
222 
211 
163 
$13.42 
16.73 
15.90 
12.29 
118 
155 
78 
145 
115.63 
25.94 
12.44 
17.79 
1945 
44 
43 
42 
41 
1940 
39 
38 
37 
36 
8.46 
8.22 
7.49 
6.78 
6.20 
5.98 
5.80 
5.76 
5.57 
5.59 
135 
128 
132 
116 
90 
69 
67 
72 
93 
83 
10.17 
9.65 
9.95 
8.74 
6.78 
5.20 
5.05 
5.42 
7.01 
6.25 
111 
133 
140 
153 
131 
134 
134 
119 
114 
51 
11.31 
12.81 
13.72 
13.34 
8.89 
6.93 
6.78 
6.48 
7.99 
3.16 
w 
OJ 
®'B. French and W. Chryst. Prices a fecting lovra farmers 1910-1949. Ames, Dept. of Scon, and 
See., Iowa State Collepje. 1950. Mimeo. 
^Adjusted rent = Base rent X Current price index 
100 
®Index computed from data compiled by the Iowa Assessor Annual Farm Census. Iowa. Dept. of 
AgriciiL ture. Yearbooks 28 through 50. 
^Adjusted rent = Base rent X (Current price index)(Current yield index) 
10,000 
Table 27. (continued). 
Average cash 
rent per 
acre - Iowa®' 
Index of all 
farm prices 
(1926 = 100) 
Rent 
adjusted 
for price 
changes^ 
Index of 
corn yields® 
(1926 = 100) 
Rent adjusted 
for price and 
yield changes^ 
1955 15.07 83 :I6.25 98 #6.10 
34 4.88 56 4.22 55 2.33 
S3 4.33 41 3.09 112 3.46 
32 6.00 41 3.09 109 3.39 
31 7.31 61 4.59 84 3.84 
1930 7.65 88 6.63 87 5.73 
29 7.75 103 7.76 101 7.84 
28 7.64 102 7.69 105 8.06 
27 7.60 97 7.31 89 6.48 
1926 
% 
7.54 100 7.54 100 7.54 
Total 171.20 190.73 205.99 
®B. French and W. Chryat. Prices affecting Iowa farmers 1910-1949. Ames, Dept. of Econ. and 
Soc., Iowa State College. 1950. Mimeo. 
Adjusted rent = Base rent X Current price index 
100 
®Ind6x computed from data compiled by the Iowa Assessor Annual Farm Census. Iowa. Dept. of 
Agriculture. Yearbooks 28 through 50. 
^Adjusted rent « Base rent index)(Current yield index) 
10,000 
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as the yields were of normal,^ 
If the average corn yield of 1926 had been accepted as the normal 
yield for the revised plan, the yield correction factor would have been 
used only in the years of 1934 and 1936. The average yield in 1926 was 
39.0 bushels (Table 27) and 75 per cent of this is 29,25 bushels. Only 
the yields of 1934 and 1936 are lower. Adjustment of the average rent 
for changes in prices and production from the 1926 averages would have 
resulted in a rant of $2.33 per acre in 1934 as compared to a rent of 
$4.22 based upon correction for price changes alone and t4»88 as the 
average rent actually paid. If the sliding scale rent had been corrected 
for corn yields in 1936, it would have been tS.ie per acre; correction 
of the base rent for prices alone would have resulted in a rent of |6.25 
per acre (Table 27). In all other years the sliding scale rent would 
have been the same as presented in Figure 20. 
The use of an arbitrary point for the inclusion of another variable 
in the determination of the rent had definite shortcomings. For exait^le, 
if 1926 average prices and yields were used to determine the sliding scale 
rent, the yield correction factor would not have been used in 1947 as the 
2 
average yield of that year was 78.2 per cent of the 1926 yield. Prices, 
however, increased 29 per cent from the previous year, and, consequently, 
the sliding scale rent would have been 29 per cent higher. Application 
^If yields are less than 75 per cent of base yield: 
Cash rent = Base rent (Current Price IndexN / Current Yield^ 
\ Base Price Index / V Base Yield / 
2 Computed from data appearing in Table 27• 
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of the yield correction factor would result in changes nearly cancelling 
out with the price corrected rent being $12,29 in 1946, and price and 
yield corrected rent $12.44 in 1947. Ignoring yield changes the rent 
would have increased from 112.29 in 1946 to $15.90 in 1947 (Figure 20). 
Complete adjustment of the cash rent for changes in prices and 
yields is shown in Figure 20.^ Considering the example set up based 
upon 1926 prices and yields, the plan would have resulted in larger 
returns to the landlord in 15 of the 24 years (1926-1960) than the 
sliding scale plan. The total rent when adjusted for prices and yields 
is §205.99j when adjusted for prices alone, #190.75} average rent paid 
with no adjusfeaents, $171.20 (Table 27). !Iliu8, the use of a flexible 
lease over a period of time including both prosperity and depression 
would have resulted in the landlord receiving a larger income than would 
have been forthcoming with fixed rentals. The tenant would have been 
protected against price and yield declines throughout the period and 
would have been able to organize his resources more efficiently. The 
example used was based upon the use of the average rent; actiially, the 
landlord renting on a flexible plan should be able to ask for a higher 
than average rent because of the assun^tion of part of the risk. The 
tenant on the other hand, should be willing to accept a base rent higher 
than the average cash rent prevailing at the time the contract is drawn; 
there is a partial transfer of risk to the landlord with the result of 
a more efficient allocation of resources within the firm. 
Computed in the same manner as rents adjusted for price changes «ri<^ 
crop failures, but applied to all years. 
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The Miesouri plan takaa a somewhat different approa^oh to the problem 
of adjusting rent.^ Tinder the plan the landlord and tenant estimate the 
gross income of each of the major enterprises at the heginning of the 
lease year and agree upon the per unit price of each of the commodities 
and a hase rent per acre* At the end of the lease year, when the rent 
is due, the per unit price of each commodity is detennined, and the 
percentage change is applied against the estimated revenue of the enter­
prise. The "base rent ia then changed by the ratio of the revised 
estimated gross income to the original estimated gross income. 
An example of the use of the plan is presented in Table 28. The 
assumption is made that the parties agreed upon a rent of $4.00 per 
acre based upon the expectations of a $2000 income. Prices changed in 
such a manner that the gross income was $1535 or |465 less than the 
income upon which the rent was based. The rent vmder the plan would 
then be reduced by 465/2000, or 23.2 per cent, to $3.07 per acre. Had 
prices risen by the proportions shown in Table 28, the rent would have 
been adjusted upward by 23.2 per cent or to $4.93. The advantage of such 
a plan is twofoldt (l) rent is associated directly with the enterprises 
of the farm business, and (2) rent is based upon the current income of 
the farm. 
A second plan is offered whereby the cash rent can be adjusted for 
changes in prices and production.^ (Table 29). The parties to the 
^Tlmmona, op. olt. pp» 21-24. Requests for over 10,000 of the lease 
forms based upon this plan were received by the Missouri Extension Service. 
^Timmons, 0£. cit. p. 23. 
Table 28. Illuatmtion of Cash Rent Adjustment Made Because of Change in Farm Price Level Between 
Time Rent Contract is Drawn and Time Kent Must be Paid.® 
Probable production 
according to 
contract agreement 
Estimated 
income 
Farm price for each product 
At time contract At time rent Percentage 
is draiTn is due change 
Resulting 
effect upon 
income 
Enterprise 
Hogs 
Beef 
Butterfat 
Eggs 
Iiooo $4.00 #3.00 -25 1750 
400 5.00 4.00 -20 320 
400 .24 .20 -17 332 
200 .85 .10 -30 133 
Total 
Per cent decrease = 
2000 
$2000 
« 23.2 
11535 
Table reproduced from Timmons, op. cit., p. 22. 
Table 29. Illustration of Cash Rent Adjustment Made Because of Change in Crop Prices and Production 
Between Time Rent Contract is Drawn and Time Rent Must be Paid,®' 
Items Acres 
Sent 
share 
Yield 7alue 
Rent Normal for 
acres farm (units) 
Normal for 
county {%) 
Current 
for farm Price Per aore Total rent 
Corn 10 1/2 5,0 40 90 36 .75 127.00 1135 .00 
Wheat 10 i/s 3,3 20 75 15 ,80 12.00 40 .00 
Meadow 10 1/2 5.0 2 50 1 8.00 8.00 40 .00 
Pasture 10 X X X X X X 2,00 20 .00 
Buildings X X X X X X X X 150 .00 
Total cash rent for this year #365. ,00 
®'Table reproduced from Tinmons, op» cit», p. 2S» 
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lease must agree to a noinnal yield for the farm, shares of the crops 
representing rent of the land, and cash rental value of pasture and 
buildings. Long time average yields of the county must be obtained. 
The landlord's share of the output of each crop is detemined on the 
basis of normal farm yields. This share is changed each year in the 
same ratio as the current average county yield is to the long run 
average county yield. The prices existing at harvest are applied to 
the adjusted quantities and summed with the cash rent for pasture and 
buildings to determine the cash rent to be paid for the year, 
IHiis plan has definite advantages for the tenant. If the normal 
yield for the farm is detemined on the basis of average management, 
the tenant can receive the return due to superior management without 
being forced to accept the risk inherent in the orthodox cash arrange­
ments, The plan offers some of the advantages of share renting to the 
landlord in a favorable risk-taking position but who is unable to make 
the contribution to management required for share renting. The assumption 
of part of the risk should result in the landlord's receiving a larger 
income over time; the tenant's income may be increased throu^ freedom 
to utilize more variable Inputs and longer production processes as a 
result of the reduction in risk and uncertainty. 
The method of adjusting rent based upon prices lias been extended 
to cash rent of orop-share renting,^ llhe adjustment of pasture and 
building rents on the basis of changing prices would enable the landlord 
to receive a return more in line with the productivity of the pasture 
Ipeck, op. cit., p, 204, 
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and would facilitate the expansion of livestook facilities in periods 
of rising prices. The Iowa plan suggests that cash rents associated 
with crop-share rents be adjusted by the index of prices received 
used for adjustments under the cash arrangements. It would seem that 
the index of livestock prices would also offer an appropriate means of 
introducing flexibility into pasture and building rents. 
Another plan for introducing flexibility in cash rents paid for 
buildings and pasture has been recently developed and put into use on 
a number of Illinois farmsHhe rent is based upon three factorsj 
(1) price of corn, (2) productivity of pastures and (3) quantity and 
quality of buildings. The procedure used is to determine the sale 
value of ten bushels of corn as a base rent per acre. The relative 
productivity of the pasture is estimated by the ratio of appraised 
value to a base value of |250 per acre. The buildings are scored 
against an arbitrary standard. For example, assume ten bushels of 
corn worth $1.80 per bushel, appraised value of land at |300 per acre, 
and buildings rated as 78 per cent adequate! 
Rent per acre = (10»|1.80) 522. -12. = $16.86. 
250 100 
This plan is somewhat redundant in that land values which are in 
part a function of rent, are used to determine rent. If by using land 
values, the rent is increased and this leads to a further increase in 
values, a spiraling process is set up. If, however, this is not the 
%. M. Prltmn, Niantic, Illinois. Infomation on flexible leases. 
Private communication 1952. 
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result, and as rents and land prices for individual farms cannot deviate 
widely from coiomunity averages the spiraling effect is unlikely, the 
plan may be of value in maintaining a workable relationship between the 
landlord and tenant and aid in the securing and maintaining of live­
stock facilities on crop-share rented farms. No information is available 
upon the success of the plan, but it is in use upon several Illinois 
farms* 
Each of the plans arose out of a definite need for a method of 
adjusting rent to changes in prices or production. The Iowa plan, 
while creating some difficulty in landlord-tenant relations as a result 
of the droughts of 1934 and 1936, continued in operation on hundreds 
of farms in the late part of the nineteen-thirties and doubtless afforded 
the tenants using the plan considerable protection during the period 
of low agricultural prices following 19S8. Throughout the period of 
1932 to 1942 the plan was advocated on the basis of the protection of 
the tenant against sharp declines in prices. In 1942, following the 
outbreak of war, the emphasis was shifted to the protection it gave 
the landlord. As prioas wore expected to rise during the war with 
cash rents lagging behind prices, landlords were urged to adopt the 
flexible leasing plan as a natter of self-protection. At this time the 
provision, for abnormally low yields was added. 
The production provision is one-sided in favor of the tenant. It 
provides a basis for the tenant to pay less rent in a poor crop year, but 
does not give the landlord the advantage of the excellent crop seasons. 
For this reason, a flexible plan based upon both prices and costs migiht 
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be more aooeptable to both parties to the lease* 
The second Missouri plan provides protection to both landlord 
and temnt upon the basis of changes in prices and production* By 
basing the rent on regional average yields, the leuidlord is assured 
of the advantage of a good cjrop if there is less than a propojrtional 
change in price, as occurred with the bumper crop of 1948, The tenant 
has the assurance that if he is successful in increasing yields, most 
of the advantage of the increase will accrue to him. At the same time, 
if there is a general decline in production or prices the rental 
obligation will be reduced* This would appear to be an acceptable 
plan to both parties * 
The plans for adjusting cash rent under the crop-share arrange­
ment appear to offer certain advantages to both parties* The tenant 
desires to have the pasture rent reduced when prices are lowi however, 
the payment of a rent based upon prices when prices are relatively 
high would facilitate the securing of livestock improvements when most 
needed to expand production* The plan that bases the cash rent of tdie 
farm on hog prices should help the landlord and tenant in making live­
stock improvements at a time when the tenant desires them most and the 
landlord is in more favorable position to make the expenditure. 
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D. Methods Recently Developed in Other Countries To 
Maintain the Rent Within the Limits of Tolerance 
of Landlords and Tenants 
Two European countries, England and France, from whom the United 
States has borrowed many of its instututions pertaining to land, have 
developed new techniques to keep the rent of the land within the 
limits of tolerance of the contracting parties. In addition to these 
countries, the Netherlands has taken steps to provide for adjustments 
in rent that will insure the tenant a return on his resources commen­
surate with changes in value productivity. 
In all three countries, legislation has heen enacted to reduce 
tenant mobility and to increase the length of the tenure expectations 
of the tenant.^ France has laws providing a minimum length of lease 
of id.ne years} the minimum tern in the Netherlands is six or twelve 
Cornells D. Scheer* An appraisal of the place of equitable tenancy 
arrangements in a progressive agriculture (The Hetherlands). Paper 
presented at the Conference on World Land Tenure Problems. University 
of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. Nov. 5, 1951. c jKimeo. rept.^ 
Albeirt Alexander Costa. Tenant landlord relations and French 
law. Paper presented at the Conference on World Land Tenure Problems. 
University of Wisoonsin, Madison, Wis. Nov, 5, 1951. crMimeo. rept.3 
John Stuart Hill. Equitable tenancy arrangements in progrisssive 
agriculture. Paper presented before the Conference on World Land 
Tenure Problems. University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. Oct. 29, 1951. 
cMimeo. rept.=i 
L. Prault. Les baux ruraux. Paris, Federation Nationals De La 
Propriete Agrloole. n.d. Sec. 17. 
149 
years, depending upon the improvements on the land; a minimum term is 
not set in Britain, but a tenant cannot be evicted as long as he farms 
the holding in a maimer satisfactory to the Minister of Agriculture. 
Following the lengthening of the lease term by statute, the 
necessity of providing flexibility in rental rates assumed increasing 
importance. In response to this growing necessity each country de­
veloped procedures providing for the right of petition for rental 
change by either party, arbitration and judicial review. 
In France, an advisory commission on leases was formed for each 
political subdivision corresponding to a county in the United States. 
This commission established normal rent for each farm in its juris­
diction. The landlord and tenant are free to bargain in regard to the 
rent in the usual manner. If, however, a rent is accepted that departs 
from the norm more than 10 per cent, either party may petition the 
courts for a re-evaluation of the rent, in which case acceptance of the 
decision of the court, based upon the advisory commission's findings, 
ia compulsory. The rent is fixed for the duration of the contract and 
cannot be changed by negotiation between the parties without approval 
of the court. In the event of a poor crop year, however, the tenant 
may petition the court to have his rental obligation reduced or can­
celled. Also, either party may, at the end of each year, have the 
contract reopened by the courts for a re-evaluation of the rent. Thus, 
whenever the rent, and consequently, the division of returns, exceeds 
the limits of tolerance of either party, he may look to the courts for 
redreaaj and in determining the adjustments the court has the counsel 
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of specialists in rental matters. 
The French law provides for inter-lease type changes without 
changes in farms or changes in tenants. Share renting ia permitted, 
but at the end of each three year period of the lease, either party 
may request the courts to convert the share lease to a standard form 
lease as described above. In the event suoh a request originates with 
the tenant, the landlord can defeat the change only by personally 
assuming the operation of the farm. 
British law is similar to the French. The parties are free to 
bargain, but either may request that the amount of rent be submitted 
for arbitration.^ Upon receiving a request for arbitration, the 
Minister of Agriculture, or his delegate, will appoint an arbitrator 
with specialized training to examine the conditions of the lease and 
set a rental value on the holdings. The decision of the arbitrator 
is final. A request for arbitration cannot be submitted more often 
than once each three years. 
The Dutch land law provides for even more public control of 
rental arrangements than the French or English laws.^ Every contract 
must be approved by an administrative body known as the Land Chamber, 
which is formed from landowners, tenants, members of the judiciary 
and economists* The parties are free to negotiate, but the amount 
of the rent must be approved by the Land Chamber. Suoh approval 
^ill, op. cit. 
^Soheer, op. cit. 
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is not forthcoming unless "... the general interests of agriculture 
are not hurt and the net revenue to be expected when management is 
proper guarantees the tenant a fair gain,"^ The rent is based upon 
the ©xpeoted net return of the farm with the tenant's claim on the 
net income being considered a prior claim over the landlord's claim. 
The administrative procedure is similar to arrangements in France 
and Britain. Either party may appeal to a special court, made up in 
the same manner as the Land Chamber, which deals exclusively with 
rental problems. Ihe parties, either separately or together, may 
request a revision in the rent each three years. 
These methods offer features not available to landlords and 
tenants in the United States. There is an absence of counsel in 
determining rental rates and flexibility is maintained through the 
use of short tern leases and teinant mobility. These are the features 
of tenancy that the in'Stitutional arrangements developed in Europe 
have eliminated. 
CongidemtJon might be given the place of advisory coBimissiona 
and arbitrfition to the rental situation in the United States. Hundreds 
of letters are received by the ccfllege; requesting information on 
rental rates and agreementa^ emd in addition the extension service 
counsels hundreds ofvothers annua^y. The need for an advisory, body 
•is definite'and the establishment of means of arbitration" would 
facilitate the use of longer leases iidiich would contribute to a 
^Ibid. p. 3 
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reduotion in tenant mobility. The possibility of borrowing onoe more 
from Exiropean tenure systems could be given profitable study. 
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SBmBT AND COHCLUSIOKS 
Nearly a quarter of a million lovians are directly concerned with 
rental arrangements in that their incomes are determined in some degree by 
the terraa of rental arrangeraents. Over one-half, 53 par cent, of the 
farmers of Iowa rent part or all of their land. A substantial proportion 
of the resources used in Iowa agriculture are combined and used under the 
terms of rental agreements since 53 per cent of Iowa's farm land is 
rented. 
These rental arrangements, which have a direct effect upon the 
livelihood of so many people and the use of large quantities of resources, 
are largely the outgrowth of custom and tradition, and, like custom and 
tradition, change slowly. The divisions of the crop or livestock under 
the share arrangements tend to remain fixed despite wide fluctuations in 
prices and costs of farm products and items of expense. Under the cash 
rental arrangement the amount of cash rent adjusts slowly to changes in 
prices, costs and production. 
Prices, costs and production may vary widely in short periods of 
tiire, 1929-1930 and 1946-1947 for example, or they may vary over a longer 
period of time such as over the last two decades from 1932. The effect 
of price, costs and production changes on the division of income between 
the parties comes about in three ways: (l) prices and costs associated 
with the same products and factors do not change in same proportion, (2) 
costs and returns associated with particular products are not shared in the 
same manner by landlord and tenant and (3) kinds of resources contributed 
by landlord and tenant respectively do not react similarly to economic 
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ohauf^es • 
In a period of rising prices, farm commodity prices may rise more 
rapidly than costs, and the net income of the party to a share arrangement 
who bears the smaller part of the cost will increase relative to the 
net income of the other party. Furthermore, if coots of supplying one 
kind of resource, land for example, do not increase as much as the costs 
of providing other kinds of resources, machinery, labor and fertilizer 
for example, the net income of the party bearing the more rigid costs 
could be expected to increase relatively to the net income of the other 
party. 
Conversely, in a period of declining prices, the changes in net in­
come would be expected to be the opposite of those changes occurring in a 
period of rising prices. This, because total costs may not be shared in 
the same ratio as returns and particular costs fail to chann:e in the same 
proportion as other costs, the share landlord's part of the net return 
could be expected to increase when prices are rising, and to decrease 
when prices are falling. 
The opposite situation could be expected to prevail under the cash 
arrangement. If rent lags behind prices, the tenant's share of the net 
return could be expected to increase when prices are rising and to decrease 
when prices are falling. 
These different types of response to changes in division of net re­
turns under the various lease types have given rise to much ttcnflict and 
confusion among landlords and tenants in attempting to adjust their 
rental situation for conditions over which they have no control. Hundreds 
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of lottors are received annually at Iowa State ColleKe raqueating infor-
nation on farm rents and on how these rents may be adjusted to changing 
economic conditions* Many additional landlords and tenants request infor­
mation on farm rents from county extension directors and vocational in­
structors throufrhout the state* 
In recognition of these needs for better Information on farm rental 
problems as well as the needs for remedial alternatives, this study was 
undertaken* More specifically, the objectives of this study aret 
1* To determine if the division of the net returns is different be­
tween lease types for a given point in time* 
2. To determine if the division of net returns varies over time for 
the same lease type* 
S* To determine the effect of variations in the divisions of net in­
come upon landlord tenant relations* 
4. To determine the nature of techniques now employed by landlords 
and tenants to introduce flexibilities into their rental arrangements* 
5* To develop means whereby landlords and tenants may adjust rents 
to changes in costs, prices emd production. 
In trying to achieve these objectives four sources of information 
were used* (l) farm business records, (2) interviews with monbers of the 
Iowa Farm Business Association, (3) related studies, and (4) some recent 
developments in farm rental laws and arrangements in other cotmtries* 
The limitations of the use of the Iowa Farm Business Association 
records as a basis for inference to the population of Iowa famers is 
clearly recognised* To obtain information on the division of net income 
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over time, complete records containing the division of coats and returns 
between landlord and tenants are necessary and such records would not be 
available from a rsuidom sample of Iowa tenants because of memory biases. 
Interviews with landlords and temnts were used in connection with ob> 
jeotives 3 and 4* 
From the conceptual analysis of the problem, it appeared that four 
alternatives of change are open to landlords and tenants faced with an 
unsatisfactory rental situation. Ihese includet 
1« intra-lease tjrpe changes in specific provisions of the lease, 
2. inter-lease type changes on the same farm with the same tenant, 
3. change farms (or tenants) with or without changing lease types, 
and 4. change tenure status, i.e., acquire ownership of land. 
The oooperators with the Business Associations were san^lsd on the 
basis of chsjiges (or lack of change) that they were known to have made 
with respect to the four above categories. A total of 65 temnts who 
made 76 changes fitting into the categories listed above were interviewed. 
In addition, 25 of their landlords were interviewed. Altogether 90 land­
lords and tenants were interviewed regarding their 76 changes attempting 
to adjust their rental arrangements to changes in costs, prices and pro­
duction* 
Investigation of the farm account records indicates that the cash 
landlords* ehares of net farm income increased with the decline in prices 
in 1929, and that the landlords' net income remained in excess of the farm 
net income for the years of 1931 and 1932. With the increase in prices 
following 1933, there has been a significant downward trend in the cash 
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rent landlords' share of net farm returns. 
The eotimated decrease in the trend has been at the rate of .67 per 
cent per year. This could be expected since highly significant corre­
lations (.73 and ,7l) were found to exist between current rents and farm 
product prices of the one and two previous years respectively. The land­
lords' shares of the net return increased sharply in 1937, pbssibly as 
result of the drought of 1936, and remained high in 1938 when fara prices 
declined. 
The division of net returns under the stock-share plan was consider­
ably different from that under cash rents. During the depression, the 
stock-share landlord participated in the net losses of the farm, bearing 
41 per cent of the net loss in 1931 and 60 per cent in 1932. The land­
lords* shares of the net farm gains was 41 per cent in 1933 and there 
-was a significant upward trend in the landlords' shares from 1933 through 
1950. The estimated rate of increase in the share going to the landlord 
was .47 per cent per year during the entire period. 
The division of returns under crop-share rents was similar to the 
division under cash rents for the years 1931 and 1932. The landlords' 
shares of the net returns exceeded the net returns of the farms in both 
years* Following 1932, the trend in the division of net returns has been 
in favor of the landlord, rising an estimated .67 per cent per year. The 
landlord received an estimated 30 per cent of the net return in 1933j by 
1950, this share had increased to 41 per cent. 
The field investigations supplementing analyses of records, disclosed 
that all of the alternative methods of adjustment outlined above were used 
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•by Farm Business Association menibers in their attempts to work out adjust­
ments in their rental situations* Changes in cash lease provisions were 
almost entirely restricted to changes in the attiount of the cash rentj 48 
of the 49 changes within arrangements including cash rents were of this 
nature. In general, these changes provided a satisfactory solution to 
the tenant as the changes lagged behind prices leaving the tenant with a 
larger share of the net income. Landlords interviewed were not as well 
satisfied with the changes for the same reason. 
Changes in crop-share lease provisions to adjust for chaises in 
prices, costs and production were relatively fewer than changes made in 
cash lease provisions, but eight of the 11 found involved changes in cash 
rent suppleioental to shares of crops. The increases in cash rent were in 
general satisfactory to tenants as cash rent was less than share rents. 
^.Iso, some tenants recognised the need for increases in cash rents in order 
to maintain and improve livestock facilities. Two changes in the division 
of the crop to adjust for low yields were found with the adjustments in 
favor of the tenant. 
Of the 14 changes found in stock-share leasing provisions, 12 were 
made to compensate the tenant for his increased costs. The methods em­
ployed to achieve this compensation involved transfer of enterprises to 
the tenant and the landlord's direct participation in some of the costs of 
operation. Some of the methods used were successful in maintaining the 
division of returns within the limits of tolerance of the parties; others 
were not. 03ie success of the measures depended upon the importance of the 
enterprise in contributing to the farm income and to the extent the land­
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lord contributed to the increased expenses. Vfhere the enterprise or the 
landlord made a substantial contribution to the tenant to defray increased 
operating costs, the adjustments were successful in maintaining a satis­
factory relationship* Where the attempt to obtain ad;]ustments was rela­
tively unimportant in terms of effect upon net income, such as the trans­
fer of one-half of the poultry enterprise to the tenant, or the landlord's 
supplying all of the grass seed, the adjustment was not successful. The 
need for methods for adjusting stock-share rent is indicated by the fact 
that only eight of the 33 stock-share tenants interviewed stated that 
satisfactory adjustments could be made within the framework of the stock-
share leasing arrangement. Either the t^e of lease would have to change 
or they would move to another farm* 
Difficulty was encountered in finding observations where the lease 
type was changed without the tenant changing farms* Of those fousad, how­
ever, the changes from cash rent were made at the su gestion of the land­
lord and the changes, from the stock-share rent were made at the suggestion 
of the tenant* Changes from crop-share to the cash lease were made at 
the tenant's suggestion and changes to the stock-share originated with the 
landlord* In a period of rising prices these are the adjustments land­
lords and tenants would be expected to make. 
The changes from stock-share leases provided a satisfaotory solution 
to the teneoit making the change, as did the changes from crop-share to 
cash* Two of the three changes from cash to crop-share rent were regarded 
as successful in that the changes permitted the continuation of workable 
arrangement between landlord and tenant* Seven of the eight tenants 
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making the change from stook-share rent were related to their landlordj 
none of the tenants changing from cash or crop-share leases were related. 
The remaining method used by landlords and tenants in attempting to 
work out adjustments in rental conditions -was to change tenants and farms. 
Eighteen tenants were interviewed who had changed farms and one who had 
discontinued farming. Of these 19 tenants^ 15 made the change because of 
dissatisfaction with their rental agreement. Thirteen of 15 tenants 
changed their lease types at the time they changed farms. As the changes 
were made in a period of rising prices, when the cash lease was most 
favorable to the tenant, and the stock-share lease was the least favorable, 
eight of the changes in lease type were from the stock-share rent and only 
two from the cash lease. These changes were considered successful by the 
tenant, particularly changes from the stock-share. However, these changes 
were achieved at a considerable cost when costs of moving and becoming 
adjusted to a new farm are considered. 
Several tenants were pushed into ownership while others were pulled 
away from renting because of dissatisfactions with rental arrangements. 
A total of 20 tenants who became owners were interviewed sdne of whom 
became owners through inheritance and similar means. Of the 11 tenants 
acquiring ownership without outside assistance, four made the change be­
cause of inability to find farms and rental arrangements that were satis­
factory, and several purchased farms because ownership costs were less 
than rent, although they regarded their rental situation as very satis­
factory. As prices increased or remained high after the purchases all 
tenants except one considered the change as satisfactory. 
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In suaunariaing rental changes found in the interviews, landlords and 
tenants niake relatively few changes in lease provisions, particularly in 
the share iype agreements. The lag in cash rent has resulted in changes 
in cash rent being more satisfactory to the tenant than to the landlord. 
Adjustments in share type lease provisions were often not directly re­
lated to items giving rise to the dissatisfaction. Of the cash and crop-
share tenants interviewed about 40 per cent of each group stated that 
satisfactory adjustments oould not be obtained -within the lease frame-
•work. Nearly three-fourths of the stock-share tenarfts interviewed stated 
that they could not make satisfactory adjustments in their lease pro­
visions. 
If -the adjustments are not available within the lease type, then the 
change in lease type or the change in farm alternatives can be used. Be­
cause of the difficulty in finding tenemts who had.changed lease types 
while s-fcaying on the same farm, it is believed that this method is not 
frequently employed. No difficulty however, was encountered in obtaining 
a sample of tenants who had changed farms, sind it was found that of those 
changing farms to adjust for changes in prices, costs and production, 
nearly all had changed lease types at the same time. This method of 
securing adjustment in rental arrangements has serious individual and 
social costs, and en^hasizes the need for having flexibility in the 
rental agreements* 
Some methods of providing flexibility in rental arrangements were 
found in the field interviews. Two of the plans involved negotiation of 
all or part of the cash rent after the production season was past. These 
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plans have the serious limitations in that if the tenant chooses, he may-
pay a much lower rent than the rent prevailing for comparahle farms. The 
landlord's only alternative in this case is to terminate the arrangement 
as soon as possible, which ie at the end of the following lease year* 
Another plan used bases the rent upon the price of hogs. As hog 
production is the major enterprise of the farm, the plan affords the ten­
ant protection against the decline in the price of his principal com­
modity. The plan has been satisfactory to the landlord as it has pro­
vided a rent in line with current price conditions. 
Sisdlar plans for adjusting rent on the basis of a number of prices 
have been devised in Iowa and neighboring states. The advantage of 
these plans exists in the protection afforded the tenant when prices 
are declixii^ and the landlord when prices are increasing. The dis­
advantage of the plans stems from lack of a correction factor for ex-
\ 
cessive variation in. yields. The use of the plan in years of almost 
complete crop failure, with a result of an increase in prices, and con­
sequently, an increase in rent, could make the payment of rent more 
difficult for the tenant than if no adjustment had been attempted. One 
plan was modified later to take into account this contingency, but made 
no provision for giving the landlord the benefit of abnormally high 
yields. 
Another plan, developed in Missouri, makes provision for adjusting 
the rent on the basis of changing prices and local changes in production. 
Such a plan is advantageous to the landlord in that it permits him to 
receive rent based upon prices and the general level of yields prevailing 
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during the lease yeari the advantage to tenant exists in the protection 
afforded in periods of declining prices, or declines in production of a 
regional nature. As the rent is based upon an estimated normal yield 
with average management, the plan should appeal to the more efficient 
tenant* 
Methods of adjusting rents have been brought into the landlord-
tenant laws of other countries, notably France, England and the Netherlands, 
Tenant mobility is reduced by making long tern leases mandatory, and the 
problem of rent adjustment has been placed under the jurisdiction of the 
courts* The courts act upon the advice of an advisory commission spe­
cialized in leasing matters* The landlords and tenants have counsel in 
determining rental rates and the right to appeal for arbitration in the 
event that a satisfactory agreement cannot be reached* !Ihus, these 
arrajogements provide a framework within which farm rentals may be adjusted 
to changing costs, prices and production within the lease and on the farm. 
These foreign expertences appear to suggest means for introducing flexi­
bilities into rental arrangements that might be useable to landlords azid 
tenants in this country* However, in light of the scope of the changes 
suggested by these foreign experiences, more study is needed of how these 
methods may be adapted to American problems and conditions. 
Within the present institutional framework of farm leasing more 
research is needed in the development of plans to provide flexibility in 
leasing for the three existing lease type. The Missouri plan offers a 
starting point for the development of such programs as it can be ex­
tended, with modifications, to all lease types. Further study is needed 
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in the area of obstaoles to flexible leasing and how the obstacles may 
be overcome. In the event that farm leasee cannot be made sufficiently-
flexible to adjust for changes in prices, costs and production. Atten­
tion could be given the development of means to facilitate inter-lease 
changes without the necessity of changing fanas.. Ihese developments 
should contribute to longer expectations of tenure and lessen the 
individual and social costs incurred through maintaining high tenant 
mobility. 
Consideration should oe given to the possibility of revising the 
institutional framework of leasing in order to permit, if desirable on 
the part of landlords, tenants or society the adoption of some of the 
techniques of rent adjustment now used in other countries. Some of the 
techniques could be employed with little modification of the existing 
rental frameworks for example, the use of a rental advisory commission 
with voluntary arbitration would permit longer leases with a more 
flexible rent. The use of the compulsory arbitration feature would 
require a major revision in landlord-tenant law and more study of the 
results and consequences of the European plans should be made to see 
how these methods can be adapted to rental problems in the United States. 
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both of a structural nature and time consuniir^ detail has helped bring 
the study to completion and the writer expresses his appreciation for 
Mr. Wunderlich's help. 
Finally, but not in any way of a minor importance, the writer 
expresses his appreciation to Julia Holand Chryst, his wife, for her 
patience, understanding and help which has made the exxvironment in 
which the work was done as pleasant as possible. 
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A* Appendix A 
The five aohedule forms used in the study follow in this appendix. 
The order and method of use tvas as followsi 
1. FF-0 completed for all respondents* Information obtained on 
this schedule concerned identifioation of respondent and rental partners, 
lease types used, and whether or not the respondent had changed faznns 
(tenants) in the 1959-1950 period. 
2« FF-1 completed indicating the details of all lease provisions 
for all years the respondent rented in or rented out during the 1939-1950 
period* All yetir to year ohazxges were indicated. 
5* A copy of FPl-A was completed, for each change found in FF-1. 
Information sought pertained to reason for change, origin of change, 
alternatives considered, satisfaction with change, and whether or not 
change was critical to relationship. 
4. For those who indicated that they had changed farms as determined 
by FF-0, a FF-2 was completed for each change. The information sought 
in FF-2 dealt with the cause of the move, the amovint of negotiation pre­
ceding the move, rental terms with new lasodlord and whether or not the 
move provided a satisfactory solution to the rental problems. 
5. A copy of FF-16 was oon^leted for all respondents in order to 
get their opinion about some rental problems, alternatives of action, 
ability to make changes within the lease type, expectation when changes 
were made and related factors. 
The schedules required approximately one and one-half hours to com­
plete and provided a fairly detailed history of the respondents tenure 
history from 1939 to 1950. 
FF-0 
Farm Rental Research 
Iowa State College 
Agr. Expt. Sta, Project 1043 
Responden"fc Address 
Landlord Tenant Ovmer Add Ovmer Landlord and Tenant 
Tract (acres) 1950 1949 1948 1947 1946 1945 1944 1943 1942 1941 1940 1939 
A ( .  • )  
B (  )  
C (  )  
D (  )  
E ( -  )  
F (  )  
(LL,T) 
Present 
Address Period (LLgf) 
- Present 
. Address Period (LL,T) 
Present 
Address Period 
A 
B 
C 
D 
F 
S i z e  
Farm Rental Research 
Iowa State College 
Agr, Expt. Station Project 
Lai 
Ad< 
Re] 
1950 1949 1948 1947 1946 1945 1944 1943 1942 1941 
1. Type of Lease 12345 12345 3.2345 3.2345 12345 12345 12345 12345 12345 12345 
2, Yfritten or Oral V/ 0 Vf 0 T/ 0 W 0 W 0 W 0 W 0 YiT 0 W 0 VI 0 
5. Term of Lease (yrs.) 
12345 
6-9.10+.. 
liJ34b 
6-9,10+ 
12345 
6-9,10+ 
i:i345 
6-0,10+ 
12345 
6-9,10+ 
12345 12345 
6-9,10+ 6-9,10+ 
12345 
6-9,10+ 
12345 
6-9,10+ 
12345 
6-9,lOH 
4. Termination (month's notice) 
456789 
10,10+ 
456789 
10,10+ 
456789 
10,10+ 
456789 
10,10+ 
456789 
10,10+ 
456789 456789 
10jl0+ 10,10+ 
456789 
10,10+ 
456789 
10,10+ 
456789 
10,10+ 
Contributions {%) 
Livestock 
5. Beef Cattle 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,60,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,3c 
40,50,6 
75,IOC 
6. I&iry Cattle 
0,2 5 , o 3 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,2^,35 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,6 
75,100 
7, Poultry 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
^0,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,6 
75,100 
8. Hop;s 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,3o 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,6 
75,100 
9. Sheep 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
76,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,6 
75,100 
Equipment 
10, Crop 
0,26,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,2§,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,5.0,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,53 
40,50,60 
75,100 
t 

FF-1 
Farm Rental Research 
Iowa State College 
Agr, Expt. Station Project 
Landlord 
Address 
Relation 
1949 1948 1947 1946 1945 1944 1943 1942 1941 1940 1939 
12345 3.2345 3.2345 12345 12345 12345 12345 12345 12345 12345 12345 
W 0 XI 0  W 0 W 0 W 0 W 0 ¥1 0  W 0 W 0 W 0 W 0 
1234b 12345 12:54b 12345 12345 l i i34b 12345 12345 12345 12345 12345 
H 6-9,10+ 6-9,10+ 6-0,10+ 6-9,10+ 6-9,10+ 6-9,10+ 6-9,10+ 6-9,10+ 6-9,10+ 6-9,10+ 6-9.10+ 
1 456789 456 789 456789 456789 456789 456789 456789 456789 456789 456789 456789 
10,10+ 10,10+ 10,10+ 10,10+ 10,10+ 10,10+ 10,10+ 10,10+ 10,10+ • 10,10+ 10,10+ 
a-
i3 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0 ,  jCO ,  0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
iO 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
»-» 
o> 
75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75^00 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
cn 
>3 0 ,25,33 0,25,33 r.  0 ,25,33 0,25,35 0,2 0,^3 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
>0 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
) 75.100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75.100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
>3 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
>0 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 '"0,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
) 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
)3 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,26,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
50 40,50,60 4.0,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
) 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
53 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,2 0,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
50 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
) 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
is  0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,2b,33 07757^3 07^^753'  
50 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
) 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 

1950 1949 1948 1947 1946 1945 1944 1943 1942 1941 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
-
'50,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 '•0,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
11. Livestock 75,100 75.100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
12. Equipment owned 
in common 
13. Iquipment ovmed 
by Landlord 
Labor 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
* 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 ^rO, oO, 60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,60,60 40,50,60 
14. Crop 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75„100 75,100 75,100 75.100 75,100 75,100 
0,2§,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,53 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,53 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
15. Livestock 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,53 0,25,33 0,25,33:-' 0,25,33 0,25,53 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 ''0,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
16, Harvesting 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
17. 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
Bide. MaintAanence 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,2 o,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
16. Labor 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,o3 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
19. Materials 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
Fencing (old) 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0.25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
20. Labor 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25.33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40.50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
21. Materials 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 

2. 
1S49 1948 1947 1946 1945 1944 1943 1942 1941 19-'0 1939 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
*75',i00 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
"75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
''0,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 ' 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
40,50,60 
75,100 
O C T -J 
^0,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,oO,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 .40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,23 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,2 0,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,53 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,b0,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,53 0,25,53 0,25,33 0,25,33' 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40^0,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 ''0,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 o> o> 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,53 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 '•0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,53 0,25,33 0,26,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75,100 75.100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60.40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
10.50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50^60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75.100 75.100 75.100 75,100 75.100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 

1947 1P49 
Fenoinp; (new) 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0 ,2 i  
40,5®,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40, 5( 
22. Labor 75,100 - 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75,100 75.] 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,53 0,2i 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40, 5C 
23. Sfeterials 75,100 75.100 75.100 75,100 ' 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,] 
New Improvements (home) 
24q  Labor  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75^100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  .  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,2£  
40 ,5C 
75 ,1  
25 ,  Mate r ia l s  
0 ,26 , •33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25  
40 ,50  
75 ,1  
(Produ<?t iQh. . .  
New ImtJ .  '  "Benef i t s  Shared)  
26 .  Labor  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25  
40 ,50  
75 ,1  
27 .  Mate r ia l s  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,5Qi j60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25  
40 ,  50  
75 ,1  
(Pr ( j .dn .  Bene-
New Imp.  f i t s  no t  Shared)  
28 .  Labor  
0 ,25 ,33  ?  
40 ,50 ,60  
7K inn  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
7Hjnn  
0 ,25 ,33  3  
40 ,50 ,60  
7Bj inO 
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
0 ,25  
40 ,50  
75 .11  
29 .  Mate r ia l s  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
7P inn  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
7R inn  
0 ,25 ,33  
C0,50Jf60  
7R inn  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
7R inn  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75  inn  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
7f ;  inn  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
7S  inn  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
7S , inn  
0 ,25  
40 ,  50 ,  
75 ,1(  
Feed - Home Grown 
;  1 ,  .1 -

3, 
m£.  
1949  1948  1947  1946  1945  1944  1943  1942  1941  194<)  1939  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  75 ,100  75 .100  75 ,100  75 .100  75 .100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 .100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33 /  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,3  3  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50560  •  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
.75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,  60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  76 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  
t-" (31 
•-3 
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33 : ' ,  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
4-0 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,  50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,503 , -60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  
:< 0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  3  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75^1  no  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75J inn  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 ,100  75 .100  75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,501j60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
7R inn  Tf ,  i nn  VR inn  7f ;  i nn  7f i^ inn  7R jnn  75  jnn  75  J  no 75^100  75 ,100  75 .100  

1949 1948 ^947 1946 1945 1944 1943 1942 
SOa Beef Cattle 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
C0,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
76,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0, o, o3 
40,50,60 
75,100 
31. Hairy 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,53 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,35 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25;33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
'.*0,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,2o, 
':0,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,53 
40,50,60 
75,100 
32, Poultry 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
'^0,50,60 
75,100 
o;ib;6'6 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,2b,56 
40,50,60 
75,100 
33o Hogs 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25j33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75-100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
34. Sheep 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
. 75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40^50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
Feed - Protein 
35. Beef Cattle 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25_,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40^50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,oO,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
36, Ifeiiry Cattle 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
37. Poultry 
0,25,33 
40^50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
-75.100 
38, Hogs 
0,25,33 
40^50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
73.13G 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
39. Sheep 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
<.0,50,&Q 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
Fuel 
40. Crop 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,]00 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,53 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
7f ;  i nn  
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
7R inn .  
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
T.c^ j ion  
4 

4. 
1949 1948 1947 1946 1945 1944 1943 1942 IC'il 1940 1929 
,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25, 33 
,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,50 40,50,50 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
5,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
,25,Z3 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0, 2o, 0,25,53 0,25,23 0,25,33 0,25,53 
,60,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 ''0,50,60 '.*0,50,60 40,50,60 <^0,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
5,100 75.100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,2b,33 0,iJb,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,2b,33 
,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
5,100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
,25j33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,35 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
5.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75,100 75.100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
5.100 75.100 75,100 75.100 • 75.100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
5,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 
,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
5,100 75,100 75,100 75.100 75,100 75.109 75.100 75,100 75.100 75.100 75.100 
,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 •40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
5.100 75.100 75.100 75,100 75,100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 
,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 -"•0,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
5,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 73.130 75,100 75.100 75.100 75.100 
,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
5,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 
,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,53 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 

1950 1949 1948 1947 1946 1945 1944 1943 194 
41. Custom 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25, 
40,50, 
75. IC 
42. Truck 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
76.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
7E.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,CO 
75.100 
0,23, 
40,50, 
75.10 
43. Car (Farm Use) 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 . 
0,;-35,53 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,35 
40,50,60 
• 75.100 
0,2 o, 0 o 
40,50,GO 
76.100 
C,2 ! i ,Z5  
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25, 
40,50, 
75,10 
Repairs 
44. Crop mach. 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
• 0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25, 
40,50, 
75,10 
45. Automotive 
0,25,35 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25, 
40,50,' 
75,10 
Crop Expense 
46. Seed Com 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25, 
40,50, 
75.10 
47. Seed (Grain) 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75. lOO' 
0,2r, 
40,50, 
75.10 
48. 
(Grass and 
Seed clover) 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,35 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25, 
40,50, 
75.10 
49. Plowing Expense 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,, 
40,50,( 
75,101 
50. Cultivatinp: Expense 
0,25,3t!) 
40,50,00 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100' 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,60,60 
75,100 
0 25 ; 
75.1 0' 

5. 
1949  .  1948  1947  1946  1945  1944  1943  1942  1941  1940  1939  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,2  D,00  
40 ,50^60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ' ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,3o  0 ,2  5 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,50  40 ,50 ,CO 40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  • 75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  
0 ,25 ,53  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,55  0 ,25 ,35  0 ,25 ,33  '  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  4G,50 ,e0  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
7  5 . -100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 ,100  75 .100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60 .  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  .40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100- 75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  
6 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,2^5753  0  ,  215 ,  u 3  6 ,25 ,3o  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,2  5 ,3o  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  ,  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 .100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  
1
6
9
 
'i 
0 , 25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
7  5 . ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
.  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ;60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  75 ,100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,35  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  .  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 .100  75 ,100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 ,100  
, 0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 ,100  75^100  7fi inn 
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  4u ,u0 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  , •  75 . ,  100  75 ,10?  75 ,1QQ 75 ,100  75  1  on  
{ 

1950 19''9 1948 19-^7 19^6 1945 1944 1943 1< 
0,25,35 .0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0.2 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 •-JO, 50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,5' 
51. Fertilizer 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75. 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,53 0,2i 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,5i 
52. Crop 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,; 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,26,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,21 
53. CroT) 
-TO,50,60 
75.100 
40,50,60 
75.100 
40,50,60 
75.100 
40,50,60 
75.100 
40,50,60 
75,100 
40,50,60 
75,100 
40,50,60 
75,100 
40,50,60 
75.100 
40,5( 
75,; 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,2i 
54. Crop 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,5( 
75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,; 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,00 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,2{ 
55. Lime 
40,50i60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,5( 
75. TOO 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 7 5 "  
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,53 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,3? Q,-:l 
56. ConitfinK (Grain) 
40,50,60 
75.100 
40,50,60 
75.100 
40,50,60 
75.100 
40,50,60 
75.100 
40,50,60 
75.100 
40,50,60 
75.100 
40,50,60 
75,100 
40,50,60 
75.100 
40,5( 
75.] 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0 ,2:,33 r^' r -r , 
57. Combinp; (Soybeans) 40,50,60 75  J  on 
40,50,60 
75,100 
40,50,60 
75,100 
40,50,60 
75,100 
40,50,00 
7,-. ^ 1 00 
40,50,60 
r'tt 1 on 
40,50,60 
7 5,100 
40,;\:,(?G 
75 J on 75,1 
0,25,33 0,25,53 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,2?; ,35 0,^f,33 r\ or: T 0,25,^3 0,2£ 
58. Com Piokinp; 
40,50,30 
75^100 
40,50,60 
7i5,100 
40,50,60 
75.100 
<0,50,60 
75^100 
40,FC,C0 
-75,100 
•*0,50,60 
75,100 
40,50,60 
75.100 
40,50,60 
75^100 
40,5C 
75 1 
0',25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,53 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40, 5C 
59 .  Shelling; 75^100 75.100 75,100 75.100 75..100 75^100 75,100 75,100 75,1 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,S3 0,2£ 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40 ,5C 
60. Insecticides 75-100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75,100 75.100 75,100 75,1 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,3o 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25 
61. 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,5C 
Crop Insurance 75 J no 75,100 75,100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75,100 75,100 75,1 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25 
62. 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40, 5C 
75.100 75,100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75 ,1  

19- '9  1948  1947  1946  1945  1944  1943  1942  1941  i9 :o  1939  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  O n  •< '3 ;  0 ,  o ,  3  3  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,60 ,60  <50 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  75 .100  75 .100  75 ,100  75 .100  75 ,100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  /-v OC. 0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0  ,  2  5 ,  C" 3  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  75 .100  75 .100  75 ,100  75 .100  75 ,100  .  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,2 tD,  33  0 ,2  5  ,  *53 0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  76 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,35  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  .  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75-100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100- 75 .100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,3?  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  •^0 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60^^  
75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  7  5 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0  ,  2  ^  O 0 33 0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,80  40,5v.;,(?0 
'  J ^  J  ^  ^  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75  ^ 1  no  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75  J  00 V.Sj lOO 75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0,ir;F ,00 0 ,25 ,53  0  25  0,25,33 0 ,25 ,3?  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
10 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,5C,C0 40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,bO 40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  75 .100  75 ,100  75 ,100 .  75 ,100  75J100 75 ,100  75  TOO 75 ,100  7  5 ,100  7 . s , inn  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 .33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
i0 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  ' ^0 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  75 .100  75.100 75 , .100  75 .100  75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
1 :0 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 ,100  75^100  75 .100  75 ,100  75,100 75,100 75,100 75^100 
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
1 :0 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  75,100 75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  • 0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
:0 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  •<0 ,50 ,60  
75 ,300  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75.100 75,100 75,100 75,100 7r,,ino 

1950 1949 1948 1947 1946 1945 1944 1943 1942 
63. 
0,25,32 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25, 
40,50, 
75,10 
Taxes 
64. Real 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
•75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,o0,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,60,60 
75,100 
0,25, 
40,50, 
75,IC 
65. Personal 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25, 
40,50, 
75,10 
Insurance 
66. Bids 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,60,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25, 
40,50, 
75,10 
67. Personal 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
'J 0,50,60 
75,100 
0, ci5, *1-3 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,2r,3C 
''0,50,60 
75,100 
, 
40,c0, 
75. IC 
Returns 
.
 
00 to 
/ 
Corn (Grain) 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75i100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,35 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,3? 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25, 
40,50, 
75, IC 
69. Corn (Down) 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25, 
40,50, 
75,IC 
70. Com (Shocked) 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25, 
40,50, 
75, IC 
71. Corn (HoREced) 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75 100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0^25.33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25, 
40,50, 
75.IC 
72. Corn (Silape) 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,53 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,2o,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,26,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25, 
40,50, 
75,10 

7. 
949  1948  1947  1946  1945  • 1944  1943  1942  1941  1940  1939  
25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,53  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33 .  0 ,25 ,33  0 , .2o ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  
25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
,100  -75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  
35 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  
25 ,33  
50 ,60  
,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 , .60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
'  75 .100  
25 ,33  
50 ,60  
LOO 
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
n  r  "  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 , .33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
H'  
O  
1-J 
25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  .  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 , .60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  • 75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  
:5 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
>0 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  
15 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
>0 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  75 ,100  
15 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ;50 ,60  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
10 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  •40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 ,100  
5 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 , -33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
0 ,60  
100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  

1950  ir4«? IS''8 i z r i  ir 6 if:3 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
Cats  
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
73 .  7Rjnn  7F ion  75 jnn  75  mo 75 ,100  75  10 .0  75^100 75 ,  mo 
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
74 .  Wheat 
40 ,50 ,60  
inn  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .1  no  
40 ,50 ,60  
75J  i  nn  
40 ,50 ,60  
100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75^  ion  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,TOO 
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
75. cnrlcy 
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  75 ,100  75 , inn  75  1  on  75 ,  ion  75 .TOO 75^100  75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,53  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
76 .  Soybeans (Threshed) 
40 ,50 ,60  
75^100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75- ,  100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,10- ;  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,53  
77 .  Soybeans (ifey) 
40 ,50 ,60  
75 , inn  
40 ,50 ,60  
75^  inn  
40 ,50 ,60  
75,ion 
40 ,50 ,60  
7f i ,ma  
40 ,50 ,60  
75,100 
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,1OO 
40 ,50 ,60  
7H,100 
40 ,50 ,60  
7 F , , ino  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,35  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,? .5 ,33  
•
 
CO 
Alfalfa 
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 , .=0 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
•
 
CO 
75 ,100  75-100  75 .100  75 ,100  75 .mo 75^100  75 ,100  75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,?3  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
79 .  Red Clover 
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 .60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 .50 ,60  
75 ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
c
 
o
 
00 
Timothy ; 
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
c
 
o
 
00 
75 . inn  75 .100  75 ,100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 ,100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  •  0 ,25 ,33  
81»  Sweet Clover 
40 ,50 ,60  
7R inn  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,1  no  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .  mo 
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
CO
 
r
o
 
•
 Clover Pasture 
40 ,50 ,60  
75^ inn  
40 ,50 ,60  
75,1nn 
40 ,50 ,60  
75 jnn 
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75-100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  40 ,50 ,60  
83 .  Other Pasture 75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  75 ,100  75 .100  75 .100  75 .100  
0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  0 ,25 ,33  
•
 
CO 
Clover Seed 
40 ,50 ,60  
75,100 
40 ,50 ,60  
75 , log  
40 ,50 ,60  
75-100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 .100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  
40 ,50 ,60  
75 ,100  

8, 
i-
i-::49 l9''-8 1E47 1C--6 19A5 1S44 1943 1942 1941 1940 1939 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,50 40,50,60 
7F ion 75jinn 75 1 nn 75,100 75 inn 75,100 75,100 75jino 75 inn 75^100 75,inn 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,.33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
.75.100 75 1 no 75 100 75 ion 75.100 75,inn 75 100 75 J no 75.100 75,100 75J inn 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 .0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75^00 75.100 75^100 75.ion 75,100- 75,100 75,100 75jlOO 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 "40,50,60 -^0,50,60 <10,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75.100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 •. 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,53 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
^0,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75^ 100 75,1 no 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,ion 75,100 75,100 75jino 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0, 25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40;50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75-100 75.100 75,100 75.100 75,100 7 5,100 - 75,100 75-100 75,100 75,100 75,100 ^ 
0,25,33 
10,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50.60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40-50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
i0,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75,100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75,100 75.100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
i0,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75 ^ 100 75.100 75-100 75,100 75,100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
i0,50,60 
75 inn 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75^inn 75^100 75^100 75^100 75,100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
10,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 
0,25,33 
•0,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75-100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 

1950 • 1949 1948 1947 1946 1945 1944 1943 1945 
85. 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25, 
40,50, 
75,It 
86. 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25, 
40,50, 
75,1( 
Livestock 
87. Dairy Prot^ucts 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40.50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25 
40,50 
75.1( 
88. EC:,es 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25.33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50[.60 
75.100 
* 0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25 
40,50 
75,1( 
89. Poultry 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75 J100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
V.R^lOO 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
7Rjl00 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
7.RjlOO 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,10-^ 
0,25 
'CO,50 
7=,r 
90. Hop-s 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75^100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75^100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75 J100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
4 0,50,60 
75 J100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,;i5,3S 
40,50,60 
75 J100 
0,::5 
40,50 
75, ^  
91. Cattle 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
7.5,100 
0,25;33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
7Bjl00 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
7RjlOO 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
7.Sjl0n 
0,25 
40,50 
7.S^1 
92. Sheep 
0/25,33 
40,.50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
7."^, 100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
7RjlOO 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75^100 
0,25 
40,50 
75,1 i 
93. 
Tfesold Livestock PrO' 
ducts (family use) 
0,25,33 
- 40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25 
40,50 
75.1 
Miscellaneous 
94. Government 
Payments 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,6,0 
• 75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25 
40,50 
75,1 

9 
1949 1948 1947 1946 1945 1944 1943 1942 1941 1940 1939 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40.50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75,100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0',25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,60,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 . 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75.100 75.100 75^100 75-100 75.100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 7F,1 no 7F ion 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 <0,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75.100 75 J1 no 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 7^,100 75,100 75,100 75^1 no 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33. 0,25,33 o,::5,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33!^ 
3r0,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 -5 0,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60" 
73^100 75,100 .75,100 75,100 75^100 75,100 75 J on 75,1 no 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0 ,25,33 0,25^33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
iO,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75.100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75^100 75^100 yfijion • 75,100 7Bjinn 7fi 1 no 75 inn 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,3'3 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
10,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75.100 75.100 75.100 75,100 75,100 75j100 75^100 75 J no 75,100 75,100 7S^inn 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
to,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 -40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75.100 75,100 75.100 75,100 75,100 75.100 75-100 75.100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
^.0,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75.100 75.100 75.100 75_jjlOO 
0,25,53 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 Q,db,'66 
40,50,60 , 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 
40^50,60 
75,100 

1950 1949 1948 1947 1946 1945 1944 1943 1942 
95 „ 
Custom Work 
(Ten. Equipo) 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50^60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,2o,33 
40,50,60 
75.-100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
- 0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,3d 
40,50,60 
75,100 
96. 
Custom Work 
(L.L, Equip a) 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.160 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0, ii- L>, 00 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0 , 2 5 , Z 5  
40,50,50 
75,100 
97, 
Custom Vfork (rquip-
men t owned in common 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
) 75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
98, 
0,25.33 
40s,50',60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50^60 
75.aoo 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
•/5,I00 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
99. 
0,25,33 . 
40^50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25.,33 
40,50,60 
75^00 
0^25,33 
40, 50;, 60 
75.100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75^00 
0,25,33 
40,50„60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
0,25,33 
40,50,60 
75,100 
Cash. Rent 
lOOo Pasture 
101. Buildings 
102. Crop land 
103, 
Mnagement 
104„ Crop Decisions 
105, Livestock Itecisions 
106. Terraces 
107. V/aterwa:/s 

1949 1948 1947 1946 1945 1944 1943 1942 1S41 1940 1939 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,2o,33 . 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50^60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75 .,100 75,-100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75.100 75,100 75,100 75.100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,2C,33 0,25,35 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40, oO,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75,100 75^100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 75,100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75^00 75,100 75.aoo 75-100 75,100 75.100 75,100 75,100 75,1L0 75.100 
0,25,33 0,25,33 0^25,33 0,25,33 . 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 0,25,33 
40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50^60 40,50,60 40,50^60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 40,50,60 
75,100 75^100 75,100 75-100 75.100 75.100 75,100 75.100 75.100 75.100 75.100 

1950" 1949 1948 1947 1946 1945 1944 1943 
108, Contours 
109. Gullies 
110. Cover crops 
livery of Gi-ain 
111. Ele-vator or Crib E - C E - C E - 0 1 1 1
 o
 
E - C E - C E - C E - C 
112. Other , 
From Record 
1133 Landlord's Net 
114. Tenant's Fet 
115, L»L. ?Iet as % Ten, Hot 
116, Cropland-Pasture Eatio 

11. 
1949 1948 1947 1946 1945 1944 1943 1942 1541 1940 1939 
E - C  E - C  E ~ C  E - C  E - C  E - C  E - C  E - C  E ~ C  E - C  E - C  
-4 
oi 

Respondent ' 
Respondent's (I^L, T) 
176 
(LL, T) 
FFI-A 
Farm Hontal Research 
Iowa iState College' 
Agr. Expt Sta, Proj, 
1043 
Change Nature of change 
Date of Change 
1. IThy was change suggested? 
2. YiOio siiggested change? LL, T 
3, Did you conaider any other changes instead of this one? Yes !Jo 
"I. If other proposals ivere coiasiaered, why was this proposal accepted? 
5. Was the change satisfactory to you at the time? Yes No 
6» How well has it worked out? 
T/hy? 
7« Are there any ftirther changes you ifrould like to have in re.gard to this 
matter? 
V 8.^ Do you thinlc the (LL, T) was satisfied with this change at the time? 
Yes'- Ho 
|.t present? Yes Ho 

3. Did you oon^iicler any other chcinges instead of this ono^ y^a No 
4. If other proposals were considered, why was this proposal accjntod? 
5» Was the change satisfactory to you at the tins? Yes No 
6» How well has it worked out? 
Wliy? 
7« Are there any further changes you "would like to have in ref;ard to this 
matter? 
8# Do you thinlc the (LL, T) was satisfied vfith this change at the time? 
Yes llo 
.t present? Yes ITo 
.'f his attitude has changed, foi* what reason? 
• If this chanp;e had not been made, do you thinlc you v/ould have continued to 
ent (this farm; to this tenant)? Yes Mo 

Respondent 17.7 (LL, T) FF-lB 
Respondent's (LL, Tj • 
Farm Rental Research 
Iowa State College 
Agr. Expt Sta. Proj, 
1043 
Type, of Intervievj's j 
I. General 
1, If none of the changes in the .lease provisions or type had been mde, do 
you thinlc you would still be renting (this farmj to this tenant)? 
Yes No 
•pfiiioh change do you regard the raos-b important in pr'eserving the rental 
arrangement? 
2, Do yov; feol that the net returns have always been divided fairly in the 
past? If not, wliy? 
3. If you feel that you have received too small a share of the not returns 
in some years and too much in others, do you expect these to "average 
out" fairly over a period of years? Yes _____ No 
4» If your costs liso more than the (landlord's; tenant's) so that your 
net retwn'becomes smaller compared to the (landlord's; tenant's) 
net return, do you thinlc the rent should be adjusted? Yes DIo 
5, If your costs decline more than the (LL, T) costs decline, so that your 
net return increases in comparison to the (LL, T) net return, do you 
think the rents should be adjusted? Yes llo 
60 If the prices of things sold v/ere to advance so that (LL, T) received 
a larger share of the farm's net return, do you think rents should be 
adjusted? Yes No ' 
7» If the prices of things sold were to advance so that (LL, T) received 
a smaller share of the net returns, do you think rents should be 
adjusted? Yes No 
8. If the'crop were wholly or partially destroyed by hail, insects, or other 
causes, and assuming no change in farm prices, do you think rents should 
be adjusted? Yes No 

3. If you fool that you havo roocivod too small a al-.aro of th^* not rot\irna 
in Bom© yoara and too nuoh in others, do you oxpoot theae to "avorarje 
out" fairly over a period of years? Yea No 
4» If your coato ilao more than tho (If.ndlord's; tonant'n) oo that your 
not return'booomos smaller c^imaro!^ to the (landlord's; tei:a.".t'3) 
not rotT;rn, do you think the ri^nt aliould bo adjusted' Yoo 
5, If your costs decline noro bhan tho (LL, T) conts dooline, so that your 
not return increases in oonpariaon to the (LL, T) not return, do ycu 
think tl;o rents should bo adjusted? Yes No 
6# If the prices of things sold v.'ore to advance so that (LL, l) rccoivod 
a larfjor sliare of the farm's net return, do you think rents should be 
adjusted? Yes No 
7» If the prices of things sold were to advtince so that (LL, T) received 
a smaller share of tho net returns, do you think rents should be 
adjusted? Yes No 
8. If the"crop were wholly or partially destroyed by hail, insects, or other 
causes, and assuming no chan.i^e in farm prices, do you think ron';s should 
be adjusted? Yes No 
TThat per cent destruction do you think the tenant'should bear'before 
rents are adjusted? Crop 10, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 75, 80, TO, 
100 per cent destroyed. 
9. If the livestock enterprise on the farm v/ore unproductive becai-.se of 
disease, hog cholera. Bang's Disease, or others, do you thinl: that bho 
rent should be adjusted? Yes No 
How much loss in production should occur before rents are adjusted? 
p 
10. If the season v/ere unusually favorable and yields were above avoraro 
and . disregarding price, do you think rents should be adjusted? Yes 
No 
How h^ich above average should yields be before somo adjustment is 
made ? . ^ 

PF-IB 
.11. If the tenant must make some unusual and unexpected ejcpenditure, such as 
/ having to replant corn, do you thinlc the landlord should bear part of 
the additional expense? Yes No 
11/liat kind of additional expenses do you thinlc the landlord should share? 
If the answer to question 4 is different from answer to question 11, why? 
II# AdjvTstnents 
1. Have you been able to make stifficient adjustements in your lease to pro­
vide a satisfaotorj'- division of net returns? 
TTny not? 
2. Do you expect to change lease typos (C ~ S, S - S, Gash) in order to get 
a satisfactory share of tlie net return _____ 
3 c After the adjustment do you feel th.at the other partj' is (about as 
cooperative, less cooperative, more cooperatiTe) 
4. Miat do you think about a plan i/hereby the division of net re^burns could 
be kept fairly constant if adjustments were made for chaiises in'prices, 
costs, and production (drought, exceptionally favorable seasons, etc.) 
III. Expectations 
1. T/iTlaQn'the lease vms made, did 3'"o\i expect livestock prices to (decline, 
rise, remain the sane) for the period of tl'ie lease 
Hovr much change did you expect? % 
2, Did you expect corn and small grain prices to (decline, rise, remain the 
same) for the period of the lease. 
How much change did you expect • ^ 
3. Did you expect the prices of the things you buy for the farm to (decline, 
rise, remin the same)-for the period of the lease •» 

II* Adjustments 
1. Have you boen able to make suf.fioiant ac'Juatoments in your loase to pro­
vide a oatisfaotory division of not roturna? 
ITny not? 
2, Do you ejcpect to ohan^o leaso typna (C - S, 3 - r,, cash) in ordor to got 
a satisfactory share of tlie not return 
S. After the adj'ustmont do you fool tl»at the other partj' is (about as 
cooperative, loss oooporativo, more oooperati'.o) 
4-. What do you think about a plan i;}ieroby tho cUvioion of net returns oould 
be kept fairly constant if adjustwonts v/ere imdo for ohan.'^es in'prions, 
costs, and production (drought, e:rooptionally favorablo seasons, etc.) 
Ill* Expectations 
1« When'the lease v/aa M.de, did you erpect livestocl: prices to (decline, 
rise, ronain the sa^e) for the period of ti-.e lease 
HOT/ much change did you expect? % 
2* Did you expect corn and s::i£ill c;rain prices to (decline, rise, remin. the 
same) for the period of the lease. 
How much cb^nge did you e::peot ^ 
Did you expect the prices of tlae things you buy for the farm to (dccline, 
rise, remain the saiae) for the period of the leaae, 
Hov; much chan^^e did you expect? fe 
4« Did you expect the yields of the fam to (decline, rise, remain the sane) 
for the period of the lease. 
; Eow much cliange did you expect? ^ 
•V. Remarks 
3i 
I"' yk • 
I 
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FARM RENTAL RESEARCH 
IOTA STATE COLLEGE 
AGR EXFT STA PROJ 10U3 
For Tenants vrtio have changed farais or occupation 
Name Date of move 
Occupation 
Address 
Former Landlord 
Size of 
new farm 
Address 
FF-2 
le Reason for change; 
Tenant 
Size of farm 
Quality of farm 
•M'Better Opportunity-
Wanted to Buy ~ 
•}«-Inability to, agree 
on rental terms 
Landlord 
Better Tenant 
Assume Operation 
Rent to Relative' 
Transfer Management 
•H-Inability to agree 
on rental terms 
Sell or give 
Remarks 
2o TOio suggested change: Landlord 
Tenant 
3a What were the landlord's mimunum conditions for continuing the 
arrangement ' 
Alternatives 
To wliat extent did you offer to nEet these conditions 
\ 
Tenant Landlord 
Sizo of farm Bstter Tenant 
Apsvune Operation 
^Better Opportunity 
Quality of fam 
"Mnabillty to agree 
on rental terms 
^Wanted to Biy 
Rent to Relative 
Transfer Ivfanagenent 
*Inability to agree 
on rental terms 
Sell or give 
Remarks 
2st Vhio suggested change; Landlord 
Tenant 
What were the landlord's mimunum conditions for continuing the 
arrangement 
Alternatives 
U# To wliat extent did you offer to meet these conditions 
St What are your arrangements with your present landlord in regard to 
these suggested changes? 
6, Has the change provided a satisfactory settlement of the difficulty, 
or would you have been as well off on the old farm 
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- 2 -
7»  Cos t s  o f  mov ing !  
Expense  o f  mov ing  
Num ber  o f  days  r equ i r ed  
N umber  o f  m i l e  d r i ve n  
N umber  o f  days  t o  f i nd  f a rm  
D i d  you  ha ve  t o  pay  any  bonus  o r  p r em i um s  t o  ob t a in  f a rm  
8, l l f ha t  do  j rou  e s t i ma t e  7 / o u r  n e t  i ncome  f rom f a rming  ope ra t i ons  a f t e r  
t he  move  
Do  you  have  any  p r ob l e ms  w i th  you r  p r e sen t  l and lo rd?  
10»  D o  s^ -ou  t h i nk  t h e se  p rob l e ms  can  be  so lved  w i thou t  you r  hav ing  t o  
move  t o  ano the r  f a r m?  
l l o  Wl : a t  was  t he  n a tu r e  o f  t he  s ugges t ed  change :  
O l d  P rov a  S ugges t ed  Your  o f f e r  Cu r r en t  
Lease  l i r pe  
R e tu rn s  
Crop  
L ive s tock  
O the r  
Expe n s e s  
Labo r  
Cash  Ren t  
Fa rm  
Pas t i o r e  
Bu i l d ings  
Crop  
O the r  

10»  D o  y ou  t h ink  t he se  p rob l ems  c an  be  s o lved  w i t h o u t  y o u r  hav ing  t o  
move  t o  a io the r  f a rm?  
llo Wl )a t  was  t he  n a tu r e  o f  t h e  sugges t ed  change ;  
O ld  P rov ,  S ugge s t e d  Your  o f f e r  Cu r r en t  
Lease  Type  
Re tu r n s  
Crop  
L ive s tock  
Other 
Expens e s  
Labor 
Cash Rent 
Farm 
Pasture 
Buildings 
Crop 
Other 
Re marks ;  
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Appendix B 
IQZ 
Table 1* Tenant's Het Income, Landlord's Ket Income and Katio of land­
lord's Net Income to Total Met Income with Extrapolation for 
Assumed Cost and Prloe Changes for a Cash Rented Farm. 
Net income Landlord's net income 
Year Tenant Landlord Total as a per cent of total 
1939 3777 940 4717 19.9 
1940 4644 894 5538 16,1 
1941 9019 1411 10430 13.5 
1942 15478 2210 17688 12.5 
1943 19117 2028 21145 9,6 
1944 15099 2389 17488 13.7 
1945 13860 2574 16434 15.7 
1946 20142 2232 22574 10.0 
1947 34042 2741 S682S 7.4 
1948 ' 21348 3159 24507 13.0 
a 29482 3698 33180 11". 4 
b 15S7D 3345 18724 17.9 
^Net incomes of landlords and tenants and rates of landlord's net 
income to total assuming a 33 per oent increase in commodity prices, a 
25 per cent increase in operating oosts* and a 15 per cent increase in 
fixed costs -nith the 1948 pattern of production unchanged* 
^et incomes of landlord and tenant and ratio of landlord's net 
income to total net income assumizig a 33 per cent decrease in commodity 
prices, 25 per cent decrease in fixed costs -with no change in the 1948 
pattern of production. 
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Table 2« Texiant's Net Inoome, Landlord's Net Income and Ratio of Land-> 
lord's Net Income to Total Net Income with Extrapolation for 
Hypothetical Cost and Price Changes for a Crop-share Rented 
Farm. 
Net income 
Year Tenant Landlord 
1939 1441 1688 
1941 1345 1275 
1942 3056 1640 
1948 5257 2454 
1944 5011 2691 
1945 3263 2304 
1946 2127 2410 
1947 3693 3726 
1948 4610 4082 
1949 4937 5180 
a 6426 6958 
b 2754 3402 
— L a n d l o r d ' s  n e t  i n c o m e  
Total as a per cent of total 
3129 53.9 
2620 48.6 
4696 34.9 
7711 31.8 
7702 34.9 
5447 42.3 
4537 53.1 
7419 50.2 
8692 47.0 
10117 51.2 
1SS84 48.0 
6156 55.3 
^Net incomes of landlords and tenant and ratio of landlord's net 
incoms to total assuming a 33 per cent increase in conmodity prices^ a 
25 per cent increase in operating costs, and a 15 per cent increase in 
fixed costs with the 1948 pattern of production unchanged. 
^et incomes of landlord and tenant and ratio of landlord's net 
income to total net income assuming a SS per cent decrease in commodity 
prices, 25 per cent decrease in fixed costs with no change in the 1948 
pattern of production. 
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Table 3* Index of Livestock and Livestock Product Prices, Index of All 
Crop Prices, and Ratio of Crop Price Index to Livestock Price 
Index.®' 
Index of 
livestock and Index of Eatio of 
livestock all crop crop index 
product prices prices to livestock 
Year 1926 « 100 1926 = 100 index 
1910 67 80 119 
11 56 82 149 
12 64 95 148 
13 70 80 114 
14 71 93 131 
16 66 100 152 
16 80 107 134 
17 116 190 164 
18 135 195 144 
19 143 186 130 
1920 123 185 150 
21 77 74 96 
22 80 81 101 
23 78 102 131 
24 80 122 153 
25 99 131 132 
26 100 100 100 
27 94 113 120 
28 99 121 122 
29 101 114 US 
19S0 86 101 117 
31 60 66 110 
32 42 40 95 
33 40 47 118 
34 49 90 IBS 
35. 78 108 138 
S6 79 105 130 
37 86 128 149 
38 73 63 86 
39 68 62 91 
^Data computed from B. French and W, Chryst, Prices affecting Iowa 
farmers, 1910-1949. Ames, Dept. of Econ. and Soc«, lova State College* 
1950* cMimeo. rept.3 
Table S. (continued). 
Index of 
livestock and Index of Eatio of 
livestock all crop crop index 
product prices prices . to livestock 
Tear 1926 • 100 1926 s 100 index 
1940 68 77 115 
41 90 87 97 
42 115 112 99 
43 130 142 109 
44 123 158 128 
45 131 156 119 
46 156 192 123 
47 202 261 129 
46 214 264 123 
49 179 178 99 
1950 186 198 106 
186 
Table 4, Index of Taxes, Iiidex of Farm Prloes, Hatlo of Index of Farm 
Prices to Index of Taxes 
Index of Ratio of 
all farm Index of farm price 
prices taxes index to 
Year 1926 = 100 1926 • 100 taxes 
1910 69 29 238 
11 60 34 176 
12 69 36 191 
IS 71 49 145 
14 75 49 153 
15 71 53 134 
16 84 56 150 
17 128 65 197 
18 145 67 216 
19 152 83 183 
1920 133 96 139 
21 76 105 72 
22 80 110 73 
23 82 110 75 
24 86 108 80 
25 105 101 104 
26 100 100 100 
27 97 99 98 
28 102 101 101 
29 103 106 97 
1930 88 109 81 
31 61 99 62 
32 41 89 46 
33 41 79 52 
34 56 74 76 
35 83 82 101 
36 83 85 98 
37 93 87 107 
38 72 87 83 
39 67 92 72 
^Data oomputed from B* French and W, Chryst* Prloes affeotlng Iowa 
fanners, 1910*1949« Ames, Dept. of Econ* and Soo., Iowa State College. 
1950. C Hlmeo, rept.^? 
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Table 4. (oontinued). 
Index of Ratio of 
all farm Index of farm price 
prioes taxes index to 
Year 1926 = 100 1926 = 100 taxes 
1940 69 87 79 
41 90 87 103 
42 116 84 138 
43 132 87 152 
44 128 90 142 
45 135 103 131 
46 163 110 148 
47 211 125 169 
48 222 139 159 
49 178 
1950 192 
188 
Table 5, Index of All Farm Prices, Index of Production Costs, and Ratio 
Index of All Farm Prices to Index of Production Costs.®' 
Index of Index of Ratio of 
all farm production farm prices 
prices costs index to prod 
Year 1926 = 100 1926 = 100 cost index 
1910 69 66 105 
11 60 65 92 
12 69 69 100 
13 71 72 99 
14 75 74 101 
15 71 75 95 
16 84 83 101 
17 128 107 120 
18 145 125 116 
19 152 133 114 
1920 133 130 102 
21 76 97 78 
22 80 92 87 
23 82 92 89 
24 86 94 91 
25 105 99 106 
26 100 100 100 
27 97 102 95 
28 102 106 96 
29 103 104 99 
1930 88 96 91 
31 61 81 75 
32 41 72 56 
33 41 70 58 
34 56 79 71 
35 83 88 94 
36 83 88 94 
37 93 94 99 
38 72 90 80 
39 67 89 75 
®Data oon5>uted from B, French and W. Chryst. Prices affecting Iowa 
farmer, 1910-1949* Ames, Dept. of Soon, and Soc*, lo'wa State College. 
1950. c Mimeo. rept.3 
189 
Table 5, (continued). 
Index of Index of Batio of 
all farm production farm prices 
prices costs index to prod, 
Year 1926 « 100 1926 s 100 cost index 
1940 69 89 78 
41 90 99 91 
42 116 114 102 
43 132 124 106 
44 128 126 102 
45 135 128 105 
46 163 144 113 
47 211 185 114 
48 222 201 110 
49 178 197 90 
1950 192 209 92 
150 
Tabl« 6* Index of Avenge Cash Rent Per Aore, Index of All Para Prloes 
and Ratio of Cash Rant Index to Farm Price Index (1919-1950).^ 
Index of Index of Ratio index of 
cash rent farm prices oaah rent to index 
Tear 1926 « 100 1926 » 100 of farm prices 
1960 188 
49 147 178 85 
48 158 222 62 
47 129 211 61 
46 114 165 70 
1945 112 155 85 
44 109 128 85 
45 99 152 75 
42 90 116 78 
41 82 90 91 
1940 79 69 114 
59 77 67 115 
58 76 77 105 
57 74 95 80 
56 74 85 89 
1955 67 85 81 
54 65 56 116 
55 57 41 159 
52 80 41 195 
51 97 61 159 
1950 101 88 115 
29 105 105 100 
28 101 102 99 
27 101 97 104 
26 100 100 100 
1925 98 105 95 
24 97 86 115 
25 96 82 117 
22 80 
21 76 
1920 155 
19 152 
^Data oonputed from B. French and W. Chryst* Prices affecting lomi 
fanners, 19lO"1949, Ames, Dept* of Soon* and Soo*, Iowa State College. 
1950* P Mineo* rept.rx 
ISl 
Table 7. Coefficients of Correlation of Deviations from Second Degree 
Polynomial Fitted to Rent Index with Deviations from Second 
Degree Polynomial Fitted to Price Index - Price Deviations 
Lagged up to Five Years. 
Lag Correlation 
(years) coefficients 
0 .416^ 
1 .732^ 
2 .712^ 
3 .517^ 
4 .050 
5 - .230 
®'Significant at the one per cent level# 
^Significant at the five per cent level. 
192 
Table 8. Nvnaber of Farm Records San^jled, Sum of Net Incomes of Farms, 
Sum of Landlords' Net Incomes and Ratio of Sum of Landlords' 
Net Incomes to Farm Net Incomes - Cash Rented Farms, 1920-
1950. 
Sum of Sum of Sum of landlords' Estimated 
H-umber net incomes landlords' net income as a standard 
in all farms net income per cent of fairm error of 
Year sample in sample in sample net income ratio®^ 
1950 10 $98,732 $13,715 13.89 8.62 
49 10 53,733 8,059 14.99 
48 10 72,958 15,234 20.88 
47 10 118,363 13,158 11.11 
46 10 102,500 13,805 13.46 
1945 10 70,483 14,327 20.33 9.48 
44 10 63,199 12,046 19.06 
43 10 68,831 7j703 11.19 
42 10 81,563 9,497 11.64 
41 10 52,198 9,109 17.45 
1940 10 38,344 9,258 24.14 11.70 
39 10 22,205 5,013 22.58 
38 10 24,458 8,271 33.81 
37 10 25,954 9,721 37.45 
36 10 30,605 5,044 16.48 
1935 10 29,480 6,278 21.29 11.00 
34 10 27,321 5,924 21.68 
33 10 17,573 4,602 26.18 
32 10 - 1,011 5,371 b 
31 10 -12,873 8,654 b 
1930 10 15,511 9,803 63.20 39.87 
29 10 30,666 7,073 23.06 
28 10 44,083 12,240 27.76 
27 10 33,045 12,049 36.46 
26 10 30,852 6,362 20.62 
^Computed from formula, v/i) s 100^i] /fy • ffL - H »y \ , 
*y' yx / 
Raymond J. Jessen. Statistical investigation of a saiaple suirrey for ob­
taining farm facts* Iowa Agr. HIxp* Sta. 5ul* 304. 1942. p* 2 6 ,  
Negative. 
!rable 8. (continued). 
Sum of Sum of Sum of landlords' Estimated 
Number net incomes landlords* net income as a standard 
in all farms net income per cent of farm error of 
Year sample in sample in sample net income ratio® 
1926 10 39,978 10,779 26.96 25.18 
24 10 28,410 8,94S 31.48 
25 10 16,776 10,746 64.05 
22 10 27,834 5,355 19.24 
21 7 6,549 3,768 59.34 
1920 6 - 5,160 5,808 
®'Coniputed from formula, , . /s ^  s ^ 
Vfll « 100^ 
V y | \ ^  y x  /  
Baymond J. Jeesen* Statistical investigation of a sample survey for ob­
taining farm facts* Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Bui* 304. 1942* p* 26. 
"nible 9« Number of Farm Reoords Sampled« Sum of Net Incomes of Farms, 
Sum of Landlords' Net Inoomes and Satio of Sum of Landlords' 
Net Incomes to Total Net Inoome - Crop-share Rented Farms, 
1920-1060. 
Sum of Sum of Sum of landlords' Estimated 
Number net incomes landlords' net income as a standard 
in all farms net inoome per oent of farm error of 
Year sample in sample in sample net Inoome ratio®* 
1950 10 $106,511 ^44,004 41.31 12.24 
49 10 60,576 31,771 52.45 
48 10 80,487 40,103 49.82 
47 10 170,317 47,996 28.18 
46 10 93,998 32,268 34.33 
1945 10 41,659 19,429 46.64 18.73 
44 10 69,936 32,494 46.46 
43 10 75,980 32,571 42.87 
42 10 92,258 31,668 34.32 
41 10 67,682 24,965 36.88 
1940 10 38,134 13,785 36.15 9.85 
S9 10 45,216 17,035 37.67 
88 10 26,148 10.809 41.34 
57 10 31,392 12,520 39,88 
36 10 29,283 12,301 42.01 
1935 10 30,508 9,888 32.41 8.19 
34 10 38,810 8,470 21.82 
33 10 25,363 7,529 29.68 
32 10 - 788 1,903 b 
31 10 3,162 7jl84 227.19 
1930 10 17,444 9,260 53.08 17.72 
29 10 30,072 11,381 37.84 
28 6 18,150 7,013 38.64 
27 7 18,890 5,699 30.17 
26 6 29,859 9,427 31.57 
1925 2 5,786 991 17.12 7.28 
24 7 17,675 9,471 53.58 
23 10 19,401 8,585 44.25 
22 3 8,880 2,503 28.18 
21 9 9,746 13,135 134.70 
1920 6 11,151 14,682 131.66 
^ox^)uted in the same manner as in Table 8. 
^Negative* 
IDP 
IDable 10* Umber of Farm Rooords Sampled, Sum of Het Incomes of Faz>m8, 
Sum of Landlords' Net Incomes and Ratio of Sum of Landlords' 
Hot Incomes to Farm Het Income - Stock-share Rented Farms, 
1922-1950. 
Sum of Sum of Sum of landlords' Estimated 
Number net incomes landlords' net income as a standard 
in all farms net income per cent of farm error of 
Year sample in sample in sample net income ratio^ 
1950 10 #130,762 168,378 52.29 3.28 
49 10 62,838 33,619 53.49 
48 10 111,567 66,049 59.20 
47 10 136,873 75,379 50.85 
46 10 135,870 69,943 51.48 
1945 10 60,810 27,099 44.56 7.88 
44 10 47,037 21,137 44.93 
4S 10 56,051 26,068 46.51 
42 10 105,769 53,155 49.53 
41 10 74j711 38,602 51.66 
1940 10 41,347 17,894 43.28 7.76 
39 10 32,827 14,102 42.96 
38 10 23,077 9,774 42.35 
37 10 9,610 5,535 57.60 
36 10 32i872 15,720 47.82 
1935 10 29,679 15,614 52.61 4.78 
34 10 46,927 20,405 43.48 
33 10 22,104 9,135 41.33 
32 10 -10,466 - 6,227 59.61^ 
31 10 -13,975 - 5,723 40,95^ 
1930 10 18,451 10,899 59.07 6.31 
29 10 27,423 12,911 47.08 
28 10 33,984 15,139 44.55 
27 10 39,511 15,436 39.07 
26 10 30,342 9^940 32.76 
1925 8 43,693 19,130 43.78 5.07 
24 10 31,033 11,401 36.73 
23 5 6,839 590 8.63 
22 3 9,257 3,972 42.91 
®<;on5)uted in the same manner as the standard errors appearing in 
Table 8. 
^Landlords' share of net loss* 
Table 11. Stock-share Landlords' Share of Net Farm Income and Total 
Fixed and Operating Costs - 1939 through 1950. 
Landlords* share 
Fixed and operating 
Year llet income expense 
1950 52.6 39.4 
49 53.5 40.1 
48 59.2 28.5 
47 55.1 34.8 
46 51.5 44.5 
1945 44.6 39.7 
44 44.9 40.1 
43 46.5 40.7 
42 49.5 43.2 
41 51.6 41.9 
1940 43.2 52.3 
39 42.9 44.2 
jf'T 
C • Appejodix C 
Table !• Changes in Lease lype Uade by Members of the Iowa Farm Business 
Assooiatlons In the Periods 1940-1946 and 1947-1950. 
Cash Crop-share Stock-share 
Period To From Grain To From Gain To From Gain 
1947-1960 24 22 2 37 22 15 7 24 -17 
1940-1946 39 20 19 32 33 -1 9 27 
CO 1—
i 
1 
Table 2« Changes In Forms of Tenancy In lona Between 1945 and 1950 as 
Given by TJ« S* Census Data*^ 
Type of tenancy 
Share- Share and 
All Cash cash cropper Other 
Per cent change -12.1 -39.8 50.9 -54.8 -23.7 
S. Censust 1950, Preliminary Releases. Farm, farm character­
istics, farm products. State of lovra and all counties. (42000-42099) 
series AC50-1. 1951. 
Table 3. Date, Origin, Cause of Change from Cash Rent, and AlteruatiTes Considered to Change 
as Given by Tenants. 
Respondent 
Date of 
change Sussested by Reason 
Alternatives 
considered 
T-S9 
T-16 
T-36 
1948 
1947 
1949 
Landlord 
Landlord 
Landlord 
Increased prices 
and costs 
Increased prices 
and costs 
Increased prices 
and costs 
None 
None 
Increased 
cash rent 
Table 4» Satiafaotion of Parties with Change from Cash Rexifc 
Respondent 
Chanp;e satisfactory 
at initiation 
Work out 
successfully Reason 
Other 
party 
satisfied 
Change 
critical to 
relationship 
T-S9 
.T-16 
T-36 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Cash rent re- Yes 
mained low 
Landlord's share Yes 
too large 
Main income from Yes 
livestock, not 
crops 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Table 5a. Satisfaction of Parties with Changes from Crop-share Kent to Cash and Stook-share Sent* 
Satisfaction of 
respondent 
Respondent Originally Present 
Sucoess of change 
Successful 
or 
unsuccessful Reason 
Satisfaction of 
other party change 
critical to 
Originally Present relationship 
Crop-share 
to cash 
T-8 Yes Yes Successful Prices increased, 
rent remained the 
same. 
Satisfied Satisfied No 
T-20 Yea Yes Successful Prices increased 
more than rent 
Satisfied Satisfied Ho 
T-S9 Yes Yes Moderately 
successful 
Prices increased, 
rent remained the 
same 
Satisfied Satisfied Don't 
know 
Crop-share to 
stock-share 
T-32 No No Unsuccessful Tenant's share of 
return too low 
Satisfied Satisfied Yes 
T-64 Yes No Moderately 
successful 
Tenant's share of 
return too low in 
last years of 
lease 
Satisfied Satisfied Don't 
know 
Table 5b. Date, Origin and Cause of Change from Stock-share Rent 
TyTpe of ohange 
and respondent Date 
Related to Suggested by Reason for 
landlord Landlord Tenant Other change 
Alternatives 
considered 
Stook-share to 
cash 
T-51 
T-41 
T-46 
T-48 
T-56 
T-60 
T-6S 
Stock-share to 
crop-share 
1-19 
T-46 
1947 
1948 
1945 
1949 
1944 
1947 
1949 
1941 
1949 
Tes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Adjust for 
pricey cost 
and production 
Work as hired man 
Landlord could 
no longer con­
tribute to 
isanagemetib 
Adjust for 
prices, costs 
and production 
Court order 
Adjust for 
prices and 
production 
Adjust for 
prices and costs 
purdiase of farm 
none 
none 
none 
none 
none 
Purchase of farm 
Table 6. Satisfaction of Landlords and Tenants with Change from Stock-share to Crop-share and 
Cash Kent. 
Change 
Type of change satisfactory 
and respondent at initiation 
Work out 
suooessfully Reason 
Critical 
Other party satisfied rela-
Originally Subsequently tionship 
Stock-share to cash 
T-31 Yes 
T-41 
T-45 
T-48 
T-60 
T-6S 
Yes 
Yes 
Yea 
Yes 
Yes 
Stock-share to crop-share 
T-19 Yes 
T-46 Yes 
Successful 
Successful 
Successful 
Successful 
Successful 
Successful 
Successful 
Moderately 
successful 
Prices increased 
more than rent 
Gave tenant 
larger part of 
net income 
Gave tenant a 
larger share of 
net returns 
Gave tenant 
larger share of 
net return 
Tenant was unable 
to secure livestock 
improvements unless 
crop-share lease 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Ko 
No 
Yes 
Don't 
know 
Yes 
o 
1^1)le 7. ReasonB GiTen, and AlternatiTos Considered by Tenants Changing Farms and Changing from 
a Stook-share Lease to Another Type. 
Date 
Type of change of 
and respondent change Reason for change 
Change Problems with 
considered a new landlord 
Alternatives offered by satisfactory solvable 
Landlord Tenant solution without moving 
Stock-share to cash 
T-12 1940 Stock-share rent 
too high relative 
to cash rent 
None Assume all of 
poultry 
Yes Yes 
T-20 1944 Landlord share of 
net return too high None 
Assume all 
poultry and dairy 
Yes Yes 
T-38 1945 Stock-share rent 
high relative to 
cash rent 
None Cash rent Yes Yes 
Stock-share to crop-share 
T-1 1946 Stook-share rent 
too high relative 
to ci^jp-share rent 
None Crop-share or 
all of poultry 
Yes Yes 
T-14 1950 n None All of poultry Yes Yes 
T-23 1943 n None Crop-share Yes Yes 
T-S5 1944 n None None Yea Yes 
T-51 1941 « None Crop-share Yea Yes 
"DBible 8« Reasons GlTen, and AlternatlTes Considered by Tenants Changing Farms and Changing from 
a Crop-share Lease* 
lype of change Date 
and of 
respondent change 
Reason given 
for changing 
fannB 
Alternatives offered by 
Landlord Tenant 
Solution Problema with new 
coneidered landlord solvable 
satisfactory without aoying 
Crop-share to 
cash 
T-22 1950 Inability to 
agree on 
rental terms 
Change to 
cash rent 
or increase 
share 
proportion 
Change to cash 
rent but lower 
figure than 
landlord asked 
No Ho 
Crop-share to 
stock-share 
T-4 1946 Expected 
prices to 
fall 
None 
M  
O  
cn 
Stock-share Tes Yes 
T-11 1941 Expected 
pirioes to 
fall 
None None No 8 6  
Table 9. Seasons Given and Alternatives Considered by Tenants Changing Farms and Changing from a 
Cash Type Lease. 
Change Date Reason Move provided Problems with new 
and of given for Alternatives offered by satisfactory landlord solvable 
respondent ehanf;e ehanp;inK farm Landlord Tenant solution •without moving 
Cash to 
crop-share 
T-25 1947 Landlord wanted More cash Some Increase Yes Yes ^ 
more cash rent rent in cash rent c> 
or crop-share 
Cash to 
stock-share 
T-9 1948 Landlord wanted More cash None Yes Yes 
more cash rent rent 
